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This dissertation, titled “Flexibility in European Wage Structure and its 
implications for the European Unemployment,” studies the problem of high rates of 
unemployment in Europe during the last few decades through the optic of European wage 
behavior. It examines the European wage structure – within and between European 
countries – to find out factors that drive wages and thereby, unemployment rates in 
European countries. A conventional view of European problem of high unemployment 
argues that European wages are explained by cross-country differences in certain labor 
market policies and institutions, and that the policies and institutions at the country-level 
are the principal source of the problem. This dissertation argues instead that European 
wages are explained by differences in macroeconomic performances and in levels of 
international competitiveness between countries and also between sectors within the 
countries, and by certain continental and global level factors, and that a full 
understanding of the effects of those factors is necessary to explain the European problem 
 vi
of high unemployment. By applying numerical techniques, namely a combination of 
cluster analysis and discriminant function analysis, this dissertation finds that European 
wages are driven by factors pointed out by the dissertation, which also explain the high 
rates of unemployment in Europe over the last few decades.  
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Chapter 1: Motivation and Introduction to the Dissertation 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Unemployment is a waste of human resource that reduces the aggregate output of 
an economy. It not only adversely affects the economy at an aggregate level, but also 
affects the lives of the unemployed by forcing them to incur economic, social as well as 
psychological costs. The unemployed face loss of income and a decline in their general 
well-being relative to those who are employed. Over time, unemployment erodes the 
human capital of the unemployed, and they lose the hope of being needed to participate in 
economic activities. Therefore, in public policy research, it is essential to examine the 
causes of unemployment and prescribe policies that are effective in reducing 
unemployment and making the lives of the people better.  
During the Great Depression of the 1930s, economies faced the problem of mass 
unemployment. Thereafter, from the 1950s to the early 1970s, the developed world 
experienced high growth rates combined with low levels of unemployment and stable 
inflation rates. This period of successful macroeconomic performance is described by the 
economic historian Maddison (1991) as the “Golden Age”. From the “Golden Age” until 
the oil crises of the seventies, unemployment in Europe (and other OECD1 countries) 
remained practically non-existent; since the oil crises, it increased episodically but 
persistently during the eighties and the nineties, and maintained high levels in the 2000s. 
                                                 
1 OECD refers to Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
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Evolution of high rates of unemployment in several European countries (and other 
OECD nations) during the last few decades emerged as an intractable problem and a 
leading policy-concern for academicians and policymakers as well as organizations such 
as the OECD and the IMF2. Researchers developed theoretical and empirical frameworks 
to explain the problem. Since the nineties, typical explanation shifted toward blaming the 
European welfare state – specifically, certain labor market policies and institutions – for 
the problem; the mantra for reducing European unemployment became rolling back the 
European welfare state by reforming labor market policies and institutions.  
Unemployment rates that were low in the past became intractable in the years 
after 1973. This intractability indicates failure on the part of policy-making. Over the 
years, reforming labor market policies and institutions has not proven to be effective in 
keeping unemployment rates at low levels, or, reducing the higher rates in European and 
other OECD countries. Since in the field of public policy, research should be directed 
toward areas where past policies have proven to be ineffective, this dissertation studies 
the problem of European unemployment.  
Policy recommendations to reform labor market policies and institutions for 
reducing unemployment in Europe rely on a huge volume of empirical studies. Although 
huge in volume, these studies lack diversity in their general theoretical and 
methodological approaches. These studies assume that in European countries, labor 
market policies and institutions make wages rigid and thereby, increase unemployment 
rates. In their general methodological approach, these studies exclusively focus on 
                                                 
2 IMF refers to the International Monetary Fund organization. 
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country-level analysis – examining the effects of country-specific policies and institutions 
on country-specific unemployment (or some measure of employment) rates. Also, these 
studies use similar or identical data measures of the policies and institutions that are well-
known for their poor quality and unreliability; as a result, their findings lack robustness 
even across minor changes in model specification. In spite of these fundamental 
problems, these studies dominate both the mainstream academia and the policy field. 
This dissertation reviews the fundamental problems associated with the existing 
empirical studies on European problem of high unemployment. This dissertation 
develops and employs an entirely different approach to studying the problem of high 
unemployment. This dissertation recognizes that European countries are economically 
interdependent, and hence, the sources of their unemployment-problem are not confined 
within each country, but may span across their national borders. Therefore, this 
dissertation focuses on searching for sources beyond the borders – transnational sources. 
For the search, this dissertation first departs from the country-level approach of the 
existing studies and employs a continental-level approach. In its approach, it examines 
European wage behavior, by treating European countries as integrated, and searches for 
factors explaining the behavior to draw implications for European problem of high 
unemployment. The continental-level examination of European wage behavior of this 
dissertation is conducted by using a couple of numerical methodological tools in an 
innovative manner to account for certain important aspects, which have been overlooked 
by existing studies in explaining European problem of high unemployment. 
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1.2 GENERAL APPROACH OF CROSS-COUNTRY EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
Empirical studies that dominate the economic literature on Europe’s high 
unemployment problem perform country-level analysis from a microeconomic 
perspective.  These studies posit that the sources of the problem lie with each country’s 
certain “employment-unfriendly” labor market policies and institutions, which make 
labor markets – wages – rigid (Scarpetta, 1996; Nickell, 1997; Elmeskov et al., 1998; 
IMF, 2003; Belot and van Ours, 2004; Nickell et al., 2005; Baccaro and Rei, 2005; 
Bassanini and Duval, 2006; Griffith et al, 2007; Fiori et al. 2007; Rovelli and Bruno, 
2008), particularly unable to adjust approximately to macroeconomic and supply-side 
shocks (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Bertola et al., 2001; Fitoussi et al., 2000), and 
hence,  raise the unemployment rates. The underlying hypothesis of this explanation is 
popularly known as the labor market flexibility (LMF) hypothesis, and the researchers 
advocating this hypothesis are called LMF theorists. The theoretical basis of this 
hypothesis resides in classical and neoclassical economic principles. In order to reduce 
unemployment in Europe, the LMF theorists prescribe flexibilization of wages (and the 
labor market) by reforming labor market policies and institutions in the form of cutting 
down minimum wages, reducing or eliminating unemployment benefits and the strictness 
of employment protection legislation and weakening the bargaining powers of trade 
unions. In other words, the LMF theorists prescribe deregulation of the labor market so 
that the determination of wage and employment levels is left with the fates of the labor 
market supply and demand forces. In the recent years, some LMF theorists have also 
prescribed deregulating the product market in order to facilitate labor market 
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deregulation, and to reduce unemployment in general (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2005; 
Griffith et al, 2007; Fiori et al. 2007).  
The general empirical approach of studies advocating the LMF hypothesis is  
performing cross-country econometric analysis for the estimation of the effects of various 
labor market policies and institutions on the unemployment (or some measure of the 
employment) rate across European (and other OECD) countries. The LMF theorists 
consider labor market policies and institutions such as the unemployment benefits 
entitlement, the duration of benefits, the unemployment benefits replacement rate, 
employment protection legislation, union density, union coverage, the centralization and 
coordination of wage bargaining, and the tax wedge to be “employment-unfriendly”, that 
is, increasing unemployment. They consider active labor market policies to be 
“employment-friendly”, enhancing employment. Therefore, in their empirical models, the 
LMF theorists hypothesize to find a negative effect of the active policies on the 
unemployment rate and a positive effect in case of each of the “employment-unfriendly” 
policies and institutions. 
In the estimation of effects of policies and institutions on unemployment (or 
employment) rate, studies focus not only on estimating the direct effects of policies and 
institutions, but also on estimating the effects of changes in policies and institutions over 
time, the combined effects of two different policies and institutions, the combined effects 
of policies and institutions with economic shocks, the combined effects of the changes in 
policies and institutions over time with the shocks, and the combined effects of the labor 
policies and institutions with product market policies and institutions. In general, the 
 6
studies mainly focus on the effects of labor market policies and institutions in one form 
or the other, which indicates a lack of diversity in their general approach.  
Many theorists criticize the empirical studies of the LMF theorists for using low 
quality data measures of labor market policies and institutions in their analyses, and also, 
for some methodological problems associated with their analyses (Akerlof et al., 2000; 
Arestis and Mariscal, 2000; Atkinson, 2001; Baker et al. 2004; Baker et al. 2005; 
Garcilazo, 2005; Galbraith, 2006; Howell et al., 2007; Oswald, 1997; Mitchell, 2003). 
The labor market policies and institutions, whose data measures are generally used for 
analysis, are highly qualitative in nature, incorporating intricate designs and structures. 
Although LMF theorists and the OECD (Layard et al. 1991, 1994; Nickell, 1997; 
Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Belot and van Ours, 2004; OECD, 2006) have devoted 
considerable efforts to constructing and improving the measures over time, the accuracy 
of the measures to represent their actual counterparts remains dubious, even under 
generous assumptions of objectivity. And, in spite of profound criticisms, the use of the 
measures remains popular. 
Besides the studies advocating the LMF hypothesis, there exists a small group of 
studies which examine the European high unemployment problem from a 
macroeconomic perspective (Solow, 1994; Baker and Schmitt, 1999; Palley 2001, 2004; 
Galbraith and Garcilazo, 2004; Garcilazo, 2005; Arestis and Sawyer, 2006; Galbraith, 
2006). These studies blame the anti-inflationary and demand-constrained policy choices 
made by European countries in the seventies and the eighties, and the similar policy 
choices adopted by European countries in the late 1980s and 1990s to enter the European 
Union (EU), followed by the adoption of the euro for the problem. The underlying 
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hypothesis of these studies is known as the macroeconomic policy (MP) hypothesis3, 
which relies on Keynesian theory. Advocates of the MP hypothesis call for sustained 
expansionary macroeconomic policies in European countries to lower their 
unemployment rates.  
Majority of the empirical studies advocating the MP hypothesis perform cross-
country analysis in which they estimate the effects of country-specific macroeconomic 
variables such as GDP, interest rate, inflation rate, and variables measuring economic 
interdependence, such as exposure to international trade, on country-specific 
unemployment (or employment) rates. Some of these studies also, incorporate labor 
market policies and institutions in their empirical models to show that the estimated 
effects of the policies and institutions on unemployment are not robust; and, for this, 
these studies use poor data measures of the policies and institutions. Garcilazo (2005) 
however, captures the effects of labor market policies and institutions, without using the 
poor quality measures. In a two-way fixed-effects panel regression model, he controls for 
the effects of country-specific labor market policies and institutions by country-fixed 
effects. And, his findings do not support the LMF hypothesis, but the MP hypothesis. 
1.3 GENERAL APPROACH OF THE DISSERTATION 
In the context of the study of European unemployment, the basic proposition of 
LMF theorists is that countries with stricter labor market policies and institutions should 
have more rigid wages, and thereby, higher rates of unemployment, than the countries 
                                                 
3 Palley (2001, 2004) calls this hypothesis the “macroeconomic policy” hypothesis. 
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with less stricter ones. Stated differently, this proposition implies that differences in 
relative wage rigidities – due the differing effects of cross-country labor market policies 
and institutions – across European countries explain the cross-country differences in 
unemployment rates. Here, relative wage rigidities imply that countries with similar labor 
market policies and institutions experience similar changes in wages over time and hence, 
less or no variations in relative wages across them, and countries with dissimilar labor 
market policies and institutions face dissimilar wage changes, and hence, greater 
variations in relative wages across them. The foundation of the LMF theorists’ 
proposition can be attributed to their shared a priori commitment to viewing European 
countries and their labor markets as separate and autonomous entities – one country, one 
labor market –, unaffected by changes taking place elsewhere. But in reality, European 
countries are not separate; they are economically integrated and interdependent and have 
been so for a long time.  
This dissertation argues that economic interdependence between European 
countries is one fact, which when taken into consideration, can generate meaningful 
implications for the European problem of high unemployment. The reason for this is that, 
due to interdependence, effects of changes taking place in one country spill over to other 
countries. When one European country experiences changes in certain policies (such as 
changes in tax rates or government expenditure or interest rates) or changes in 
macroeconomic variables (such as investment, exports, imports),  employment and wage 
levels of that country changes due to a direct effect and that of other countries change due 
to transmitted or indirect effects. Due to the differing rates of policy-induced or 
endogenous changes in macroeconomic variables across the countries, the employment 
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and wage levels of the countries fluctuate differently, leading to variations in the relative 
employment and wage levels between them.  Apart from the effects of country-specific 
policies or macroeconomic variables, changes in continental or global environment (such 
as fluctuations in bilateral exchange rate or an oil price shock or a global financial crisis) 
also affect the interdependent economies and their employment and wage levels, leading 
relative employment and wage levels to vary across countries. This dissertation names 
the variables that depict policies or macroeconomic variables of one country relative to 
that of the other or the variables related to the continental and global environment as 
transnational variables. These variables may take forms such as relative investment, 
relative taxes, relative exports, world crude oil price, bilateral exchange rate, and relative 
migration rate. This dissertation argues that because of the interdependence between 
European countries, a better and more meaningful explanation of European cross-country 
differences in unemployment rates requires taking account of the effects of transnational 
variables. Therefore, this dissertation shifts from the LMF theorists’ country-level 
approach and takes a pan-European or continental-level approach to capture the effects of 
transnational variables on European unemployment. 
Variability in relative wages across European countries, led by transnational 
variables, implies the presence of relative wage flexibilities across the countries. 
Countries with similar labor market policies and institutions may face dissimilar changes 
in their wages due to the effects of transnational factors, and hence, variations in the 
relative wages between them, or to say, relative wage flexibilities between them. LMF 
theorists, who exclusively focus on relative wage rigidities, neglect these flexibilities 
because they do not look for sources affecting relative wages and relative unemployment 
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rates beyond the frontiers of each nation. But, as discussed above, if European countries 
are viewed as integrated economies, relative wages flexibilities may be found between 
the countries and these flexibilities, and thereby, variations in relative employment or 
unemployment rates across the countries may be explained by transnational variables. 
Therefore, to determine whether high rates of European unemployment is explained by 
labor market policy and institutional variables or by transnational variables, this 
dissertation examines the nature of European wage structure across integrated Europe and 
checks whether there exists relative wage rigidities or flexibilities. This dissertation tests 
the nature of the European wage structure, or, stated differently, the nature of relative 
wages in Europe, without imposing any theoretical preconditions – employing an 
atheoretic approach – and allowing the wage data to reveal how the relative wages 
actually behave in Europe. This atheoretic approach is unlike that of the LMF theorists in 
which it is a priori assumed that labor market policies and institutions make wages rigid. 
From the study of European wage structure, this dissertation answers its first research 
question that is: What is the nature of European wage structure over time? How rigid or 
flexible is it?   
This dissertation constructs a continental-level data set of annual rate of change of 
average wage for 255 European country-sectors (sectors of European countries) from 
multiple data sets of remuneration and employment of fifteen sectors of seventeen 
European countries to test the nature of European wage structure. For this test, the 
continental-level data set is subjected to cluster analysis and discriminant function 
analysis (DFA), which firstly group the 255 country-sectors into one or more clusters on 
the basis of maximum similarities (and dissimilarities) in their average wage changes 
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over time, followed by discriminating maximally between the clusters. Therefore, 
country-sectors showing similar patterns of average wage changes or similar wage 
behaviors over time cluster together, while those displaying dissimilar behaviors form 
separate clusters. The analyses are performed multiple times on progressively smaller sets 
of the original set of 255 country-sectors to take account of maximum possible patterns of 
similarities (or dissimilarities) in average wage changes that persist across the country-
sectors. Cluster structures, obtained from the analyses, render testing the LMF hypothesis 
without the necessity of using the poor quality data measures of policies and institutions. 
This is because, if countries (and their sectors) with similar labor market structures (say 
the Nordic countries, which have similar labor market policies and institutional structures 
defined by Nordic social policy model, or the Continental countries, which have similar 
labor market policies and institutional structures defined by Continental social policy 
model) cluster together, it indicates that the countries display similar patterns of wage 
movements over time because of their similar labor market structures, supporting the 
LMF hypothesis. Therefore, if clustering supports the LMF hypothesis, it implies that 
relative wages are rigid across European countries and the problem of unemployment 
may be attributed to labor market policies and institutions. However, if clustering does 
not reveal any meaningful pattern, nothing is implied about the nature of relative wages 
and thereby, about fluctuations in European unemployment rates. And, if clustering 
reveals patterns that do not confirm the LMF hypothesis, but seem meaningful, it 
indicates that relative wages are flexible across the clusters, which may be explained by 
transnational factors as argued by this dissertation. 
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After the test of the European wage structure, this dissertation searches for the 
variables explaining the relative wage behaviors across European country-sectors. In case 
the test indicates relative wage flexibilities to persist across clusters, this dissertation 
develops a methodology to identify whether or not transnational factors explain the 
flexibilities. For this, it extends the DFA from the test of over-time European wage 
structure, and develops another analysis to search for transnational sources that may 
explain the flexibilities. It selects a set of macroeconomic, demographic and labor market 
variables, which theoretically affect wages and employment rates, and uses the variables 
to construct multiple transnational variables, which theoretically explain variations in 
relative wages and employment rates across countries. The transnational variables are 
then subjected to a kind of forensic analysis and tested for their degree of associations 
with the relative wage flexibilities across clusters. The study of European wage structure, 
and the search for sources that may explain relative wage rigidities or flexibilities 
observed in the wage structure answers the second research question of this dissertation, 
which is: What are the factor(s) that lead to flexibility (or rigidity) in European wage 
structure? In case of observed relative wage flexibilities in European wage structure, 
once transnational variables displaying high and significant associations with the relative 
wage flexibilities are identified, theoretical arguments are used to explain why and how 
those variables explain variations in relative employment (or unemployment) rates across 
European countries. Therefore, from the test of the nature of relative wages and the 
search for the sources explaining the nature, this dissertation answers its final research 
question that is: Why and how do the factor(s) that lead to flexibility (or rigidity) in 
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European wage structure explain the evolution of unemployment in European economies 
during the last few decades? 
This dissertation takes an approach different from that of the cross-country 
studies, and investigates the relationship between relative wage variations (rigidities or 
flexibilities) and changes in unemployment rates. With this approach, the goal of this 
dissertation is to better understand the evolution of high and differential rates of 
unemployment across European countries during the last few decades. 
1.4 OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION 
The second chapter of this dissertation presents a review of facts, theories, and 
empirical studies and their shortcomings associated with the evolution of European 
unemployment since the last few decades. The third chapter provides the logic behind 
studying the nature of European wage structure for drawing implications for the 
European problem of high unemployment. The fourth chapter constructs a continental-
level data set and uses it for testing the nature of the European wage structure. This 
chapter also describes cluster analysis and discriminant function analysis that are used for 
the test, and reports the findings from the test. The fifth chapter extends the previous 
chapters’ analyses and searches for transnational factors that may explain the nature of 
the European wage structure. After identifying the factors, this chapter explains 
theoretically why and how the factors also explain the fluctuations of unemployment 
rates across European countries and Europe as a whole. The sixth chapter presents the 
general findings of this dissertation and prescribes a series of policy recommendations to 
reduce European unemployment.   
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Chapter 2:  Literature Review 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter reviews the economic literature on European problem of high 
unemployment of recent decades. Section 2.2 of this chapter presents the empirical facts 
concerning the evolution of unemployment in European countries over the last few 
decades. Section 2.3 presents various theories of unemployment and their explanations of 
wage behavior, which are employed by researchers in explaining the causes of high rates 
of European unemployment. Section 2.4 presents a review of changes in Europe’s 
macroeconomic environment, and thereby, shifts in theoretical explanations of Europe’s 
high unemployment problem since the 1970s. Section 2.5 reviews some empirical studies 
that blame labor market – wage – inflexibility brought by the characteristics and defects 
of certain country-specific labor market policies and institutions for Europe’s 
unemployment problem. This argument of the studies is based on a hypothesis called the 
labor market flexibility (LMF) hypothesis. Studies advocating this hypothesis dominate 
the economic literature on European high unemployment problem. Section 2.6 reviews 
some empirical studies by a smaller group of researchers who hold bad macroeconomic 
policy choices made by European countries in the last few decades responsible for their 
high unemployment problem. Section 2.7 discusses the shortcomings of the empirical 
studies that advocate the LMF hypothesis. Section 2.8 introduces the idea of studying 
Europe’s high unemployment problem from a pan-European perspective, and looking 
beyond the national frontiers for the sources of the problem, which are largely ignored by 
studies dominating the literature on the problem.  
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2.2 EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN UNEMPLOYMENT – EMPIRICAL FACTS 
Unemployment in Europe was very low from the end of the Second World War 
until the first oil crisis in 1973. It started rising after the crisis and continued to increase 
in the eighties and the nineties, displaying considerable heterogeneity across European 
countries. In recent years, unemployment rates in some European countries have 
stabilized relative to the past two decades, but even today unemployment remains the 
greatest policy-concern of Europe.  
Several countries of Europe experienced very high rates of unemployment over 
the past few decades. Table A.2.1 presents the five-year average rate of unemployment 
from 1960 to 2004, and the annual unemployment rate from 2005 to 2007 for seventeen 
European countries and the United States[4][5]. It can be observed from the table that 
during the five-year periods 1960-64, 1965-69 and 1970-74, unemployment rates were 
low in European countries. After the first oil crisis of 1973, during the period 1975-79, 
Ireland’s average unemployment rate went above 8 percent and the average 
unemployment rates of a number of European countries such as Belgium, Denmark, 
Spain, and Portugal crossed 6 percent. In 1980-84, after the second oil crisis of 1979, 
there was a sharp rise in the average unemployment rates of most of the European 
countries. The average unemployment rates of Denmark, France, Italy, and UK exceeded 
                                                 
4 Unemployment rate is defined as the number of unemployed persons as a percentage of total labor force. 
Total labor force includes civilian labor force as well as labor force employed in the armed forces. This 
definition of unemployment rate (unemployed, civilian labor force, total labor force) conforms to the 
International Labor Organization’s guidelines. Under the guidelines, persons of working age who, in a 
specified period, are without work and are both available for and are actively seeking work are defined as 
unemployed. The data on unemployment rate are collected from household labor force surveys.  
5 The unemployment rate presented in the table A.2.1 represents the number of unemployed persons as a 
percentage of civilian labor force. 
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8 percent, while that of Belgium, Ireland, and the Netherlands crossed 10 percent. During 
that period, Spain experienced an average unemployment rate above 15 percent. From the 
1980s until the end of the 1990s, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, 
and UK experienced very high average unemployment rates. Since 2000, the high 
average rates of unemployment stabilized for many European nations, but the rates still 
remain at much higher levels compared to the levels of the sixties and the seventies. In 
2007, Germany, Greece, Spain, and Portugal experienced unemployment rates above 8 
percent, Belgium above 7 percent and Italy, Finland, and Sweden above 6 percent. 
France’s rate of unemployment in 2007 is not yet provided by the source of data, but in 
2006 the rate was above 9 percent. 
Compared to European countries, the US’s experience of unemployment has been 
quite modest since 1960, which is evident from Table A.2.1. Like European countries, 
before the oil crises, the US’s average rate of unemployment was low. After the first 
crisis, it went above 7 percent and after the second one, it crossed 8 percent. But after the 
mid of the 1980s, average unemployment rate of the United States remained closer to 6 
percent till the mid of the 1990s, and since 1995 till 2007, it stabilized at rates closer to 5 
percent. It is also evident from Figure B.2.1, which displays the annual trends of 
standardized unemployment rates6 of seventeen European countries and the United States 
from 1970 to 2008 (first two quarters of 2008), that over the years the United States has 
performed better in terms of employment than many European nations. 
                                                 
6 Standardized unemployment rate (the OECD’s definition) is defined as the number of unemployed 
persons as a percentage of the civilian labor force. The OECD calculates it by adjusting each nation’s data 
on unemployment to a common conceptual ground in order to provide a better basis for international 
comparison of unemployment rates. 
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Theorists advocating the labor market flexibility (LMF) hypothesis describe that 
actual unemployment is composed of cyclical unemployment7 and structural 
unemployment8. They hold that macroeconomic policies are only effective in reducing 
the cyclical part, but not the structural one. Structural unemployment, which arises from 
structural factors of an economy such as demographic composition of the labor force, 
labor market policies and institutions, and not by cyclical factors, they say can only be 
reduced by structural reforms. The theorists say that changes in the structural 
unemployment rate component represent changes in long-run equilibrium unemployment 
rate, which they represent by theoretical concepts of long-run equilibrium unemployment 
rate such as natural rate of unemployment (NRU) or non-accelerating inflation rate of 
unemployment (NAIRU)9 (OECD, 1994b, Chap.2, pg.66). Since both NRU and NAIRU 
are theoretical concepts, they lack direct measures. Therefore, the theorists use theoretical 
constructs of NRU or NAIRU as proxy measures of the structural unemployment rate. 
In the context of European unemployment, theorists advocating the LMF 
hypothesis propose that the structural unemployment rate tracks the actual unemployment 
rate quite closely (OECD, 1994b, Chap.2 pg.66). Therefore, to reduce the overall 
unemployment rate effectively, they propose reducing the structural unemployment rate 
                                                 
7 Cyclical unemployment is defined as the unemployment that arises as a result of cyclical changes in the 
economy such as recession, recovery, growth and decline, along the business cycle. 
8 Structural unemployment is the unemployment that occurs as a result of continuous structural changes in 
an economy. The structural changes cause mismatch between the job seeking unemployed and the jobs 
available to them in terms of skills, regional location, or some other dimension. The number of jobs may be 
equal to the number of unemployed, but the unemployed may lack the skills needed for the jobs available to 
them, or they are not in the region where the available jobs match their skills. 
9 The concept of a natural rate of unemployment rate (NRU) was introduced by the monetarists and was 
later used by new classical theorists as well as new Keynesians (calling it NAIRU- non-accelerating 
inflation rate of unemployment), with variations in their respective underlying assumptions and models. 
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first. The theorists blame labor market policies and institutions for producing structural 
rigidities in European labor markets, and in turn, increasing the structural unemployment 
rate. They therefore, prescribe labor market reforms to reduce the structural 
unemployment rate, and thereby, the actual unemployment rate in Europe.  
Figures B.2.2-B.2.19 present the trends of actual unemployment rate10 and 
structural unemployment rate11 of Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Austria, the Netherlands, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, UK,  
Norway, Switzerland, and the United States, respectively, from 1970 to 2008 (1991 to 
2008 in the case of Germany). The figures show that there exists a significant gap 
between actual unemployment rates and structural unemployment rates for the European 
countries and the United States, which raises concern over the idea of reducing structural 
unemployment to reduce the actual one. Over the years, viewing the gap, LMF theorists 
proposed an alternative explanation saying that because of persistence of unemployment 
– hysteresis (present rates of equilibrium unemployment may depend on past rates of 
actual unemployment) – structural unemployment rate cannot track the actual one closely 
(OECD, 1994b, Chap.2, pg.67). And, they started looking for structural factors that lead 
to the hysteresis in European countries. 
                                                 
10 Actual unemployment rate plotted in the figures is defined as the number of unemployed as a percentage 
of total labor force. 




2.3 THEORIES OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND THEIR EXPLANATIONS OF WAGE 
BEHAVIOR  
With the evolution of rising rates of unemployment in European countries since 
the seventies, researchers developed various theoretical and empirical frameworks to 
examine the sources of the evolution. All these frameworks appear to have theoretical 
roots in one or more theories of unemployment viz. the classical theory, Keynesian 
theory, the monetarist theory, the new classical theory and the new Keynesian theory.  
Classical theory12 of unemployment is based on the workings of the classical 
labor market, which comprises a labor demand and a labor supply schedule. These 
schedules are described by two classical postulates. The first postulate is described as 
“wage (real) equals the marginal product of labor” (Keynes 1936, Chap.2, pg.5), which 
defines the labor demand schedule. It implies that labor demand depends on labor 
productivity, which equals real wage rate; therefore, when real wage falls, labor demand, 
and thereby, employment increases. The second postulate, on the other hand, is described 
as “utility of the wage for any given volume of employed labor is equal to the marginal 
disutility of that amount of employment” (Keynes 1936, Chap.2, pg.5), which defines the 
labor supply schedule. It implies that labor supply depends on the willingness of workers 
to put additional hours of work in response to changing wage rates, such that when real 
                                                 
12 Classical theory emerged in the 19th century as a revolution against the earlier body of economic 
doctrine called the mercantilism. It attacked the two tenets of mercantilism, (i) bullionism (the belief that 
the wealth and power of a nation depends on its stock of precious metals, and (ii) necessity of state action 
for the development of a capitalist system. Contrary to the mercantilists, the classical theorists (i) 
emphasized the role of real factors in determining real variables such as output and employment as opposed 
to monetary factors, and (ii) stressed the role of free market (laissez faire economy) and the self- adjusting 
tendencies of the markets (along with optimizing tendencies of the economic agents) in the absence of state 
control, which they considered to be unnecessary and harmful. Adam Smith, David Ricardo, W.S. Jevons, 
J.S. Mills, Jean-Baptiste Say, and Alfred Marshall are considered as the classical theorists. 
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wage increases, labor supply increases. Both labor demand and labor supply schedules 
are, therefore, functions of the real wage. And, their intersection determines the labor 
market equilibrium – the equilibrium levels of employment and real wage – at which full 
employment is attained.  
Classical theory assumes real wages to be perfectly flexible in a labor market and 
all the participants of the market – employers and employees – to have perfect 
information about the wages. This assumption of perfect flexibility of real wages ensures 
full employment at classical labor market equilibrium. Unemployment prevails only 
when real wages fail to adjust – remain rigid – to equate labor supply to labor demand, or 
in other words, to permit the labor market to clear. Real wage rigidity, according to 
classical theory, occurs due to laborers’ refusal or inability to accept a real wage 
equivalent to their marginal productivity, where the refusal or inability may be enforced 
by legislation, or imposed by social practice, or may result from collective bargaining 
agreement enforced by trade union negotiations, or because of slow response to changes, 
or occur as a result of mere human obstinacy (Keynes, 1936, Chap.2, pg.6).  
With the assumption of perfect wage flexibility, Classical theory allows only two 
possible types of unemployment to prevail in an economy, which are frictional 
unemployment and voluntary unemployment. The frictional unemployment occurs due to 
normal turnover of labor; when workers are temporarily between jobs due to reasons such 
as they leave present jobs to search for new and better ones, older workers retire and 
leave the labor force while the younger ones enter to take up their jobs and people reenter 
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the labor force13. The voluntary unemployment, on the other hand, arises as a result of 
downwardly rigid wages (real), where the rigidity arises because of reasons mentioned 
above. Therefore, making wages flexible, and that too downwardly, is the classical 
theory’s solution for reducing voluntary unemployment. 
Keynesian theory14 originated as a revolution against the classical theory. 
Keynes, in the very beginning of his General Theory (Keynes, 1936), rejected the 
foundation of the classical labor market that is the classical labor supply schedule, and 
tried to shift the determination of employment and wage levels away from the classical 
labor supply-demand mechanism (Keynes, 1936, Chap.2, pg.8). He rejected the classical 
labor supply schedule or the second postulate of the classical theory on two different 
grounds. Firstly, Keynes rejected the postulate saying that it is “not theoretically 
fundamental” because it fails to describe the way in which workers actually behave. He 
pointed out that the postulate implies workers care only for their absolute or nominal 
wage rates, but in fact, workers also care for their relative wages because they are 
concerned about their wage-position relative to that of the other workers (Keynes, 1936, 
Chap.1, pg.7-15). Therefore, according to Keynes, when real wages of the workers are 
cut by means of reducing their money (nominal) wages, the workers who face the wage-
cuts may resist the money wage reductions because the wage-cuts deteriorate their 
relative wage-positions compared to that of those who face no such wage-cuts. However, 
                                                 
13 Begg, Fischer, and Dornbusch (2000, Chap.27) describe frictional unemployment as “the irreducible 
minimum level of unemployment in a dynamic society”. 
14 During the Great Depression of 1930s, the classical theory was unable to explain mass unemployment. 
In 1936, Keynesian theory (Keynes, 1936) originated by rejecting the beliefs of the classical theory and 
explaining the causes for the prevailing mass unemployment at that time and prescribed a cure for the 
affliction. 
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if the cuts in real wages are undertaken by means of increasing consumer price level, 
workers may remain indifferent to the rise in general price level because the rise in 
general price level affects the real wages of all the workers equally keeping their relative 
wage-positions unchanged. This explanation of workers’ response to changes in real 
wages is the Keynesian explanation of relative wage rigidity.   
Secondly, Keynes rejected the second postulate on a ground, which he said is “a 
more fundamental objection”. He argued that the postulate implies that reductions in 
money wages decrease real wages, but in fact, cuts in money wages do not ensure fall in 
real wages. The reason for this that he presented is that decrease in money wage reduces 
price level almost in same proportion, which keeps real wage (ratio of money wage to 
price) unchanged15 
Keynes, in his theory of unemployment, asserted that equilibrium level of 
employment and real wage rate are not determined by labor market supply and demand 
forces; rather, levels of employment and wages are determined by the level of aggregate 
demand (or effective demand) for the products that workers produce. This aggregate 
demand or effective demand, he explained, flows from factors such as consumption and 
investment demands (also, from other factors such as net export demand, net government 
expenditure), which in turn depend on variables such as marginal propensity to consume, 
interest rate and marginal efficiency of capital16. Therefore, according to the Keynesian 
                                                 
15 Keynes proposed this argument using Marshall’s theory that prices are governed by marginal costs, 
which in turn are governed by money wages (costs of labor). Therefore, change in money wages will cause 
prices to change (almost in the same proportion). 
16 The variables marginal propensity to consume and marginal efficiency of capital are described in 
Keynes’ General Theory (1936). 
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theory of unemployment, output, employment and wage are determined by the 
components of aggregate demand – consumption, investment, government expenditure, 
taxes, exports and imports – in the economy. 
Based on his theory of unemployment, Keynes also rejected the classical belief17 
that fully flexible real wages ensure full employment equilibrium. He asserted that since 
the volume of employment and the volume of aggregate (or effective) demand are 
uniquely correlated (Keynes, 1936, Chap.19, pg.257-260), changes in real wages will not 
affect employment levels if effective demand (or the determinants of its components) 
remains unchanged.  In this context, Keynes stated that “reduction in money-wages will 
have no lasting tendency to increase employment except by virtue of its repercussions 
either on propensity to consume for the community as a whole, or on a schedule of 
marginal efficiencies of capital, or on the rate of interest” (Keynes,1936, Chap.19 pg. 
262). In the Chapter nineteen of the General Theory, Keynes presented a list analyzing 
the repercussions of reduction in money-wages on marginal propensity to consume, 
marginal efficiency of capital, interest rate, terms of trade etc., which he said will not 
have lasting effects on employment level (Keynes, 1936, Chap.19, pg.262-265).  
Unlike the classical theory, Keynesian theory of unemployment does not blame 
wage rigidity for unemployment. Keynesian theory rather, introduced a concept of 
                                                 
17 Keynes (1936, Chap.19, pg.257) described the underlying argument of the classical belief as: a 
reduction in money wages will ceteris paribus stimulate demand by diminishing the price of the finished 
product, and will therefore, increase output and employment up to the point where the money wage 
reduction that the labor has agreed to accept is just offset by the diminishing marginal efficiency of labor 
occurring from the increased production of output (from a given equipment). 
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involuntary unemployment18, which is said to occur when workers are willing to work at 
the going wage rate but cannot find jobs because of insufficient effective demand in the 
economy. And, to reduce involuntary unemployment, Keynesian theory proposed 
expansionary demand policies implemented by means of an active role played by the 
government or the state.  
To the Keynesian framework, in the 1960s, Samuelson and Solow (1960) added a 
relation known as the Phillips curve, which states that inflation and unemployment are 
inversely related. The relation is mathematically expressed as:  
tt UP βα −=∆               (2.1) 
In the above equation, tP∆  is the inflation rate (rate of change of price) at time t,  
α  represents labor productivity growth, β  is a positive coefficient, and tU  is the 
unemployment rate at time t. During the sixties, the Phillips curve relation led 
policymakers to choose between possible combinations of levels of inflation and 
unemployment. The relation however, collapsed when in the late sixties, and in the early 
seventies, the US economy faced stagflation – a combination of high inflation and high 
unemployment – showing non-negative relation between inflation and unemployment 
rates. With the collapse of the Phillips curve, monetarist theory emerged as a revolution 
against the Keynesian theory.  
                                                 
18 Keynes defined involuntary unemployment as: “Men are involuntarily unemployed, if in the event of a 
small rise in the price of wage-goods relatively to the money-wage, both the aggregate supply of labor 
willing to work for the current money-wage and the aggregate demand for it at that wage would be greater 
than the existing volume of employment” (Keynes1936, Chap.2, pg.15). 
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Monetarists’ theory of unemployment is similar to that of the classical theory in 
which labor market equilibrium is determined by the supply-demand mechanism of the 
labor market. The monetarists separated between a short-run and a long-run 
determination of the labor market equilibrium. In the short-run, they asserted that change 
in inflation rate, resulting from a change in money supply19, affect real wage rate, which 
in turn affects employment level. According to the monetarists (Friedman, 1968), 
workers demand for real wages on the basis of their expectation20 for inflation in the 
coming production period. If actual inflation is lower than what is expected by the 
workers, the employers pay actual real wage above the expected real wage of the 
workers. This leads employers to layoff workers and increase unemployment. Similarly, 
if actual inflation is more than what is expected, employers pay actual real wage rate 
below the expected real wage of the workers. It is then that the employers find it cheaper 
to hire additional workers, and they employ more, which increases employment. 
Therefore, according to the monetarists’ theory of unemployment, as long as monetary 
authorities keep changing money supply, inflation rate fluctuates, making both real wage 
and employment (or unemployment) levels to fluctuate. The monetarists’ relationship 
between inflation rate (actual and expected) and unemployment is represented by 
Friedman’s expectations-augmented short-run Phillips curve relation, which is expressed 
as:  
                                                 
19 For the monetarists, inflation is a monetary phenomenon, and monetary authorities make money supply 
to rise (or fall), consequently causing inflation (or deflation).  
20 Monetarists assume that inflation expectations are made adaptively based on all the information 
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where 10 ≤≤ λ . This equation is obtained by introducing an expected inflation 
component in equation (2.1).  
Over time, monetarists argue that inflation rate stabilizes, and therefore, workers’ 
inflation, and thereby, wage expectations are realized, that is, actual and expected real 
wage equate. Hence, in the long-run, with the stabilization of inflation rate, real wage and 
employment rates also stabilize, and the labor market clears corresponding to the long-
run equilibrium real wage rate (the real wage rate at which actual and expected real wage 
equate). The only unemployment that remains in the long-run is voluntary 
unemployment, arising from voluntary friction, and/or structural changes. The 
monetarists named the long-run equilibrium rate of unemployment as the natural rate of 
unemployment (NRU)21 at which inflation rate remains unchanged and wage 
expectations realize (Friedman, 1968, Phelps, 1968). And, according to the monetarists, 
even if actual unemployment drifts away from the NRU, say due to short run fluctuations 
in money supply, sooner or later inflation and real wage expectations are realized and the 
actual rate gravitates toward its natural rate. The NRU can be derived from the equation 
(2.2) by replacing )( tt PEP ∆=∆  – in the long-run, expected inflation equals actual 
inflation – in it. Assuming 1=λ , that is, change in expected inflation is reflected one-for-
one in wages in equation (2.2), and solving it for the NRU yields the expression for NRU 
as: 
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In the backdrop of stagflation in the United States, the new classical theory 
emerged to study macroeconomics by using neoclassical – microeconomic – framework. 
Classical theory being the forerunner of the neoclassical theory, the new classical theory 
of unemployment is similar to the classical one. Like in the classical labor market, labor 
supply and demand forces determine the equilibrium in the new classical labor market. 
And, the only possible unemployment that may exist in equilibrium is either frictional or 
voluntary. The new classical theorists also named the equilibrium unemployment rate as 
the natural rate of unemployment (NRU), but they differentiated it from the monetarists’ 
NRU, asserting that their NRU is attained not only in the long-run, but also in the short-
run. They eliminated the difference between the short-run and the long-run labor market 
equilibrium by their assumption of rational expectations22, that is, by assuming that all 
economic agents make rational forecasts (about prices and wages), using all the 
information available from the present as well as the past. Assuming the economic agents 
to make forecasts or expectations rationally, the new classical theorists assert that the 
agents are able to realize any anticipated change in the economy, which lead wage 
(and/or price) expectations to fluctuate, and hence, revise their expectations to match with 
the actual ones. Therefore, the rational expectations assumption ensures equilibrium at 
the natural rate, both in the short run and the long run. And, in case an unanticipated 
change occurs in the economy, and expectations are not realized, the employment level 
                                                 
22 The concept of rational expectation was originated by John F. Muth (1961). 
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deviates from the NRU, but soon economic agents realize the change and correct their 
forecast errors the employment level returns to the NRU.   
The new classical theory, like the classical theory, assumes that equilibrium in the 
labor market is always attained under perfectly flexible wages. When labor demand shifts 
(say due to technological change) or labor supply changes (say due to change in some 
demographic factor) and the real wages adjust appropriately, the labor market clears and 
equilibrium is attained. Only when wages are rigid, unemployment prevails.  
New Keynesian theory emerged as a response to the new classical theory. Like 
the new classical theorists, the new Keynesians build macroeconomic models using 
neoclassical framework. The new Keynesians assume economic agents to make 
expectations rationally, but they assume imperfectly competitive market, where prices 
and wages are not perfectly flexible to ensure market clearance.  
The new Keynesian theory of unemployment differentiates between short-run and 
long-run determination of wages and employment levels in a labor market. Their short-
run theory is Keynesian, in which they assert that employment is determined by 
aggregate demand and its components.  Unemployment arises due to changes in the 
aggregate demand components, and is cyclical in nature. Therefore, short-run 
unemployment, according to the new Keynesians, can be reduced by fiscal and monetary 
policies. Also, the new Keynesians ascertain that involuntary unemployment can prevail 
in the economy (Layard et al., 1991, Chap.1, pg.11), which is unlike the new classical 
theorists, who reject the conceptual validity of involuntary unemployment (Galbraith and 
Darity, 1994, Chap.8, pg.250). The new Keynesian long-run theory of unemployment is 
however, classical in nature. The long-run theory is known as the non-accelerating 
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inflation rate of unemployment (or NAIRU) theory. The new Keynesian NAIRU is often 
assumed to be synonymous with the new classical NRU, (Ball and Mankiw, 2002), but 
theorists point out fundamental differences between the NAIRU and the NRU 
(Stockhammer, 2007).  
The new Keynesian labor market comprises a price-setting schedule, analogous to 
the new classical labor demand schedule, and a wage-setting schedule, analogous to the 
new classical labor supply schedule, which depict the bargaining claims made by 
employers and workers, respectively (Layard et al., 1991, Chap.1, pg.12). The price-
setting schedule depends on the market power of the employers (firms), while the wage-
setting one depends on factors such as labor market policies and institutions – also known 
as wage-push factors – which influence the wage claims made by the workers. The new 
Keynesian labor market equilibrium is attained when the claims of both the employers 
and workers are met, where the equilibrium level of real wage rate is the rate desired by 
both the wage-setters and the price-setters, and that real wage rate determines the 
equilibrium level of employment. The new Keynesian equilibrium rate of unemployment 
is known as the NAIRU at which corresponding claims of the workers and employers are 
met, their price and wage expectations are realized, and inflation rate remains stable. 
Therefore, according to the new Keynesians, long-run NAIRU equilibrium in the labor 
market is not determined by market clearance, like NRU, but by the balance of power 
between workers and employers (Stockhammer, 2007).  
New Keynesian theorists do not assume wage (and price) to be perfectly flexible. 
Rather, they developed theories to show how optimal behavior of economic agents in 
imperfectly competitive markets imply lesser wage flexibility in response to changes in 
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aggregate demand and supply than in the case of competitive markets. The new 
Keynesian theorists developed multiple theories of wage rigidity including, the relative 
wage theory, the efficiency wage theory, the implicit contracts theory, and the “insiders”-
“outsiders” theory to explain wage rigidity in imperfectly competitive markets (Galbraith 
and Darity, 1994, Chap.10, pg.304). Among those theories, the relative wage theory is the 
one which was originally proposed by Keynes (1936, Chap.2, pg.7-15) and is discussed 
above. New Keynesians retain Keynes’ basic argument and apply the theory to their labor 
market models to define one of the sources of wage rigidity.  
Efficiency wage theory23 argues that firms pay efficiency wage, which is over 
and above market-clearing wage, in order to educe higher levels of labor productivity. 
Because of asymmetries associated with employers’ information about worker’s 
productivity (and assuming that monitoring the workers is costly), paying efficiency 
wages appears profitable for the firms. Wage rigidity, under efficiency wage theory, 
occurs because the employers are unwilling to pay market-clearing levels in lieu of the 
risk of receiving inferior labor productivities, which compels workers, who cannot 
persuade employers to hire them at wages below efficiency wage, to remain unemployed. 
Implicit contracts theory is based on the argument that workers prefer higher 
wages at the risk of unemployment over lower wages with job security. Wage rigidity, 
                                                 
23 The efficiency wage theory is pioneered by Akerlof and Yellen (1990). According to this theory firms 
chose to pay wages above the market-clearing level, called the efficiency wage, because of market 
imperfections that arise as a result of asymmetries associated with employers’ information about worker’s 
productivity. The employers pay efficiency wages (assuming that monitoring the workers is costly) for 
reasons such as: (a) to attract applicants with higher productivity, (b) to motivate hired workers to impart 
greater effort, (c) to discourage shirking because if workers are caught shirking they will face significant 
cost of losing such a high wage job, and (d) to improve the productivity of the workers by increasing their 
general well being (making them healthy). Therefore, it turns out to be profitable for the firm to pay wages 
above the market-clearing wage rate. 
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under implicit contracts theory, occurs because workers implicitly agree on a contract 
with their employers to obtain wages above market-clearing level in exchange for 
imparting the employers the freedom to fire them at the employers’ convenience24. After 
getting fired, the workers are unable to bid for immediate jobs at lower wages because of 
the contract, and the only choice that they are left with is to wait for getting hired when 
the employers find hiring favorable.  
“Insiders-outsiders” theory is concerned with the conflict of interest between 
“insiders”, who are employed, and “outsiders”, who are unemployed (or work in the 
informal and competitive sectors of the labor market). According to this theory, 
“insiders” enjoy job protection facilitated by labor turnover costs that their employers 
need to incur when they fire them, but the “outsiders” lack any such protection. Since the 
labor turnover costs elicit a sense of job protection to the “insiders”, they make higher 
wage claims without fearing for getting fired. In the face of say adverse labor demand 
shocks, if some “insiders” get fired, the remaining ones continue with their higher wage 
claims. They negotiate through unions to set wages above the market-clearing level 
(which may be society’s standard fair wage), which the “outsiders” (unemployed 
members of the union or non-members) are unable to underbid because of threats of 
social sanctions. And, as a result, the “outsiders” continue to remain unemployed. Under 
this theory, wage rigidity, and thereby, unemployment is occurs due to higher wage 
claims made by the “insiders”.  
                                                 
24 Implicit contract theory presumes that because of the contract workers prepare themselves beforehand 
for the spells of unemployment using their high wage rates. 
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Theorists25 who dominate the economic literature on European high 
unemployment problem apply principles of the new classical theory and the new 
Keynesian theories, both of which have roots in the classical and neoclassical theory, for 
their explanation of the problem. They argue that, high rates of European unemployment 
are due to factors related to the European welfare state – labor market policies and 
institutions such as unemployment benefits, employment protection legislation, and 
unionization – which influence workers’ wage demands and make wages downwardly 
rigid, and thereby, increase NRU or NAIRU. These theorists hold that unemployment 
benefits payments, on one hand, increase the wage claims of the “insiders”, and on the 
other hand, decrease the effectiveness of the unemployed “outsiders” to search for jobs, 
both of which increase unemployment. Employment protection legislation is said to 
increase unemployment not only by making firing of the “insiders” costly, but also by 
reducing the chances of the “outsiders” to get hired. Union power increases 
unemployment by allowing the “insiders” to negotiate for wages above market-clearing 
levels, and thereby, reducing the chance of the unemployed “outsider” to get employed. 
The theorists also blame these policies and institutions for generating long-term effects 
on unemployment leading to unemployment persistence. Therefore, they prescribe labor 
market reforms – reforming the policies and institutions – to make wages downwardly 
flexible, and thereby, reducing unemployment (NRU or NAIRU) in Europe.  
                                                 
25 These theorists are called as labor market flexibility (LMF) theorists because the underlying hypothesis 
of their explanation for European unemployment problem is called the labor market flexibility (LMF) 
hypothesis, which is discussed in Section 2.5.  
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In the explanation of the European high unemployment problem, only a few 
theorists apply Keynesian principles. These theorists26 blame bad macroeconomic policy 
– anti-inflationary and austere fiscal policy – choices made by European countries in the 
past few decades for their problems of high unemployment. Based on Keynesian theory, 
they prescribe expansionary macroeconomic policies to generate effective demand, and 
consequently increase employment (and reduce unemployment) in European countries, 
and in Europe as a whole.  
2.4 MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT AND THE EVOLUTION OF THEORETICAL 
EXPLANATIONS  
Since the rise of unemployment rates in European countries in the seventies, 
researchers and policymakers have put forward several explanations for the rise, which 
have shifted and evolved over time27. Initially, in the seventies, when unemployment 
rates started rising in a number of European countries explanations were directed toward 
examining the role of shocks including, oil price shocks and total factor productivity 
slowdown for leading to the rise. Europe (and the rest of the world) faced oil crises in 
1973 and 1979, which led to world-wide increases in oil prices. Another shock that hit 
European nations during the seventies was the large decline in total factor productivity 
growth. Using a natural rate or NRU framework, researchers studied the role of shocks in 
explaining the rise of unemployment rates in European countries. They argued that, any 
adverse shock that increases the prices of factors of production other than that of labor 
                                                 
26 These theorists are called as macroeconomic policy (MP) theorists because the underlying hypothesis of 
their explanation for European unemployment problem is called the macroeconomic policy (MP) 
hypothesis, which is discussed in section 2.6. 
27 Blanchard (2006) reviews the shifts in the explanations since the 1970s. 
 34
requires a fall in wages in order to maintain equilibrium level of employment at the NRU. 
And, if wages do not fall, unemployment rate rises. Therefore, to restrict the increase in 
unemployment rates as a result of the oil shocks and total factor productivity shock, 
which increased the prices of factors of production other than labor, required a fall in 
wages. The researchers argued that European countries were hit by the adverse shocks 
after a period of growing labor militancy in the forms of “Events of May” in France in 
1968, “Hot Autumn” in Italy in 1969, the wildcat strikes in Germany in 1969, and the end 
of dictatorships in Portugal and Spain in 1974 and 1975, which led to excessive wage 
demands by the workers, or in other words, made wages downwardly rigid. They, 
therefore, concluded that the downward rigidity of wages in the face of the shocks led to 
the rise of unemployment in Europe. In this context, Baker and Schmitt (1999) argue that 
if it is true that the events of labor militancy led to high wage demands, the capital share 
of income and the rates of return to capital should display a fall, or at least remain 
unchanged during the period of militancy or right after that. But, Baker and Schmitt 
(1999, table 2) present data on measures of capital share of income and return to capital 
for European countries, which show large increases in both measures since 1979. These 
empirical facts, therefore, cast doubt over the view that excessive power of the workers, 
in the face of the adverse shocks, led to the rise of unemployment in Europe.  
Explanations based on the role of oil and total factor productivity slowdown 
shocks lost ground over the time once it was noted that unemployment rates continued to 
rise in Europe even in the eighties, much after the effects of the shocks were gone. 
Furthermore, the explanations seemed amiss when the United States displayed better 
performance than Europe in terms of unemployment, even after being hit by the same 
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shocks. Looking at the difference between the US’s and Europe’s employment 
performances, researchers started comparing the US economy with that of Europe to 
explain the difference. In the 1980s, Europe, the United States, and other OECD nations, 
in general, experienced shocks as a result of the spread of computer technology and 
increase in global competition. Theorists then began to argue that the spread of 
technology and trade increased the demand for highly skilled workers, while reducing the 
demand for the less-skilled ones in those countries, which led to the rise in 
unemployment rate in the countries. Using the natural rate framework, the theorists 
proposed fall in the wages of the less-skilled workers for increasing their labor demand. 
Comparing the United States with Europe, theorists argued that since in the US the wages 
of the less-skilled (those without a college degree) workers fell considerably during the 
eighties, therefore, the United States experienced lower rates of unemployment. And, 
since Europe showed no decline in the wages of its less-skilled workers, it experienced 
high rates of unemployment. This argument would have been true if the rise in European 
unemployment was concentrated among the less-skilled workers, but empirical facts do 
not support this argument. Baker and Schmidt (1999, table 3) pointed out that the ratio of 
the unemployment rate of less-educated workers to that of the college-educated ones in 
Europe is no greater than that in the United States. Also, the data on employment rates by 
education level reveal that the decline in European employment rates has remained 
similar across all skills and education levels (Nickell and Bell, 1995; Card, Kramer and 
Lemieux, 1996; Krueger and Pischke, 1997).   
Unemployment rates continued to rise in the eighties reaching very high levels in 
countries such as France, Spain, Belgium, Ireland, UK, Italy, and the Netherlands, which 
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led researchers to not only explain the rise, but also the  persistence of high rates of 
unemployment. Several explanations were proposed in the eighties to explain the 
persistence of unemployment. One explanation emphasized the dynamic role of capital 
accumulation in leading to the persistence of unemployment (Bruno and Sachs, 1985; 
Bean et al., 1986). According to this explanation, long periods of adverse shocks lead to a 
decline in rate of capital accumulation, which decreases the number of jobs and thereby, 
restricts a quick decline in unemployment rates (Blanchard, 1991). A second explanation 
emphasized the role of certain labor market policies and institutions in leading to the 
persistence over time. Based on “insiders-outsiders” theory28, unions are said to set 
wages of the “insiders” over and above market-clearing levels (or making wages 
downwardly rigid) even in the face of adverse labor demand conditions, which hinders a 
quick return to NRU or NAIRU even when labor demand conditions improve, and 
thereby, lead to unemployment persistence or hysteresis (Blanchard and Summers, 1986). 
Some theorists emphasized that unemployment benefits payments reduce the 
effectiveness of the unemployed, who receive the benefits, to search for jobs and 
influence them to not to exit unemployment easily. This in turn, leads to the persistence. 
In this context, some theorists add that being unemployed for a long period of time not 
only reduces the morale of the unemployed to search for jobs, but also makes their skills 
obsolete over time, makes them appear less attractive to employers (Layard and Nickell, 
1987). These effects make it difficult for the unemployed to exit unemployment. Bertola 
                                                 
28 The “insiders-outsiders” theory developed by Lindbeck and Snower (1989) and was first applied as a 
theory of unemployment by Gregory (1986) followed by Blanchard and Summers (1986) (Blanchard, 
2006). A less extreme version of this theory is provided by Nickell and Wadhwani (1990). 
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(1990) emphasized the role of employment protection legislation in leading to persistence 
of unemployment. Bertola argued that employment protection legislation makes firing of 
workers costly for the employers, and therefore, discourages them to make new hires 
even when times are good because if they hire less during good times they will then have 
to fire less and incur less cost during bad times. Such behavior on the part of the 
employers, over time, leads to persistence of unemployment.  
The early 1990s displayed high levels of unemployment in Europe, but 
considerably heterogeneous rates across European nations. While Ireland, the 
Netherlands, and UK experienced a decline in their unemployment rates, Denmark, 
Finland, and Sweden saw a sharp increase; while Austria, Portugal, and Norway 
maintained relatively low rates of unemployment, France, Spain, and Italy maintained 
very high rates. And, Germany began to face steadily increasing rates after reunification. 
These unemployment trends made the explanations based on shocks unpopular because, 
in the nineties, it was evident that the shocks of seventies and eighties cannot plausibly 
have effects then. Therefore, in the early nineties, the focus shifted entirely from the role 
of common shocks toward looking at the differences in labor market policies and 
institutions across European countries in explaining the differences in the trends of 
unemployment rates across those countries. Differences were also examined between the 
European countries and the United States (and other OECD countries). 
In 1994, the OECD produced an influential report, the OECD Jobs Study (OECD, 
1994a) that led researchers and policymakers to blame labor market policies and 
institutions for the high and heterogeneous rates of unemployment across European (and 
other OECD) countries. The report made a number of recommendations for reducing or 
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simply eliminating labor market policies and institutions. With the emergence of the 
report, the literature on Europe’s high unemployment problem started getting flooded by 
a series of studies studying and examining the effects of country-specific labor market 
policies and institutions on the unemployment rates of European (and other OECD) 
countries (Scarpetta, 1996; Siebert, 1997; Haveman, 1997; Nickell, 1997; Elmeskov et 
al., 1998; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Bertola et al., 2001; Fitoussi et al., 2000; Belot 
and van Ours, 2004, Nickell et al., 2005; Baccaro and Rei, 2005; Bassanini and Duval, 
2006). These studies argued that certain labor market policies and institutions impede the 
appropriate labor market and wage adjustments, making the market and wages rigid, and 
thereby, increasing unemployment. And, in the case of European countries, they argued 
that over time, in the eighties and nineties, the labor market policies and institutions have 
grown to be more rigid relative to what they were in the sixties, which led to the rise in 
unemployment rates in those countries in the eighties and the nineties. They also added 
that the countries with more rigid labor market regulations – policies and institutions – 
and thereby, more rigid wages experienced higher rates of unemployment than those with 
less rigid labor market regulations. Therefore, to reduce unemployment in Europe, these 
studies recommended making wages (and labor market) flexible (downwardly) by means 
of reforming “unemployment-causing” labor market policies and institutions. As 
mentioned in Chapter One, these policies and institutions include the unemployment 
benefits entitlement, the duration of benefits, the unemployment benefits replacement 
rate, employment protection legislation, union density, union coverage, the centralization 
and coordination of wage bargaining, and the tax wedge. 
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In 2000, there came another shift in the explanation of European unemployment 
problem. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) produced a study, which argued that labor 
market policies and institutions cannot be solely blamed for the rise in unemployment 
rates in European countries because these policies and institutions were present even 
when unemployment rates were low in those countries. They, rather, argued that the 
source of high unemployment is explained by a combination of common shocks and the 
labor market policies and institutions. They explained that when European countries were 
hit by common shocks, country-specific labor market policies and institutions restricted 
appropriate labor market (and wages) adjustments, which led to high rates of 
unemployment in those countries. And, in the face of shocks, countries with more rigid 
policies and institutions faced higher rates of unemployment that those with less rigid 
policies and institutions. With the emergence of Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) study, 
some theorists shifted their focus toward measuring the effects of macroeconomic shocks 
in the presence of labor market policies and institutions on unemployment rates, but 
others maintained the previous position. Although before Blanchard and Wolfers, Bruno 
and Sachs (1985) and Layard et al. (1991, Chap.9, pg.430-437) have emphasized the 
combined effects of shocks and institutions on unemployment, the study of Blanchard 
and Wolfers is considered to be the influential one. The underlying hypothesis of the 
explanations based on both the sole role of labor market policies and institutions and their 
role combined with common shocks is known as the labor market flexibility (LMF) 
hypothesis, which theoretically relies on classical and neoclassical economic principles. 
And, the theorists advocating the LMF hypothesis are called the LMF theorists. 
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In addition to the LMF theorists, another group of theorists emerged in the 
nineties who, contrary to the LMF hypothesis, argued that problem of European 
unemployment lies not with labor market policies and institutions, but with the demand 
constrained policy choices that were made by European countries in the eighties, and then 
prior to joining the European Union (EU) and adopting the euro, irrespective of their 
country-specific social and economic conditions. The underlying hypothesis of this 
argument is known as the macroeconomic policy (MP) hypothesis. The advocates of the 
MP hypothesis, called MP theorists, prescribe sustained expansionary macroeconomic 
policies across the European countries as the means to lower European unemployment. 
Studies advocating the LMF hypothesis although face profound criticisms from 
many (Akerlof et al., 2000; Arestis and Mariscal, 2000; Atkinson, 2001; Baker et al. 
2004; Baker et al. 2005; Garcilazo, 2005; Galbraith, 2006; Howell et al., 2007; Oswald, 
1997; Mitchell, 2003), these studies, and their policy recommendations dominate the 
economic literature and the policy arena. In the recent years, in addition to the role of 
labor market policies and institutions, some LMF theorists have emphasized the role of 
product market regulations – policies and institutions – in explaining European high 
unemployment problem (Berger and Danninger, 2006; Bassanini and Duval, 2006; 
Amable et al., 2006; Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2005; Griffith et al., 2007; Fiori et al., 2007, 
Rovelli and Bruno, 2008). These theorists argue that since product market regulations 
increase the mark-up over prices, demand for products that the workers produce falls, and 
in turn, the demand for workers fall, leading to a rise in unemployment. Also, employers 
who enjoy product-market rents with the higher mark-ups, distribute parts of their 
product-market rents to the workers in the form of higher wages, which reduces labor 
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demand, and thereby, increases unemployment. These theorists argue that the benefits of 
labor market reforms have differed across European (and other OECD) countries because 
of the differences in their degrees of product market regulations. They, although, 
unanimously blame both labor and product market policies and institutions  for the high 
rates of unemployment, some among them argue that product market deregulations 
reduce unemployment when the labor market policies and institutions are less rigid, or in 
other words, less regulated (Berger and Danninger, 2006; Bassanini and Duval, 2006; 
Amable et al., 2006), while others argue that product market deregulations reduce 
unemployment more effectively when labor market regulations are high (Nicoletti and 
Scarpetta, 2005; Griffith et al., 2007; Fiori et al., 2007). The basic argument of the 
second group is that countries in which labor market regulations are high, wages are 
already quite above the market-clearing level and employment quite below its full 
employment level, hence, in those countries product market deregulations have greater 
potential to change wages and employment levels than in those in which labor market 
regulations are low. Therefore, even the current economic literature and policy field 
remain dominated by studies advocating the LMF hypothesis.  
2.5 LABOR MARKET FLEXIBILITY HYPOTHESIS – REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
Empirical studies supporting the labor market flexibility (LMF) hypothesis can be 
broadly classified into three groups. The first group solely blames the rigidities of labor 
market policies and institutions for the rise of unemployment rates in European countries 
(Scarpetta, 1996; Nickell, 1997; Elmeskov et al., 1998; IMF, 2003; Belot and van Ours, 
2004; Nickell et al., 2005; Baccarro and Rei, 2005; Bassanini and Duval, 2006). The 
 42
second group holds external shocks responsible for the higher rates of unemployment in 
the countries with more rigid labor market policies and institutions and vice versa 
(Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Bertola et al., 2001 and Fitoussi et al., 2000). And, the 
third group in addition to the rigidities of labor market policies and institutions, also 
blames product market regulations for the higher rates of unemployment (Berger and 
Danninger, 2006; Bassanini and Duval, 2006 and Amable et al., 2006; Nicoletti and 
Scarpetta, 2005 and Griffith et al., 2007, Fiori et al., 2007, Rovelli and Bruno, 2008). The 
general methodological approach of the three groups of studies is to estimate the effects 
of labor market policies and institutions, changes in those policies and institutions and 
interactions between them, interactions of policies and institutions with external shocks, 
and the interactions of change in policies and institutions with external shocks on 
unemployment rate (or employment rate). The third group of studies, in addition to 
estimating the effects of labor market policies and institutions, also estimates the effects 
of product market policies and institutions and their interactions with labor market 
policies and institutions on unemployment (or employment). A review of some of the 
notable studies advocating the LMF hypothesis is presented as follows: 
Scarpetta (1996) aims to assess the effectiveness of labor market reforms 
prescribed by the OECD Jobs Study (OECD, 1994) for reducing European 
unemployment. For this purpose, Scarpetta examines the role of various labor market 
policies and institutions in (i) explaining differences in the levels of structural or 
“equilibrium” unemployment rate across fifteen to seventeen OECD countries during 
1983-93, and (ii) leading to the persistence of unemployment in those countries during 
1970-93. Scarpetta analyzes four models in which unemployment rate (total 
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unemployment rate, youth-unemployment rate, long-term unemployment rate, and non-
employment rate) is used as a dependent variable, while various labor market policies and 
institutions, indicators of product market regulation and macroeconomic shock variables 
such as the real interest rate and terms-of-trade are included as independent variables. 
Due to the lack of direct measure(s) of product market regulation, Scarpetta employs a 
measure of openness to foreign trade (showing the degree of competitiveness to which 
domestic firms are exposed) and a proxy for pervasiveness of trade restrictions, 
representing degrees of product market competition. Scarpetta incorporates the 
pervasiveness of trade restrictions and an interaction between the pervasiveness of trade 
restrictions and the openness to foreign trade29 in his models. In order to control for 
cyclical variations in the actual unemployment rate, he incorporates output gap in the 
models, which also renders computing the estimated effects of other explanatory 
variables on the structural portion of the actual unemployment rate. In order to account 
for the effects of labor market policies and institutions on persistence of unemployment, 
Scarpetta introduces lagged unemployment rate, whose coefficient is expressed as a 
function of labor market policy and institutional factors, as an exploratory variable in the 
models. From the estimation of the models, Scarpetta finds that: (a) both employment 
protection legislation and the unemployment benefits entitlements increase structural 
unemployment, and also lead to persistence of unemployment; (b) active labor market 
policies reduce unemployment; (c) the tax wedge has no effect on unemployment; (d) the 
                                                 
29 Scarpetta uses the interaction term because he argues that the effects of pervasiveness of same degrees 




highly centralized and decentralized bargaining systems are associated with low levels of 
unemployment, while the intermediate ones are associated with high levels of 
unemployment30; and (e) the pervasiveness of trade restrictions shows significant 
positive effect on unemployment rate only in one model specification. Both proxy 
measures of product market regulation otherwise show no significant effect on 
unemployment rate or youth unemployment rate in any model specification. However, 
both measures show significant and positive effect on long-term unemployment rate and 
also on non-employment rate. Based on the findings, Scarpetta concludes that labor 
market policies and institutions affect both the levels of structural unemployment as well 
as the speed with which labor markets adjust in the OECD countries, that is, persistence 
of unemployment. He also concludes that lack of foreign competition has significant 
effects on “the most vulnerable job seekers, if not on all those who are unemployed”.  
Nickell (1997) tests the LMF hypothesis on a sample of twenty OECD nations 
over two six-year periods, viz. 1983-88 and 1989-1994. Nickell estimates a set of 
regression equations in which various labor market policy and institutional variables are 
regressed on a measure of unemployment (average rate of unemployment, long-term 
unemployment or short-term unemployment), which is included in log form. Other 
variables such as change in average inflation rate and dummy for the second time period 
are also incorporated in the equations as independent variables. From the analyses, 
Nickell finds that: (a) generosity of unemployment benefits when run indefinitely 
                                                 
30 This result confirms the hump-shaped hypothesis of Calmfors and Driffill (1988), which is discussed in 
Chapter 3. The hypothesis refers that highly centralized (co- operative) bargaining systems, such as Austria 
and Nordic countries, and totally decentralized (competitive) systems, such as US, are negatively 
associated with unemployment, while intermediate systems are positively associated with the same. 
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increases unemployment; (b) generous unemployment benefits combined with fixed 
benefits duration reduces unemployment; (c) high levels of unionization associated with 
collective bargaining and no coordination (high coordination) in bargaining increases 
(decreases) unemployment; (d) higher tax wedge increases unemployment; and (e) unlike 
Scarpetta (1996), there is no association between employment protection legislation and 
unemployment rate. From these findings, Nickell concludes that the basic LMF 
hypothesis is “too vague and probably misleading” because several labor market 
institutions that are held as the source of high unemployment do not display any 
observable effects on unemployment. 
Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998), like Scarpetta (1996), assess the 
effectiveness of some of the recommendations of the OECD Jobs Study (1994). For this 
assessment, Elmeskov et al. estimate the effects of changes in various labor market 
policy and institutional variables on the changes in unemployment rates of OECD 
countries during 1983-95. The time period covered by Elmeskov et al. for their analysis 
is almost identical to that of Nickell (1997), but the former employs annual data while the 
latter uses data over two six-year time periods. Unlike, Scarpetta (1996) and Nickell 
(1997), Elmeskov et al. include interactions between labor market policy and institutional 
variables in their models. They perform this to test a hypothesis that institutions are 
interdependent and their impacts on unemployment are direct as well as indirect, that is, 
via affecting other institutional variables. The interaction terms include interaction 
between unemployment benefits and active labor market policies, between 
unemployment benefits and employment protection legislations, between employment 
protection legislations and the degree of centralization or coordination and between the 
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tax wedge and the degree of centralization or coordination. From their analyses, 
Elmeskov et al. find that: (a) unemployment benefits increase unemployment, while 
active labor market policies decrease it; (b) unlike Nickell (1997), employment protection 
legislation and unemployment are positively associated, and this association is 
concentrated in systems with intermediate levels of bargaining coordination; (c) unlike 
Scarpetta (1996), the tax wedge and unemployment are positively associated, and the 
association is concentrated in intermediate bargaining coordination systems. This finding 
is similar to that of Nickell (1997), but the impact size of the tax wedge on 
unemployment differs considerably across the two studies; (d) union density increases 
unemployment; and (e) systems with intermediate levels of coordination and 
centralization are associated with high rates of unemployment, while the highly 
coordinated and centralized bargaining systems, and highly decentralized and least 
coordinated systems are associated with lower levels of unemployment. But, the highly 
coordinated and centralized ones are associated with relatively lower unemployment rates 
than the decentralized and least coordinated ones.  
The Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) study brought a shift in the test of LMF 
hypothesis from an estimation of the effects of labor market policies and institutions on 
unemployment to estimating their effects combined with macroeconomic shocks. 
Blanchard and Wolfers argued that the studies which consider the labor market policies 
and institutions to solely explain the high rates of unemployment in European (and other 
OECD) countries are flawed because the policies and institutions that are blamed in the 
eighties and the nineties were also present in the decades when unemployment rate was 
low. Pointing out the flaw associated with the studies, Blanchard and Wolfers stated that:  
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Explanations based solely on institutions also run however into a major empirical 
problem: many of these institutions were already present when unemployment 
was low (and similar across countries), and, while many became less 
employment-friendly in the 1970s, the movement since then has been mostly in 
the opposite direction. Thus, while labour market institutions can potentially 
explain cross country differences today, they do not appear able to explain the 
general evolution of unemployment over time (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000, 
pg.C2). 
 
Blanchard and Wolfers emphasized that adverse external shocks increase 
unemployment in countries whose labor market policies and institutions impede labor 
market adjustments. To analyze this explanation, Blanchard and Wolfers test the effects 
of interaction between institutions and macroeconomic shocks on unemployment rate. 
They perform their analysis on a sample of twenty OECD countries over eight five-year 
periods (and last two annual years) during 1960-96. In their first empirical model, 
Blanchard and Wolfers estimate the effects of various labor market policies and 
institutions, unobserved shocks common across countries, and institutions interacted with 
unobserved shocks on unemployment rate. From the estimation of the model, they find 
that: (a) an interaction of unobservable shocks with each policy and institutional variable 
such as the benefits replacement rate, the benefits duration, employment protection 
legislation, the tax wedge, and union density increases unemployment rate; (b) an 
interaction of unobservable shocks with active labor market policies, and with bargaining 
coordination decreases unemployment rate; and (c) union coverage has no significant 
effect on unemployment. From these findings, Blanchard and Wolfers conclude that 
macroeconomic shocks combined with sources of labor market rigidity explains both the 
rise in unemployment over the period between 1960 and 1996 and the cross-country 
variations in unemployment rates. Blanchard and Wolfers note that their findings are 
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sensitive to changes in specification because, in their model, when they replace certain 
policies and institutions such as the benefits replacement rate, employment protection 
legislation and the tax wedge by their alternative measures,  the effects of the policies and 
institutions on unemployment that were significant before become insignificant.  Other 
variations in the model specification such as the introduction of time-varying measure of 
institutions produced results which indicate a lack of robustness of their general findings.  
Bertola, Blau and Kahn (2001) extend the work of Blanchard and Wolfers 
(2000) and, in addition, focus on capturing effects of demographic changes. Bertola et al. 
begin with a comparative analysis between the US and other OECD countries during 
1960-96 in which they estimate the effects of macroeconomic shocks and a demographic 
variable that is youth population share (number of people between age 15-24 as a fraction 
of number of people 15 years or over) on unemployment rate. From their analysis, they 
find that the macroeconomic shocks and the demographic variable explain only a modest 
portion of the observed fall in the US unemployment rate compared to other OECD 
nations. To search for a full explanation, Bertola et al. add time-invariant labor market 
policy and institutional variables31 and interactions of the variables with shocks to the 
same model and estimate their effects on unemployment rate. From the estimation, 
Bertola et al. find that: (a) taxes, the benefits duration and employment protection 
legislation increase unemployment; (b) the coordination of bargaining decreases 
unemployment; (c) the effects of the benefits replacement rate, union density, union 
                                                 
31 Bertola et al. use time-invariant institutional measures, like Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), because 
international differences in the policies and institutions are much greater than changes in the same over 
time within countries. Also, Blanchard and Wolfers found stronger results when they use time-invariant 
measures than when they used time-variant ones. 
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coverage and active labor market variables on unemployment are all insignificant in the 
majority of the regressions; (d) the interaction between institutions and shocks account 
for 48-63 percent of the difference between the US’s and other OECD nations’ 
unemployment rates during 1970-95; and (e) replacing macroeconomic shocks by 
common period shocks (represented by time dummies) and adding interactions of the 
period shocks with institutions shows that the interactions explain 77 percent of the 
divergence between the US’s and other countries’ unemployment rates. 
The heterogeneity in the rates of unemployment in the eighties and the nineties 
across European countries (such as the Netherlands, Ireland, and UK experienced falling 
rates of unemployment, while others continued to face rising rates) led Fitoussi et al. 
(2000) to examine: (i) whether or not the credit of the fall in unemployment rates of the 
Netherlands, Ireland, and UK can be attributed to their adoption of structural reforms; 
and (ii) whether or not the failure of other countries to reduce their unemployment rates 
can be attributed to their failure to undertake such reforms. To examine (i) and (ii), 
Fitoussi et al. perform their analysis on nineteen OECD countries during 1960 to 1998. 
They begin their analysis with a model estimating the effects of variables such as world 
interest rate, rate of change in labor productivity, oil price, non-wage support (income 
from private wealth plus social spending) relative to labor productivity, rate of direct 
household taxes, rate of payroll taxes, rate of inflation, and lagged unemployment rate (to 
account for persistence of unemployment) on unemployment rate. In the model, Fitoussi 
et al., further impose cross-country restrictions by constraining the effects of shocks to be 
identical across countries up to a factor of proportionality, which they capture by a 
sensitivity parameter. They do this to model the differences in the effects of shocks 
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across countries due to the differences in their degrees of real wage rigidity. The 
estimates of the sensitivity parameter are supposed to reveal that the extent to which 
shocks lead to unemployment are lowest in the countries that have relatively few labor-
market rigidities. But, the results reveal otherwise – shocks lead to higher unemployment 
in the countries with lesser rigidities in the labor market – which is directly at odds with 
the LMF hypothesis. 
To another model, Fitoussi et al. introduce labor market policy and institutional 
variables and estimate the extent to which differences in policy and institutional variables 
explain country fixed-effect and country-specific sensitivity parameter. From their 
estimation, Fitoussi et al. find that: (a) the benefits replacement ratio, union density, and 
union coverage have positive effects on the size of country-specific fixed effect, which 
implies that countries with higher degrees of these variables have higher unemployment; 
(b) the coordination of bargaining has a  negative effect on the size of country-specific 
fixed effect, that is, on unemployment; (c) benefits duration and union density have 
positive effects on the size of country-specific sensitivity parameter, while the 
coordination of bargaining and active labor market policies have negative effects; and (d) 
the effects of the rest of the labor-market institutional variables are insignificant. Fitoussi 
et al.32 conclude that these findings provide modest support to the labor-market rigidity 
view. Labor market policies and institutions can at least explain the persistence of 
unemployment in some nations, and the institutional reforms in the OECD countries can 
                                                 
32 Fitoussi et al. point out that Ireland succeeded in reducing unemployment rate with little or no reform of 
their labor market institutions. 
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only explain a small portion of the heterogeneity in unemployment rates across the 
countries.  
The IMF (2003) study aims at answering “how well institutions explain the 
evolution of unemployment over time and between countries, and which institutions turn 
out to matter most and why?”  For the IMF study, Baccarro and Rei (2005) comment that 
it is “the paper that perhaps provides the strongest evidence supporting the deregulatory 
view”. The IMF study performs econometric analysis on a sample of twenty OECD 
countries during the period 1960 to 1998. It estimates four panel regression models with 
country-fixed effects. In the first model, the IMF study estimates the effects of labor 
market policy and institutional variables33 such as the benefits replacement ratio, 
employment protection legislation, the tax rate, union density, bargaining centralization, 
interaction between policy and institutional variables, and non-linear effects of 
institutional variables on unemployment rate. This study does not examine the effects of 
active labor market policies and unemployment duration because of lack of data. By 
adding additional independent variables, the IMF study obtains three additional models 
and analyzes those. The additional variables include lagged unemployment rate, 
interaction between lagged unemployment rate and institutions, measure of central bank 
independence34, interaction between the measure of central bank independence and 
bargaining coordination, macroeconomic shock variables such as productivity shock, 
trade shock and interest rate shock, country-specific time trends, and dummies to control 
                                                 
33 The IMF study uses data for labor market policies and institutions from an extended version of the 
“Labor Market Institutions Database” assembled by Nickell and Nunziata (2001). 
34 The central bank interdependence variable captures the degree to which monetary authority is able to 
resist political pressure to raise prices or cause inflation in an economy. 
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for the effects of German reunification and that of Finland’s fall in trade with former 
Soviet Union in 1990 and 1991. From the estimation of the four models, the IMF study 
finds that: (a) the generosity of unemployment benefits increases unemployment via 
increasing unemployment persistence; (b) unionization or union density increases 
unemployment; (c) employment protection legislation increases unemployment, but this 
effect reduces with the increase in the degree of  unionization; (d) the tax wedge 
increases unemployment, but this effect decreases with the increase in the degree of 
unionization; and (e) bargaining coordination generates opposite effects on 
unemployment, which does not allow to draw any general conclusion concerning its 
overall effect.  
Belot and van Ours (2004) examine the LMF hypothesis by estimating the 
effects of labor market policies and institutions, and also the effects of interdependence 
(measured by the interactions) between the policy and institutional variables on 
unemployment.  As mentioned above, Elmeskov et al. (1998) also include interactions 
between institutions as explanatory variables in their model, but Belot and van Ours 
include a comparatively wider set of interactions. Belot and van Ours particularly focus 
on three types of interactions between institutional variables which include: (i) an 
interaction between the labor tax rate and unemployment benefits, (ii) interactions 
between the level of wage bargaining and employment protection legislation, and (iii) an 
interaction between the level of wage bargaining and union density. Belot and van Ours 
estimate the effects of labor market policy and institutional variables, interacted 
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institutions and change in inflation rate on standardized unemployment rate35 (and non- 
employment rate) for a sample of seventeen OECD countries over five-year periods 
between 1960 and 1996. In their model, they also, control for unobserved variation across 
countries and time-periods by including country fixed-effects and time fixed-effects, 
respectively. Belot and van Ours report results from seven regressions, four of which test 
only the direct effects of policy and institutional variables on unemployment and the last 
three include both the direct and the indirect (measured by the interacted institutions) 
effects. The results reveal that: (a) the unemployment benefits replacement rate, the tax 
rate, and union density increase unemployment and employment protection legislation 
and the bargaining coordination decrease it, when country and time fixed-effects are not 
included in the model. The finding that employment protection legislation decreases 
unemployment is contrary to the findings of Scarpetta (1996) and Elmeskov  et al.(1998) 
as well as to the LMF hypothesis; (b) the results presented in (a) become insignificant 
once country fixed-effects and time fixed-effects are included in the model; (c) the 
interaction between the tax rate and the benefits replacement rate increases 
unemployment, which implies that the tax rate generates greater effects on 
unemployment rate in case the benefits replacement rate is high, and alternatively, the 
benefits replacement rate have greater effect on the unemployment rate in case the tax 
rate is high; and (d) the benefits replacement rate decreases unemployment when the 
interaction between the tax rate and the benefits replacement rate is included in the 
model.  
                                                 
35 The data of standardized unemployment rate that is used is measured by the OECD. 
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Nickell et al. (2005) examine how much of long-term variation in unemployment 
rates for twenty OECD nations over the period 1961 to 1995 is explained by the changes 
in their labor market policies and institutions. In their study, Nickell et al. test a null 
hypothesis, which is secular shifts in unemployment are explained by secular shifts in 
labor market policies institutions, and an alternative hypothesis, which is variation in 
long-term unemployment rates are explained by interaction between labor market policies 
and institutions and external macroeconomic shocks, and not by change in labor market 
policies and institutions. To test the null hypothesis, Nickell et al. estimate the effects of 
various labor market policy and institutional variables and interaction of those variables 
with shock variables (labor demand shock, total factor productivity shock, real import 
price shock, money supply shock and real interest rate) on unemployment rate. Nickell et 
al. also include one-period lagged unemployment rate and its interaction with 
employment protection legislation to take account of unemployment persistence, and 
dummies for country and time as explanatory variables in their model. From the 
estimation of the model, Nickell et al. find that: (a) employment protection legislation 
increases unemployment, especially by raising unemployment persistence; (b) the 
benefits systems raises unemployment; (c) union density has no significant effect on 
unemployment, but the rate of change of union density raises unemployment; (d) the tax 
rate increases unemployment, but in coordinated systems the tax rate decreases 
unemployment; (e) except for money supply shock, other observable shock variables 
show significant impact on unemployment. 
To test the alternative hypothesis, Nickell et al. introduce interactions of labor 
market policy and institutional variables with unobserved shocks. They capture the 
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effects of the shocks by time dummies. The inclusion of the interaction terms makes their 
model a non-linear one. Hence, Nickell et al. perform a non-linear estimation. The 
findings reveal that interacted institutions with time-effects (or unobserved shocks) do 
not have any significant effect on unemployment. Hence, Nickell et al., contrary to 
Blanchard and Wolfers’ conclusion, conclude that not the interaction between institutions 
and unobserved shocks, but the changes in labor market policies and institutions solely 
explain the changes in unemployment rates across OECD nations.   
Baccarro and Rei (2005) perform a time-series cross-section analysis on OECD 
countries during 1960-98 to examine whether or not systemic deregulation of national 
labor markets reduces unemployment rate. For their analysis they use a basic model that 
estimates the effects of various labor market policy and institutional variables,  
interaction between bargaining coordination and union density, interaction between 
bargaining coordination and the tax wedge, interaction between bargaining coordination 
and employment protection legislation, interaction between bargaining coordination and 
the benefits replacement rate, and interaction between bargaining coordination and 
central bank independence on unemployment rate. Baccarro and Rei begin their analysis 
by estimating a full static model using annual data, and arrive finally at their preferred 
model specification, which is a static fixed-effects model in first differences estimated by 
using five-year averaged data. The preferred model includes all the policy and 
institutional variables, no interacted institutions, and only interest rate as macroeconomic 
control. From the estimation of the preferred model, Baccarro and Rei find that: (a) all 
institutional variables have insignificant or negative effect on unemployment, except 
unionization rate, which has a significant and positive effect; and (b) real interest rates 
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and index of central bank independence have significant and positive effects on 
unemployment. Unlike, other studies testing the LMF hypothesis, Bacarro and Rei devote 
extreme attention toward the robustness of their findings. For this purpose, they explore 
both static and dynamic models using both annual and averages data series, and running 
numerous alternative techniques of estimation. Baccarro and Rei also, account for 
methodological problems that are generally associated with time-series cross-section 
analyses. 
The Bassanini and Duval (2006)36 study is one of the latest efforts of the OECD 
to reassess the recommendations of the OECD Jobs Study (1994). In this study, Bassanini 
and Duval estimate a static baseline model using data for twenty OECD countries over 
the period 1982-2003. The baseline model tests the effects of labor market policy and 
institutional variables, interacted institutions, macroeconomic shock variables (including, 
total factor productivity shock, terms-of-trade shock, interest rate shock and labor 
demand shock), and stringency of product market regulation (PMR) on unemployment 
rate. To measure the stringency of PMR, Bassanini and Duval use a PMR indicator only 
for non-manufacturing industries, which does not incorporate all the aspects of regulatory 
reforms affecting all sectors that have been undertaken by OECD countries in the past 
few decades. In their baseline model, Bassanini and Duval also include output gap 
variable to control for the cyclical effects of unemployment, and country and time 
dummies. Bassanini and Duval estimate seven baseline models from which they find that 
                                                 
36 The empirical analysis of Bassanini and Duval (2006) is presented in OECD’s Employment Outlook of 
2006 (OECD, Chap.7, 2006). 
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(a) employment protection legislation37 had no significant effect on unemployment; (b) 
the benefits replacement rate, the tax wedge, and high corporatism increase 
unemployment; (c) in five out of seven estimations, effect of union density on 
unemployment is negative and insignificant, and for the rest two is positive, but 
significant in one and insignificant in the other; and (d) the stringent product market 
regulation increase unemployment.  
Berger and Danninger (2006) examine the effects of product market as well as 
labor market policies and institutions on employment growth, but unlike Scarpetta (1996) 
and Bassanini and Duval (2006), Berger and Danninger explore the impacts of 
interactions between the product and labor market policy and institutional variables. They 
perform their analysis on OECD countries over a period from 1990 to 2004. Berger and 
Danninger use the OECD’s six indicators of product market regulation (PMR), which 
capture different aspects of the regulation38. Berger and Danninger capture labor market 
regulation by the OECD’s measure of strictness of employment protection legislation 
(EPL). In their model, Berger and Danninger estimate the effects of the PMR, the EPL 
and interaction between the EPL and the PMR on employment growth rate of 
employment. The interaction term is in the form of a dummy variable, which is set equal 
to unity if a country has above average product and labor market regulation and zero 
                                                 
37 Bassanini and Duval use the OECD’s latest and truly annual series (and not an interpolated one) of the 
employment protection legislation, which is used for the first time. 
38 The six PMR indicators include aggregate regulation, administrative regulation, economic regulation, 
barriers to entrepreneurship, degree of state control, and barriers to trade and investment. The measures of 
the indicators are in the form of categorical variables such that each indicator takes a value of zero when 




otherwise. From the estimation of the model, Berger and Danninger find that: (a) both 
product and labor market deregulation increase employment; and (b) the effect of 
deregulating one market on employment increases with the decrease in the regulation in 
the other market.  Berger and Danninger conclude that labor market reforms generate 
greater employment growth rates if the product market is more competitive and product 
market deregulations generate greater employment growth rates when labor markets are 
less regulated. And based on the findings, they also conclude that the benefits of 
structural reforms have differed so much among OECD countries because of the 
differences in their degrees of product market regulation.  
Griffith et al. (2007) examine the roles of both labor market and product market 
reforms in reducing unemployment rates in OECD countries over the eighties and the 
nineties. In their model, they estimate the effects of labor and product market regulations 
and an interaction between both on unemployment rate. They measure labor market 
regulations by the bargaining power of the workers (collective bargaining coverage and 
trade union membership), the tax wedge, employment protection legislation and the 
benefits replacement ratio. They use a measure of average firm profitability in an 
economy to represent product market regulation. Griffith et al. introduce one interaction 
between the average firm profitability and bargaining coverage and another interaction 
between the average firm profitability and union density. They do this to test whether or 
not production market deregulation reduces unemployment more when the union 
bargaining power is higher. In their model, Griffith et al. also control for other factors 
such as real exchange rate, change in inflation rate, output gap, and public sector 
employment rate. In order to check the robustness of their results, Griffith et al. perform 
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the same analysis by using employment rate as the dependent variable, instead of 
unemployment rate. From the estimation of their models, Griffith et al. find that: (a) the 
tax wedge and the benefits replacement rate increase unemployment rate; (b) the EPL 
shows no significant association with unemployment rate; (c) the product market reforms 
increase employment; and (d) the employment gains through product market regulations 
are higher when the bargaining strength of the unions are high. From these findings, 
Griffith et al. conclude that both labor and product market deregulation increase 
employment, but the increase from product market deregulation is greater when the labor 
markets are more rigid. 
Fiori et al. (2007) examine the effects of both labor and product market 
regulations and their effects in combination on employment. In their study, Fiori et al. 
test whether product market deregulation generates greater beneficial employment effects 
when labor market is highly or lowly regulated, or in other words, test whether or not 
product and labor market deregulations are complements. They also test whether product 
market deregulation facilitates labor market deregulation by reducing workers’ 
bargaining power, or in other words, whether or not product and labor market 
deregulation are substitutes. To perform these tests Fiori et al. employ harmonized annual 
data for twenty OECD countries from 1980 to 2003. They use employment protection 
legislation, gross benefits replacement rates, the tax wedge, a measure of unionism 
(combination of union density and coverage rate), and a measure of corporatism 
(combination of bargaining centralization and coordination) as indicators of labor market 
regulation. Fiori et al. include both domestic regulations and border barriers to construct 
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an indicator of product market regulation (PMR)39. They estimate the effects of the PMR 
indicator, the labor market regulation indicators and the interactions between the PMR 
and labor market regulations on employment and find that: (a) the product market 
deregulation increases employment; (b) high regulations in the labor market or high 
unionism reduce employment, which supports the LMF hypothesis; (c) the effect of 
interaction between product and labor market regulation on employment in significant 
and negative. From these findings, Fiori et al. conclude that labor and product market 
reforms increase employment and product market deregulation increases employment 
more in case labor market policies and institutions are stricter. Fiori et al. also note that 
the finding that product market deregulation facilitates labor market deregulation is an 
important one because in situations where it is politically difficult to reform labor 
markets, conducting product market deregulation will deregulate the labor market. 
Rovelli and Bruno (2008) is the first study that tests the LMF hypothesis across 
twenty-seven European Union (EU) countries. Rovelli and Bruno examine whether or not 
the heterogeneity in employment outcomes across the twenty-seven EU countries are 
explained by differences in their labor market policies and institutions. Before performing 
their analysis, Rovelli and Bruno caution the readers that it is not possible to adequately 
control for reverse causality or endogeneity between employment outcome and policy 
and institutional variables, and for the unobserved effects of omitted variables. And 
                                                 
39 Fiori et al. (2007) use measures of domestic regulations in certain non-manufacturing sectors in the 
areas of public ownership of the firms, legal barriers to access markets and other barriers to entry related to 
market and industry structures to construct summary indicator for domestic PMR and restrictions on 
foreign direct investment to construct an indicator of border barriers. They combine the two indicators (the 




hence, finding a positive association between generosity of policy and employment rate, 
should not be considered as causality running from the former to the latter. Instead, it 
should be considered as a prima facie evidence against a negative causation. Rovelli and 
Bruno also, mention that the hypothesis of positive causalities between generous policies 
and employment outcomes should be considered simply as “educated guesses” and the 
results of analyses should be considered as a structured description of the data. 
For empirical analysis, due to the lack of data for the new EU members before 
2000, Rovelli and Bruno use data for the period 2000 to 2005; they use data for two 
periods, 2000-02 and 2003-05. To test the LMF hypothesis, Rovelli and Bruno estimate 
the effects of labor market policy and institutional variables on employment rate. They 
use ratio of expenditure on active (and passive) labor market policies to GDP as a 
measure of labor market policy generosity. They use an index of employment rigidity 
(that they extract from World Bank’s “Doing Business Database”) as a measure of 
policy-induced rigidity. However, later on Rovelli and Bruno replace this index by the 
OECD’s measure of strictness of employment protection legislation (EPL). Rovelli and 
Bruno also incorporate the tax wedge, and an indicator of product market regulation (the 
OECD’s index of impediments to product market competition) as explanatory variables, 
and estimate their effects on the employment rate. In addition to the policy and 
institutional variables, Rovelli and Bruno also include a lagged GDP per capita variable, 
a dummy for cultural differences (Catholic or Orthodox) and its interaction with the 
measure of active labor market policies (ALMPs) and a measure of “pro-work” attitude 
and its interaction with the ALMPs measure. From their analyses Rovelli and Bruno find 
that: (a) the ALMPs and employment rates are positively and significantly associated, 
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which is found to hold that in case of countries that have higher “pro-work” attitude; (b) 
effect of interrelation between the ALMPs and culture is significant; (c) the passive 
policies and the employment rate are positively and significantly associated; (d) the EPL 
(or index of employment rigidity) and the employment rate are not significantly 
associated, (or weakly positively associated in case of few model specifications); (e) the 
introduction of the EPL in a model reinforces the positive effect of the ALMP measure 
on employment rate; (g) the tax wedge and the employment rate are not significantly 
associated; and (h)  the product market regulation and the employment rate are negatively 
and significantly associated. From these findings Rovelli and Bruno conclude that lower 
degrees of rigidities in labor market institutions and in the product market institutions 
increase employment rates and the increase in expenditures on employment enhancing 
labor market policies, especially active labor market policies increases employment rates. 
2.6 MACROECONOMIC POLICY HYPOTHESIS – REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
Empirical studies supporting the macroeconomic policy (MP) hypothesis blame 
bad macroeconomic policies adopted by European nations for their high rate of 
unemployment. The MP theorists (Solow, 1994; Baker and Schmitt, 1999; Palley, 1998, 
1999; Palley, 2001, 2004; Galbraith and Garcilazo, 2004; Garcilazo; 2005; Galbraith, 
2006; Howell et al., 2007) reject the LMF hypothesis and emphasize the role of European 
Central Bank’s (and of the Bundesbank before it) policy choices of maintaining stable 
inflation rates and that of the fiscal austerity imposed by the Maastricht criteria in 
explaining European high unemployment during the eighties and the nineties. In their 
empirical analyses, some MP theorists critically assess the LMF hypothesis, while others 
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test the effects of macroeconomic variables on unemployment (or employment) rate. A 
review of some of the empirical studies advocating the MP hypothesis (and rejecting the 
LMF hypothesis) is presented as follows: 
Baker and Schmitt (1999) argue that the rise of European unemployment is due 
to the macroeconomic demand constrained policies – reducing inflation and maintaining 
fiscal austerity – adopted by European nations to join the European Union followed by 
adopting the euro. Baker and Schmitt say that because of economic interdependence – 
through international product market, international capital market and international 
exchange rate market – between European nations, the effects of the policy decisions 
made under the Maastricht Treaty quickly transmitted across national frontiers and led to 
the simultaneous rise in unemployment rates in European countries. In order to test their 
hypothesis, Baker and Schmitt estimate the effects of foreign economic growth on 
unemployment rate, where the measure of the foreign economic growth rate is weighted 
by each country’s export share in GDP (that is, the percentage of an economy’s GDP 
dependent on exports). The result shows that slow foreign growth is a major factor 
behind the rise in each country’s unemployment rate.  
Baker et al. (2005)40 critically assess the LMF hypothesis. Firstly, Baker et al. 
present scatter plots displaying a direct relationship between unemployment rate and each 
“employment-unfriendly” labor market policy and institutional variable for twenty 
OECD countries over four five-year periods from 1980-1999.  From the plots, they find 
that none of the relationships show a statistically meaningful association. Secondly, 
                                                 
40 Baker et al. (2005) is same as Baker et al. (2003). 
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Baker et al. critically review seven notable studies advocating the LMF hypothesis and 
conclude that the studies provide very weak empirical support for the LMF hypothesis. 
They point out that the ranges of the estimates of same policy and institutional variables 
vary widely across studies, indicating a lack of robustness of the findings. Also, they note 
that, in some studies, the impact sizes of policies and institutions seem implausible. 
Finally, Baker et al. perform their empirical test of the LMF hypothesis on twenty OECD 
countries over the period 1960-99. Using data on policy and institutional variables 
constructed by Nickell et al. (2005), Blanchard and Wolfers (1999), Belot and van Ours 
(2004) and some others, Baker et al. test the sensitivity of the Nickell (1997)’s model. 
Contrary to the results of the Nickell’s study, in which all the policy and institutional 
variables had statistically significant and positive effect on unemployment rate except for 
the EPL, Baker et al. find none of the estimates to be statistically significant except for 
that of union density, which is significant only at 10 percent level. They also find the 
effect of the ALMPs to be insignificant. Baker et al. test another model in which they test 
the effects of policies and institutions and interacted policies and institutions on 
unemployment while controlling for country-fixed effects as well as time-fixed effects. 
The results from the estimation show very little support for the LMF hypothesis. They 
estimate the same model using the same data, but in one case they cover the period from 
1960-84, when most of the rise in unemployment rate occurred, and in second case they 
cover the period 1980-99, when unemployment rates continued to diverge. The results 
from these models reinforce weak support for the LMF hypothesis. 
In Baker et al. (2004) study, Baker et al. extend their critical assessment of the 
studies advocating the LMF hypothesis. They critically review two studies, Nicoletti and 
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Scarpetta (2002) and IMF (2003), which advocate the LMF hypothesis. They point out 
some serious methodological problems associated with the IMF study. Furthermore, they 
test the robustness of the results of the IMF study by estimating the IMF study’s 
regression models after introducing some variations in the models. The estimation yields 
results very different from that of the IMF study. The results also show very weak or 
simply no support for the LMF hypothesis.  
Howell et al. (2007) critically review studies such as Baccaro and Rei (2005) and 
Bassanini and Duval (2006) that advocate the LMF hypothesis. They present multiple 
scatter plots assessing a bivariate relationship of unemployment rate (or change in 
unemployment rate) with each labor market policy and institutional variable such as the 
gross benefits replacement rate, the net benefits replacement rate and the benefits 
duration (change in benefits duration). None of the plots display a positive association to 
show support for the LMF hypothesis. Howell et al. closely study effects of 
unemployment benefits system on unemployment rate. They conduct comprehensive 
Granger-causality tests to test the causality between the gross replacement rate (and each 
of its consecutive four lags) and unemployment rate over the period 1962-2004. The 
findings from the test, contrary to the LMF hypothesis, indicate that the causal relation 
runs from unemployment to benefits and not the other way round.  
Palley (2001, 2004) argues that the high rates of European unemployment are not 
because of rigid, sclerotic European labor markets, but as a result of bad macroeconomic 
policy choices – the adherence to the natural rate theory, and thereby, adopting anti-
inflation policies – and speculative exchange rate conditions due to flexible exchange rate 
system (like, Davidson (1998)). Palley also argues that the effects of bad policy choices 
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spread quickly via trade-based spill-over effects across European countries that led to a 
continent wide rising unemployment rate. To test his hypotheses, Palley begins with 
regressing two lagged unemployment rates on unemployment rate, in order to capture the 
effects of persistence of unemployment over time. From the regression results, he 
concludes that persistence of unemployment is a common feature of all the countries. 
Furthermore,  Palley added various labor market institutional variables, followed by 
country-specific effects for Ireland and Spain (since, both of these countries experienced 
very high rates of unemployment during the period covered in the analysis), 
macroeconomic variables (such as current and lagged GDP growth, lagged real interest 
rate and change in inflation rate), measure of international trade exposure between 
European nations, measure of international trade exposure between the United States, and 
Canada, and country-specific dummies, to the basic model and ended up with six 
different models. From the estimation of the full model, Palley finds that (a) the estimates 
of all the macroeconomic variables, country specific dummies and the international trade 
exposure between European nations are correctly signed and significant at 1 percent 
level; (b) the estimates of the benefits replacement rate, the benefits duration, union 
density and employment protection legislation are all insignificant, while the estimate of 
tax wedge is significant only at 10 percent level; (c) active labor market policies and  
bargaining coordination lower unemployment, while union coverage increases it; and (d) 
the level of significance of each the estimates of the labor market policy and institutional 
variable change each time new variables are added to the model. Therefore, Palley (2001, 
2004) concludes that the results show no support for the LMF hypothesis, and rather, 
supports the MP hypothesis. 
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Garcilazo (2005) examines the sources of high rates of European unemployment 
from three, regional, national and continental, perspectives. Using a fixed-effects panel 
regression model, Garcilazo tests the LMF hypothesis that European regions with lower 
relative wages and more wage inequality face less unemployment and vice versa. He tests 
the effects of regional wage inequality (and regional relative wages) on regional 
unemployment rate. Garcilazo incorporates country-fixed effects in his regional model in 
order to capture the effects of county-specific forces and time-fixed effects to capture the 
effects of continental-level forces. He mentions that the use of country-fixed effects 
allows controlling for the effects of labor market policies and institutions without using 
their low quality data measures. The findings of Garcilazo’s study show that, contrary to 
the LMF hypothesis, wage inequality and unemployment are positively associated and 
relative wages and unemployment are associated negatively. The estimates of the 
country-fixed effects indicate capturing the effects of country-specific forces such as 
appreciation of the pound in the case of UK, reunification in the case of Germany, and 
emigration in the cases of Portugal and Greece. The estimates of the time-fixed effects 
indicate capturing the adverse effects on employment associated with the implementation 
of the Maastricht Treaty. Garcilazo, therefore, concludes that in Europe, high rates of 
unemployment cannot be reduced by labor market reforms, but by compressing wages (or 
reducing wage inequality) and increasing relative wages across European regions.  
2.7 SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CROSS-COUNTRY EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
Policymakers and academicians who prescribe labor market reforms to reduce 
unemployment in European countries rely heavily on the findings of the empirical studies 
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produced by the LMF theorists. But the problems associated with the data and 
methodologies used by these studies raise great concerns over the reliance on their 
findings, and thereby, on the effectiveness of the policy recommendations that are 
proposed based on those findings. The data and methodological problems associated with 
those studies are discussed below. 
2.7.1 Data Problems 
Problems with the Measures of Labor Market Policies and Institutions 
As mentioned before, the OECD’s influential report (OECD, 1994) invited 
researchers to empirically test adverse effects of labor market policies and institutions on 
unemployment. To perform these tests, researchers demanded quantitative measures of 
the policies and institutions that could be used for econometric analyses. Since the 
policies and institutions are highly qualitative in nature, the creation of their quantitative 
measures required considerable subjective judgments. With the growing demand for 
quantitative measures of the policies and institutions, researchers started creating 
quantitative data series for the policies and institutions. Using their subjective judgments, 
they assigned quantitative (or numerical) scores to each policy and institutional variable 
and created their quantitative data series. Layard, Nickell, and various others pioneered in 
the creation of the data measures (Layard et al., 1991; 1994 Nickell and Bell, 1994; and 
Nickell and Layard, 1997; Nickell, 1997). The OECD and some LMF theorists continued 
to devote considerable efforts over time to improve the quality of the data measures 
(Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Nickell and Nunziata, 2001; Nickell et al. 2002; Belot van 
Ours, 2004; and OECD, 2006). However, since the measures were created, their quality 
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and accuracy have remained open to question. Some criticize that the quantitative 
counterparts of the policies and institutions do not represent the qualitative – actual – 
policies and institutions accurately and cannot possibly do that, while others criticize the 
measures for being biased.  
Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) criticize one of the early measures of 
unemployment benefits system, namely the unemployment benefits duration. They argue 
that the duration measure does not account for the variations in the actual institutional 
design of the benefits system that prevails across countries. The duration measure was 
renounced over time and studies began using a gross benefits replacement rate measure 
representing the generosity of the benefits system. This measure was created to 
incorporate both the levels of benefits payments and the duration of benefits. In recent 
years, the OECD has produced a measure of net replacement rate, which is said to be 
more appropriate than the gross measure. However, Howell et al. (2007) point out that 
even the net replacement rate measure, like the gross one, does not account for some 
critical features of the unemployment benefits system. 
Garcilazo (2005) critically examines Nickell (1997)’s six-year averaged measures 
of union density, union coverage, and the degree of coordination, and also Belot and van 
Ours (2004)’s five-year averaged measures of union density, union coverage, the degree 
of centralization, and the degree of coordination. He points out that none of the measures 
captures the actual variations in those institutions, which exist across countries and across 
time.  
Howell et al. (2007) discuss the unreliability of the measure of strictness of 
employment protection legislation (EPL). They mention that an early measure of the EPL 
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was constructed by the OECD for only two data points, one for the late eighties and 
another for the late nineties. Using the two data points, researchers created two additional 
data points, one for the early eighties and another for 1990-94, by the method of 
interpolation. Later on, Blanchard and Wolfers merged Lazear’s measure of the EPL with 
that of the OECD’s one and produced an EPL measure for five-year periods from the 
early sixties to the late nineties. Furthermore, Nickell et al. (2002, 2003) annualized the 
five-year periods series by interpolation. Recently, the OECD (OECD, 2006) has 
produced a more comprehensive data series of the strictness of the EPL, which is said to 
be a superior and a truly annualized series of the EPL, but since its construction involves 
subjective judgment, the accuracy of the EPL series remains questionable.  
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) criticize the data measures on labor market policy 
and institutional variables for being biased by stating that:  
One must worry however that these results are in part the result of research 
Darwinism. The measures used by Nickell have all been constructed ex-post 
facto, by researchers who were not unaware of unemployment developments. 
When constructing a measure of employment protection for Spain, it is hard to 
forget that unemployment in Spain is very high… Also, given the complexity in 
measuring institutions, measures which do well in explaining unemployment have 
survived better than those that did not (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000, pg.C22). 
 
Howell et al. (2007) also point out that the LMF theorists who created the measures are 
the advocates of LMF hypothesis, and hence, when they assigned quantitative values to 
the policy and institutional variables, their judgments could possibly have been biased 
toward assigning such values which would confirm their hypothesis. They, therefore, 
conclude that such bias leads to the problem of self selection in the creation of the 
measures.   
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 In spite of severe criticisms of the data measures of the labor market policies and 
institutions, even today the measures are widely used in empirical analyses, which is 
evident from the recent studies such as Bassanini and Duval (2006), Berger and 
Danninger, (2006), Griffith et al. (2007), Fiori et al. (2007) and Rovelli and Bruno 
(2008).  
 
Problems with the Measure of Unemployment 
The data series on unemployment used by empirical studies testing the LMF 
hypothesis are not without criticism. Howell et al. (2007) point out some of the problems 
with the data series on unemployment. They point out that with the over flow of 
empirical studies testing the LMF hypothesis, some empiricists started extending the 
period of coverage of their analyses by going back to even the sixties. Over such a long 
period of time, many countries have changed their national method of data collection; 
therefore, the historical consistency of the data series of unemployment rate starting from 
the sixties is questionable.  Howell et al., in this context, comment that there exists no 
data series on unemployment for most of the European nations, which is historically 
consistent and comparable across the nations even beginning from the seventies.  
2.7.2 Methodological Problems 
Lack of Robustness 
As mentioned earlier, the results of empirical studies supporting LMF hypothesis 
suffer from a lack of robustness. The lack of robustness is evident from the sensitivity of 
the estimates of labor market policy and institutional variables to both the changes in the 
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source of data and the changes in model specification. Baker et al. (2004, 2005) review 
some empirical studies advocating the LMF hypothesis, showing that changes in data 
source or in model specification not only change the magnitude and the sign of the 
estimates of policy and institutional variable considerably, but also their levels of 
significance across studies. This is also evident from the review of the studies presented 
in this dissertation in Sections 2.5 and 2.6. When Baker et al. (2005) tested the sensitivity 
of the models of Nickell (1997)’s study by using comparatively better (or say, a different) 
data series of policies and institutions, all estimates that were statistically significant in 
Nickell’s study became statistically insignificant. And, when Baker et al. (2004) 
introduced minor variations in the IMF study’s models and estimated those, the results 
were found to be notably different from that of the IMF study.  
Problem of Endogeneity or Reverse Causation 
Based on the LMF hypothesis, empirical studies hold that the generosity of 
unemployment benefits increases unemployment rate, while active labor market policies 
(ALMPs) decrease it. They therefore, test the effects of these policies on unemployment, 
expecting that the coefficient for unemployment benefits to be positive, while that of the 
ALMPs is negative. But Baker et al. (2004, 2005), Garcilazo (2005), Howell et al. (2007) 
argue that the estimates are flawed because there exists the possibility of reverse 
causation or endogeneity between these policies and the unemployment rate. The reverse 
causation arises in case of unemployment benefits and the ALMPs because in the face of 
rising unemployment rates, governments are likely to increase the generosity of 
unemployment benefits and/or increase their spending on the ALMPs, leading the 
causality to run from the policies to unemployment rate and not the other way round, as 
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suggested by the LMF theorists. In spite of the possibility of reverse causation, most of 
the studies do not even mention the possibility, let alone address it.  
Lack of Diversity in Methodological Approaches 
Empirical studies testing the LMF hypothesis lack diversity in their general 
methodological approaches. As is evident from the review of the empirical studies 
presented in Section 2.5, the studies unanimously perform econometric analyses to test 
the effects of policies and institutions on some measure of unemployment or employment 
at a national-level. These studies, in general, perform their analysis on European (and 
other OECD) countries using annual or five to six-year averaged series. And in spite of 
the poor quality of the data measures of the policies and institutions, they use those 
measures.  The lack of diversity of these studies has led theorists to neglect important 
aspects of the European (and other OECD) economies that can generate better and 
meaningful explanations for the problem of European unemployment. This dissertation 
therefore, departs from the general approach of the existing studies and analyzes the 
problem of Europe’s unemployment by developing and using certain numerical 
methodological tools. 
2.8 STUDY OF UNEMPLOYMENT AT A CONTINENTAL LEVEL 
LMF theorists explain the high and heterogeneous unemployment rates across 
European countries by the differences in wage rigidity across the countries, which exist 
due to cross-country differences in labor market policy and institutional variables. Their 
focus on country-specific policy and institutional variables to explain the changes in 
country-specific unemployment rates reveals that the theorists consider each European 
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country (and its labor market) to be a separate entity unaffected by the changes taking 
place in other countries, when the fact is that they are not separate, but highly 
interdependent. As mentioned in Chapter One, due to economic interdependence between 
European countries, changes in transnational factors – international, continental or global 
factors – explain variations in relative employment (or unemployment) rates and relative 
wages across the countries. This dissertation recognizes that since European countries are 
interdependent, taking account of the effects of transnational variables may generate 
meaningful explanations for the variations in relative wages and relative employment (or 
unemployment) rates across European countries, which have been overlooked by the 
LMF theorists Therefore, the prime goal of this dissertation is to study European problem 
of high unemployment from a continental-level, and not a country-level, perspective. Its 
basic approach for the study is to test whether relative wages between countries are rigid, 
as suggested by LMF theorists, or flexible, due to the effects of transnational variables, 
and thereby, determine the factors that explain the nature of relative wages, and thereby, 
explain fluctuations in unemployment rates across European countries.  
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Chapter 3:  Notion of “Wage Rigidity” and the Study of European 
Wage Structure 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
Wage rigidity, since the 1990s, has been the central focus of mainstream 
academicians and policymakers, who advocate the labor market flexibility (LMF) 
hypothesis in the study of European problem of high unemployment. The advocates of 
the LMF hypothesis – the LMF theorists – state that certain labor market policies and 
institutions make wages rigid (downwardly), which hinders appropriate labor market 
adjustment, and thereby, increase unemployment. Therefore, to reduce unemployment, 
they prescribe reforming those labor market policies and institutions to eliminate wage 
rigidity and facilitate wage flexibility for ensuring unhindered labor market functioning, 
or in other words, to ensure labor market flexibility. Hence, the term “labor market 
flexibility”, coined by the LMF theorists, is often considered to be synonymous with 
“wage flexibility”. The following quotes show the emphasis of LMF theorists on the role 
of labor market policies and institutions in preventing labor market flexibility or wage 
flexibility. 
All countries have experienced a shift in demand away from unskilled jobs 
towards more highly skilled jobs. In most countries where relative wages have 
been flexible (the United States, Canada, Australia), both the relative employment 
and unemployment rates of the unskilled changed little during the 1980s. In 
comparatively inflexible Europe, on the other hand, both relative employment and 
unemployment deteriorated (OECD, 1994a; Part I, pg. 23). 
 
The OECD countries indeed show a wide range of labor market policy strategies 
as well as very different institutional settings that intervene in the functioning of 
the market (Scarpetta, 1996). 
 
Empirical evidence emphasizes the importance of wage flexibility in reducing 
unemployment. Aggregate wage flexibility tends to neutralize adverse shocks to 
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aggregate labor demand, while relative wage flexibility helps attaining better 
matching of labor demand and supply across different groups (Scarpetta, 1996).  
 
A country that institutionally prohibits flexible wages at the lower end can be 
expected to have a low percentage of employment in low-paid jobs (Seibert, 
1997). 
 
The combination of intensified competition in a global economy and of labor-
saving technical progress requires flexibility in wages, but this flexibility in 
prevented by institutional conditions (Seibert, 1997).  
 
Wage formation in the United States comes close to being a market process; it is 
decentralized, with low unionization and low coordination of wage changes 
across the economy. However, wage negotiations in European countries exhibit 
characteristics that move formation away from the market process (OECD, 1994): 
wages are often not determined on the firm level but on the industry level or even 
at the economy-wide level (Seibert, 1997). 
 
…starting from a simple notion of an equilibrium in a classically clearing labor 
market, institutional arrangements can influence the clearing function of the labor 
market in basically three ways: by weakening the demand for labor, making it less 
attractive to hire a worker by explicitly pushing up the wage costs or by 
introducing  a negative shadow price for labor; by distorting the labor supply; and 
by impairing the equilibrating function of the market mechanism (for instance, by 
influencing bargaining behavior) (Seibert, 1997). 
 
…the equilibrium level of unemployment is affected first, by any factor which 
influences the ease with which unemployed individuals can be matched to 
available job vacancies, and second, by any factor which tends to raise wages in a 
direct fashion despite excess supply in the labor market. These factors often take 
the form of labor market institutions (Nickell et al. 2005). 
 
The basic goal of the LMF theorists to reform policies and institutions is to 
weaken or simply eliminate the sources of wage rigidity or barriers to wage flexibility, 
and allow labor market forces – labor supply and labor demand – to clear the labor 
market.  Section 3.2 describes various labor market policies and institutions, which act as 
barriers to wage flexibility in Europe. Section 3.3 reveals some sources of wage 
flexibility across economically interdependent European countries, which are neglected 
by the LMF theorists. Section 3.4 provides a brief outline of the methodological approach 
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of this dissertation to measure relative wage flexibility in Europe and determine the 
factors that lead to such flexibility. 
3.2 BARRIERS TO WAGE FLEXIBILITY – LABOR MARKET POLICIES AND 
INSTITUTIONS 
Four institutional layers that the LMF theorists say affects labor market outcomes 
are: (i) the labor market mechanism of labor supply and demand adjustments via wage 
adjustment; (ii) the systems of wage determination and bargaining, which comprise the 
role of trade unions and the centralization and coordination of bargaining; (iii) the legal 
system of employment protection legislation that shields workers from uncertain risks; 
and (iv) the system of non-employment income, that is, unemployment benefits system. 
To reduce unemployment in Europe, LMF theorists call for reducing or eliminating the 
effects of the last three layers and impart the first layer the sole role to influence the 
outcomes. The OECD’s influential report (OECD, 1994a, Part III, pg.43-49) proposed 
nine recommendations to reduce high rates of unemployment in European (and other 
OECD) countries, out of which the fifth, sixth, and ninth proposed enhancing the role of 
the first layer, while curtailing or eliminating the roles of the other layers. The fifth 
recommendation proposed making wages and labor costs flexible (downwardly) to 
enhance competition in the labor market and allow market forces to clear the labor 
market. The sixth and ninth recommendations targeted at limiting or simply eliminating 
employment protection legislation and unemployment benefits systems, respectively.  
As mentioned in Chapter One, labor market policies and institutions that are 
considered by the LMF theorists as “employment-unfriendly” – generate adverse effects 
on employment rates – for European countries include: unemployment benefits 
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replacement rate, unemployment benefits duration, employment protection legislation, 
union coverage, union density, the centralization and coordination of bargaining 
institution and the tax wedge41. One set of policies, that is, the active labor market 
policies is however, considered by the LMF theorists to be “employment-friendly” 
policies. Therefore, they propose expanding the role of active policies to reduce 
unemployment, which is evident from the seventh recommendation of the OECD’s 
influential report42.   
Labor market policies and institutions are not recent phenomena in the Europe. As 
a result of the lessons learned from the two World Wars, the Great Depression and the 
period of growth after the Second World War till the seventies, the policies and 
institutions emerged in the developed world in order to generate benefits on both 
efficiency and equity grounds. In this context, Howell (2005) states that: 
The Great Depression helped teach the lesson that too much inequality, economic 
insecurity, and lack of access by large parts of the population to basic needs such 
as food, health and safety, housing, and education can cripple economic 
efficiency. The case for a healthy, safe, decently housed, and adequately educated 
workforce – all of which requires some minimal level of income, which in turn 
requires employment and insurance against job loss – can be traced back to Alfred 
Marshall’s Principles of Economics (1890) and even further back to Adam 
Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776) (Howell, 2005, Chap.1, pg. 8).  
 
The policies and institutions were adopted to benefit the people and the economy as a 
whole. Unions and collective bargaining aimed at raising workers’ voice and encourage 
                                                 
41 The “employment-unfriendly” policies and institutions are also referred as the “usual suspects” (Nickell 
et al., 2005), which all the LMF theorists unanimously suspect to cause rising unemployment rates in 
Europe. 
42 The seventh recommendation of OECD’s report (OECD, 1994a, Part III, pg.43-49) proposes to expand 




stability in industrial relations. Unemployment insurance and other non-employment 
income assistance financially aided workers during their times of need, and also 
facilitated them to search for jobs. Employment protection legislation protected workers 
from sudden and unfair dismissals. But, in spite of the several benefits associated with 
these policies and institutions, the LMF theorists rarely mention them.   
The rest of this section provides a discussion of unemployment benefits system, 
the system of wage determination and bargaining institution, employment protection 
legislation, the labor tax wedge and active labor market policies. Among these policies 
and institutions, the unemployment benefits system, the systems of wage determination 
and bargaining, and the employment protection legislation are considered as the barriers 
to wage flexibility by the LMF theorists. Although employment protection legislation is 
primarily said to influence employment flexibility, the LMF theorists describe that in a 
way it may also make wages rigid.  
3.2.1 Unemployment Benefits System 
Unemployment benefits are the payments that are made by the government to 
support the unemployed. These payments not only meet the immediate financial needs of 
the unemployed, but also aid them financially while they search for the right job that 
matches their skill-sets and not take up the first job available to them. By aiding the 
unemployed to search for jobs efficiently, the benefits payments also help the employers 
by enabling them to find employees with skills that they are looking for.  
Unemployment benefits system came into existence in Europe in the 1800s. In 
1832, the foundry men’s union in Britain established the first unemployment insurance 
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(UI) system; in 1892, the typographers’ union created the UI fund in Sweden. These 
primordial systems were provided by trade unions. In 1901, the first public UI system, 
known as the ‘Gent-system’, was introduced in a Belgian town called Gent. Under this 
system, union-administered UI funds received public support in the form of government 
subsidies. Germany, Britain, France, and the Nordic countries (except Sweden) adopted 
the Gent-system during the pre-World War I period. However, in 1911 Britain replaced 
the system by a compulsory UI system. By the end of the First World War several 
European countries adopted a compulsory UI system. Among the Nordic countries, 
Norway introduced its compulsory UI system in 1938, and only Denmark, Finland, 
Sweden, and Iceland maintained the Gent-system. Belgium, over the time, moved to an 
intermediate system administered by unions, but with compulsory membership 
(Holmlund, 1998).  
With the evolution and persistence of high rates of unemployment rate in Europe 
during the last few decades, economists searched for the contributions of structural 
factors of the labor market for the evolution and persistence. In this search, the generosity 
of unemployment benefits was picked as a prime factor43. Labor economists used 
frameworks provided by the job search theory of the seventies to empirically investigate 
the effects of unemployment benefits on the outcomes of the labor market. The 
framework of the natural rate theory of unemployment further enabled them to 
                                                 
43 Not only the economists of the recent decades, but also the economists of the interwar period such as 
A.C. Pigou, John Hicks, Edwin Cannan, Henry Clay, Eli Hecksher and Gustav Cassel have commented 
about the effects of unemployment insurance policies on the labor market. The earlier economists argued 
that the unemployment benefits payments raise wage pressure by strengthening the bargaining position of 
the unions. They also argued that such payments also affect job-search behavior and the duration of 
unemployment (Holmlund, 1998). 
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empirically assess the effects of the generosity of unemployment benefits on the natural 
(or structural) rate of unemployment.  
Effects on the Labor Market – Wage and Employment 
LMF theorists consider the generosity of unemployment benefits to be a barrier to 
wage flexibility. They state that the generosity of unemployment benefits affects wages 
in ways that generate upward wage pressure and restrict wage flexibility. LMF theorists 
describe a number of ways in which unemployment benefits affect wage, unemployment 
and unemployment persistence, which are: (i) unemployment benefits payments increase 
the reservation wage of the unemployed, which makes them reluctant to accept a job at a 
wage below their reservation wage; therefore, while they receive benefits, the 
unemployed maintain their reservation wage and prefer not to exit unemployment. In this 
context, Siebert (1997, pg.51) states that: “….a higher reservation wage traps the 
beneficiaries in unemployment and impairs the market clearing role of wages.” The 
higher reservation wage is also said to raise the floor of the wage structure, which prices 
the less-skilled out of the market; (ii) unemployment benefits payments reduce the cost of 
becoming unemployed, and hence, encourage the employed “insiders” to take the risk of 
getting fired and raise their wage claims. Also, knowing that unemployment benefits aid 
the unemployed beneficiaries, the employed “insiders” push their wage demands up 
without considering that their wage claims  reduce the chances of the unemployed to get 
hired; and (iii) unemployment benefits payments support the unemployed financially, and 
hence, reduce their incentive to search for jobs or take up a job – given the option to 
remain unemployed and receive a low income in the form of benefits or to take up a full-
time job and earn an income above the level of benefits, unemployed beneficiaries may 
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prefer the former and not search for jobs or take up a job until the benefits payments flow 
in – which increases unemployment. If the duration of benefits payments is long, the 
unemployed people who choose to remain unemployed lose the incentive to work over 
time, which makes them reluctant to exit unemployment quickly; therefore, longer 
duration of benefits payments increases the duration of unemployment or in other words 
causes unemployment persistence. Also, remaining unemployed for a long time, due to 
longer duration of the benefits payments, makes the skills of the unemployed obsolete, 
and the unemployed lose their chances of getting hired (because employers are aware of 
the fact that longer duration of unemployment depreciates human capital). Therefore, 
longer duration of benefits causes unemployment persistence.   
Contrary to the LMF theorists, who argue that the generosity of the 
unemployment benefits payments increases unemployment and also leads to 
unemployment persistence, there exist a number of others who contend that there is no 
such relationship between benefits payments and unemployment. Baker et al. (2004) 
argue that the cause-and-effect relationship between the unemployment benefits and 
unemployment is not in the direction that the LMF theorists’ suggest, but rather in the 
opposite direction. The reason they provide for this is that in an economy, in the face of 
rising unemployment, government reacts by increasing the generosity of the 
unemployment benefits. Therefore, they point out that studies which test the effect of the 
generosity of the unemployment benefits on unemployment face the problem of reverse 
causation, which makes their findings unreliable.  
Long ago, Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) pointed out that the general 
economic models, which test the effects of unemployment benefits’ incentives are not 
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reliable because those models fail to take account of the detailed benefits entitlement 
conditions, benefits administration and other institutional factors related to the 
unemployment benefits system. Also, they provided an argument, which is contrary to 
that of the LMF theorists, that unemployment benefits do not affect the level of 
unemployment, but only the composition of unemployment. Atkinson and Micklewright 
explained their argument by saying that, if the unemployed “outsiders” refuse to take up 
jobs (because they are receiving benefits payments) it does not necessarily imply that the 
unemployment level increases, because the jobs refused by some are taken by others. 
Therefore, according to Atkinson and Micklewright, the refusals only change the 
composition of unemployment, not its level; this change in composition is known as  
“composition effect”.  
Holmlund (1998) argues that the adverse effects of the generosity of the 
unemployment benefits on unemployment level and unemployment persistence, as 
proposed by the LMF theorists, are limited or offset by the effects of the generosity of the 
unemployment benefits in increasing inflows into employment. He describes that people 
who do not qualify as beneficiaries, may prefer to work over remaining unemployed 
because holding a job qualifies them as beneficiaries. Therefore, the generosity of 
unemployment benefits encourages the unemployed to take up jobs, which reduces both 
the unemployment level as well as the unemployment persistence. And, this effect is 
known as “entitlement effect”.    
Measurement 
The generosity of unemployment benefits of a country depends on the type(s) of 
unemployment benefits system(s) that exists in that country. In Europe, unemployment 
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benefits system exists in various forms such as: the unemployment insurance (UI) 
system; the unemployment assistance (UA) system; the guaranteed income (GI) system; 
and the cash-benefit (KAS) system. The UI system provides benefits payments to only 
those unemployed who meet the designated criteria of eligibility of the system to receive 
the payments44. The UA system provides financial assistance to only those unemployed 
who qualify for the given criteria of eligibility to receive the assistance45. The GI system 
guarantees a basic minimum income to a person or a family, where the level of benefits 
entitlement is means-tested, that is, the income(s) received by other members of the 
family .is deducted from the benefits entitlement. And, the KAS system, which is called a 
“cash” benefit system, exists only in Sweden, which provides benefits mainly to those 
who are not insured. It is also extended to those who do not meet the unemployment 
benefits requirements. And, this system runs for only a limited duration (OECD, 1994b, 
Chap.8, pg.172-173.  
In Europe, Austria, Germany, Portugal, and Spain, have both the UI and UA 
systems. Ireland, UK, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, and Finland have the UI and 
                                                 
44 Under the UI system, the level of benefits entitlement depends on three factors, which are: (i) the 
duration of benefit, which varies from a few months to a few years and it ceases to exist beyond its 
duration; (ii) the record of earlier employment; and (iii) earnings is previous job. The level of benefits, 
typically, ranges between 40 to 80 per cent of the earnings, up to a ceiling. There are however, exceptions 
to the generalization of the UI system. For example, in Belgium, the duration of benefits is unlimited for 
heads of the household and single people; in UK, the level of benefits is unrelated to previous earnings; and 
in a number of other countries the duration of benefits varies by age, family circumstances, and the level of 
entitlement decreases with the increase in the duration of spell (OECD, 1994b, Chap. 8, pg.172-173). 
45 Under the UA system, the level of entitlement: (i) is unrelated to earnings from previous job and not 
conditional on earlier employment record; (ii) is means-tested, that is., the income received by other 
members of the family are deducted from the benefits; and (iii) has no limit on its duration of receipt. There 
are, however, exceptions to the generalization of the UA system. For example, in countries such as Austria, 
France, Germany, Portugal, and Spain, the UA benefits are extensions of their UI benefits. Hence, in those 
countries the benefits become conditional on earlier employment record. In the case of Austria and 
Germany, the benefits are also related to previous earnings and in case of Portugal and Spain the benefits 
are limited in duration (OECD, 1994b, Chap.8, pg.172-173). 
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GI systems. Greece, Switzerland, and Norway have only the UI system. Sweden has the 
UI and KAS (it is Sweden’s “cash” (non-contributory but limited duration) benefits 
systems. And France has the UI, UA and GI systems (OECD, 1994b, Chap.8, pg.172-
173). The presence of multiple benefits systems and the complexity incorporated within 
each system makes the construction of measures for unemployment benefits both difficult 
and misleading. However, the OECD provides its measures.   
Unemployment benefits system comprises four aspects, which are: (i) the level of 
benefits entitlement; (ii) the duration of benefits entitlement; (iii) the coverage of the 
system; and (iv) the strictness with which the system operates.  Data measures are 
available for the first two aspects, but there are no comprehensive measures for the last 
two (Nickell et al. 2005). The level of benefits entitlement is represented by a benefits 
replacement rate measure, which is a ratio of unemployment benefits to the previous 
wage income (after tax). The duration of benefits entitlement is represented by the 
number of years for which a representative unemployed worker is eligible for benefits 
receipts. However, with the increase in the recognition of the complexity of each nation’s 
criteria for eligibility, such as the criterion of assessing previous work experience, 
contributions and age, the duration measure has been largely abandoned since the late 
1990s. The OECD recognized that the rules (and their enforcement) covering both the 
eligibility and the duration are critical elements of the benefits system, and hence, the 
OECD provided a measure of the benefits replacement rate, which they supplemented 
with a measure of the proportion of unemployed eligible for the benefits. This measure is 
called the gross replacement rate, which is available across a number of family types, 
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income levels and different durations of unemployment46. This measure came to be used 
extensively after the late 1990s. In the recent years, the OECD has produced a measure of 
net replacement rate, which takes account of the unemployment compensation after taxes 
and various family and housing related benefits, and is often preferred over the gross 
replacement rate measure. 
3.2.2 Systems of Wage Determination and Bargaining  
The systems of wage-setting and bargaining include components viz. (i) union 
density and union coverage, (ii) bargaining centralization, and (iii) bargaining 
coordination. LMF theorists assert that these components affect wages and employment 
significantly. The components restrict the responsiveness of wages to the changes in 
labor market conditions, which impedes labor market adjustments. Hence, the 
components of the systems are considered by the LMF theorists as barriers to wage 
flexibility.  
Union Density and Union Coverage 
 Union density and coverage refer to the degrees to which wages are determined 
collectively. Union density is defined as the proportion of workers who are the members 
of the trade unions. Although union density refers to the degree of unionization, it does 
not provide sufficient evidence of the power of the unions (or workers). The reason for 
                                                 
46 Gross benefits replacement rate is constructed by using: (i) three periods during the unemployment spell 
of a person with a long record of previous employment. These periods are: (a) the first year, (b) second and 
third year, and (c) fourth and fifth years, of unemployment; (ii) three family and income situations, which 
are: (a) a single person, (b) a married person with a dependent spouse, and (c) a married person with a 
spouse in work; and (iii) two different levels of previous earnings that are (a) average earnings and two-
thirds of average earnings (OECD,1994b, Chap.8, pg.172-173). 
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the lack of evidence is that, in many countries, especially European countries, not only 
the union members, but also the non-union members are covered by the terms and 
conditions of trade union contracts. Wage agreements made under such contracts are 
extended administratively to the non-union members, and the extension laws fill the gap 
between the density and the coverage. Thus high rate of union coverage generates 
spillover effects of high union power of the unionized sectors on the non-unionized ones.  
Union density and union coverage vary considerably across the European 
countries. France, which has the lowest union density of around 10 percent, has a union 
coverage of around 95 percent, which is one of the highest levels. In the UK, union 
density and coverage have declined since the 1980s when extension laws were abolished. 
The Scandinavian countries have however, maintained high and stable union density and 
coverage over time (Nickell et al. 2005). 
Effects on the Labor Market – Wage and Employment 
Union density and coverage represent the bargaining power of the employed 
“insiders”. LMF theorists argue that unions bargain, on behalf of the “insiders” for setting 
wage above the market clearing level. The wage-setting restricts wages to fall below the 
level that is set by the unions and the market does not clear. Hence, unionization makes 
wages downwardly rigid, resulting into unemployment. LMF theorists, however, argue 
that such an adverse effect of unionization on unemployment is nullified by the 




Union density is measured by the number of trade union members as a percentage 
of all wage and salary earners. And union coverage is measured by the percentage share 
of employees covered by collective contracts. Both measures are presented in percentage 
terms.  
Bargaining Centralization  
 Wage bargaining in an economy takes place at a plant, a firm, an industry or an 
aggregate economy-wide level, and the centralization of the bargaining refers to the level 
at which the bargaining takes place. The system in which plants, firms and industries (or 
sectors) negotiate separately over wages represents a decentralized system. The system in 
which only a few large organizations and unions cooperate and bargain represents a 
centralized system. And, the system in which bargaining takes place at levels somewhere 
between the levels of a decentralized and centralized systems, that system represents an 
intermediate system.  
Effects on the Labor Market – Wage and Employment  
LMF theorists assert that the level of bargaining centralization affects 
employment (or unemployment) via its influence on wage bargaining. Tarantelli (1986) 
and Bruno and Sachs (1985) argue that in centralized systems, since wage bargaining 
takes place at a national level and in a cooperative manner, those systems allow the 
economy to respond to any adverse shock in a more consistent and co-operative way than 
the decentralized systems. Therefore, they conclude that high level of centralization 
offsets the adverse effect of unionism on employment (or unemployment). Calmfors and 
Driffill (1988) however, stress that the relationship between the level of bargaining 
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centralization and labor market outcomes is not linear, rather hump-shaped. They argue 
that both highly centralized (co-operative) bargaining systems, such as the systems of 
Nordic countries, and fully decentralized (competitive) systems, such as the system of the 
United States, generate positive effects on employment, which nullify the negative effects 
of the unionism. They say that in decentralized systems markets are competitive, and 
hence, wages remain downwardly flexible. However, LMF theorists unanimously agree 
that intermediate systems, found in continental European countries, generate negative 
employment effects.  
Measurement 
LMF theorists have provided measures for the level of bargaining centralization, 
which are ranks assigned to countries on basis of the subjective judgments of the 
theorists. In Europe, bargaining does not take place at a single level, but at multiple levels 
where an agreement of a higher level sets the floor for lower-level agreements. The 
presence of multiple bargaining levels makes it difficult to determine the level that is 
predominant in a nation, which complicates the classification of (ranking of) different 
systems into broad categories. Still, LMF theorists rank the countries and use those ranks 
to estimate the effects of degree of centralization on unemployment. 
Bargaining Coordination 
Bargaining coordination refers to the extent to which decisions taken by trade 
unions and employers’ federations at different bargaining levels are concerted in order to 
facilitate strategies that are beneficial for both. It refers to the degree of consensus 
between the employers and the unions in a collective bargaining system, irrespective of 
the level at which the bargaining takes place.  
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Effects on the Labor Market – Wage and Employment  
LMF theorists assert that highly coordinated bargaining systems, like the highly 
centralized systems, offset the adverse effects of unionism on unemployment. They argue 
that high levels of coordination restrain the wage claims of the employed “insiders”, and 
thereby, lower downward wage rigidity, which generates positive effects on employment. 
In many discussions, often the distinction between coordination and centralization is not 
clear, but one should note that under the former, while bargaining wider implications for 
employment are taken into consideration and the latter only indicates the level at which 
bargaining takes place. 
Measurement 
LMF theorists produce measures for bargaining coordination, which are ranks 
assigned to each country. Like the bargaining centralization system, the system of 
coordination is also complicated. LMF theorists, however, produce ranks to classify each 
country’s coordination system into broad groups. The ranks represent the degrees of 
inter-firm coordination and that of the inter-union coordination in the process of wage 
bargaining and also a sum of both.   
3.2.3 Employment Protection Legislation 
Employment protection legislation (EPL) refers to the regulations concerning 
hiring and firing of an employee. The hiring related regulations include: (a) rules 
favoring disadvantaged groups; (b) lowering contracting costs by setting general rules 
and standards; and (c) encourage on-the job training and human capital formation, and 
thereby, increasing the productivity and earnings of the employed “insiders”. And, the 
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regulations related to firing include: (a) reducing arbitrary dismissal of the workers, (b) 
giving notification before dismissing an employee in order to allow the employee to 
engage in a job search before getting laid-off; (c) mandating severance pay47; and (d) 
extending special requirements for collective dismissals and part-time work schemes. The 
EPL48, not only benefits the employees by protecting them against job related 
insecurities, but also benefits the employers (OECD, 1994b, Chap.6, pg.69). It benefits 
the employers indirectly by leading them toward making better hires; since the EPL 
limits the freedom of the employers to fire via firing regulations and labor adjustment 
costs, the employers are encouraged to make better hires. 
Effects on the Labor Market – Wage and Employment 
LMF theorists assert that the strictness of the EPL generates adverse effects on the 
labor market by increasing unemployment and contributing toward unemployment 
persistence. They describe a number of ways in which the EPL affects the labor market, 
which are: (i) the strictness of the EPL increases labor turnover costs of the employers by 
imposing layoff costs due to severance pay on them, which they have to incur when they 
fire someone. The labor adjustment costs, on one hand, make it difficult for the 
employers to fire someone when market conditions are unfavorable and, on the other 
make the employers leery of hiring additional employees or create new jobs even when 
the market conditions turn favorable. The costs discourage employers to make additional 
                                                 
47 Severance pay is the pay an employee receives when they are laid off or they retire. It includes other 
benefits such as health insurance, payment for unused leave or vacation etc. in addition to employee’s 
remaining regular pay. 
48 The OECD Jobs Study (OECD, 1994b, Chap.6, pg.73) report presents a list of arguments in favor of 
employment protection regulation and also arguments countering those arguments in favor. 
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hires because if they increase hires, they will have to face the difficulty in reversing their 
decisions when the market conditions worsen. The strictness of the EPL therefore, 
reduces employment flexibility in the labor market via increasing labor adjustment costs. 
It also lowers the demand for labor and hence, increases unemployment by discouraging 
employers to employ. However, Siebert (1997, pg. 49), in this context, argues that such 
an adverse effect of labor adjustment costs on hiring decisions (on labor demand) is 
reduced if the employers are able to adjust the wages or the working-hour downward. 
But, if strictness of the EPL is combined with downward wage rigidity, adverse effects of 
the EPL on unemployment cannot be lowered; (ii) the effects of high labor adjustment 
costs, due the strictness of the EPL, affect the decision of the employers to make hires 
even in the long run, which therefore, lead to over-time persistence of unemployment; 
and (iii) the strictness of the EPL reduces the fear of the employed “insiders” to get fired 
by providing them protection against dismissals. This loss of fear increases the wage 
claims of the “insiders” making wages rigid. Due to this effect of the EPL on wage 
rigidity, it is also held as a barrier to wage flexibility. 
Measurement 
Measure of the EPL is constructed on basis of subjective judgments on each 
country’s strength of the legal framework governing hiring and firing. Blanchard and 
Wolfers developed a measure of the EPL in a major project on employment protection, 
undertaken by the OECD in 1999. This measure was an updated measure over the one 
developed by Grubb and Wells (1993). The newer measure included more dimensions of 
employment regulation than the Grubb and Wells’ measure. Blanchard and Wolfers 
produced two data points for the EPL measure and from those two data points, finally 
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yearly data points were created by the method of interpolation. In 2004, OECD (2004) 
provided a truly annual data series for the EPL, which is considered to be superior to all 
the previously existing series of the EPL49. 
3.2.4 Labor Tax Wedge 
A labor tax wedge is described as the wedge between producers’ wage, which is 
the cost of labor to the employers, and consumption wage, which is the net income (net of 
direct and indirect taxes) of the workers. Payroll taxes, which are the taxes that employers 
pay on the number of employees they employ, represent the cost of labor to the employer. 
The employers’ social security contributions, which are a part of the producers’ wage, are 
paid by the employers to the government. Income taxes and employees’ social security 
contributions, which are a part of the consumption wage, are paid by income earners from 
their income. Consumption taxes, which are also a part of the consumption wage, are the 
indirect taxes that are indirectly paid by the consumers when they purchase goods and 
services. Therefore, the labor tax wedge is created by including payroll taxes, income 
                                                 
49 The calculation of the OECD’s 2004 measure of the EPL involves the use of eighteen basic items, which 
are measured in terms of: (i) units of time, such as days (used in measuring say, delay involved before 
notice can start; length of notice period; severance pay; length of trial period etc.); (ii) an ordinal scale, say, 
from 0-3 or 0-4 , (used in measuring say, notification procedures; definition of justified or unfair dismissal; 
valid cases for use of fixed- term contracts; definition of collective dismissal etc..); (iii) a number, (used for 
say, representing the maximum number of successive fixed term contracts); (iv)a yes or a no, (used for say, 
depicting restrictions on number of renewals). Each of the basic items is measured by means of the 
qualitative judgments of both workers and employers. On basis of the subjective judgments of the workers 
and employers a numerical strictness score, from 0-6,  is assigned to each of the different items, such that a 
lower score represents lower level of strictness and a higher score represents a greater level of strictness. 
Once the scores for the eighteen items are obtained, they are normalized and classified into three indicators 
of the EPL. These indictors are: (1) employment protection of regular workers against individual; (2) 




taxes, indirect taxes and social security contributions of the employees’ and employers’. 
And, any change in one or more of these taxes and contributions changes the tax wedge.  
Effects on the Labor Market – Wage and Employment 
LMF theorists assert that taxes on labor and social security contributions – 
components of the labor tax wedge – affect labor market in many ways. An increase in 
the payroll taxes increases the cost of labor to the employers, and hence, reduces the 
employers’ demands for labor, which in turn raises unemployment. An increase in 
income taxes and social security contributions reduces the return that is earned from 
working, which influences the workers to enjoy more leisure and work less, leading to 
depress labor supply. An increase in consumption or indirect taxes reduces the 
purchasing power of the income earned from working. Therefore, the increase in 
consumption taxes affects labor market decisions in the same manner as the direct taxes.  
LMF theorists do not consider the labor tax wedge to be a barrier to wage 
flexibility. They, however, assert that a rise in the tax wedge in a country increases its 
unemployment level if the wages are rigid, where the wage-rigidity may occur due to the 
effects of the barriers to wage flexibility that are mentioned above (or due to some other 
factors). An increase in payroll taxes (and/or an increase in employers’ social security 
contributions), which increases the tax wedge, increases the burden of cost to the 
employers. LMF theorists argue that the effect of the increased cost burden reduces labor 
demand, leading to unemployment, until the burden is not shifted from the employer’ on 
to the workers. They further argue that, the shift requires downwardly flexible wages, 
which may be restrained by the barriers to wage flexibility or other sources of wage 
rigidity such as implicit contracts or efficiency wages. Therefore, in case the wages are 
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not flexible and an increase in cost burden of the employers cannot be reduced, an 
increase in labor tax wedge increases the unemployment especially of the low-paid or 
minimum wage workers, because their wages cannot be lowered further.  
Measurement 
A measure of the labor tax wedge is represented by a sum of payroll tax, income 
tax and employee’ plus employer’ social security contributions expressed as a percentage 
of total labor costs, which include gross earnings and social security contributions of the 
employers. The OECD uses an average production worker’s average tax rates for 
personal income tax, indirect tax and employers’ and employees’ social security 
contribution (calculated in the OECD’s The Tax and Benefit Position of Production 
Workers) to create the measure of the labor tax wedge.   
3.2.5 Active Labor Market Policies 
Active labor market policies (ALMPs) are a set of labor market policies, which 
encompass a wide range of labor market activities such as employee training plus 
professional development, job-counseling, job-creation via subsidized employment, and 
enhancing matching between workers and jobs through job assistance program. The basic 
aim of these activities is to provide active assistance to the unemployed to improve their 
chances of getting employed. Unlike the passive supports provided by unemployment 
benefits system, the ALMPs directly assist reemployment.  Therefore, as mentioned 
above, LMF theorists consider the ALMPs to increase employment.   
In Europe, active labor market policies have been around since the 1960s and 
have evolved since then. In the sixties, the active policies, which were called “active 
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manpower policies”, were designed for addressing the needs of a fast-growing economy 
(OECD, 1964). However, with the change in economic, and specifically, in labor market 
conditions in the 1970s and the 1980s, a change in the role of ALPMs’ was called for. It 
was then, the focus of the ALMPs shifted toward addressing the problem unemployment. 
In 1992, the OECD Labor Ministers recognized the role of ALMPs in reducing 
unemployment and recommended shifting labor market expenditures toward active 
measures in order to improve the quality of the labor force, mobilize labor supply, and 
improve job search process.  
Effects on the Labor market – Wage and Employment 
LMF theorists assert that the ALMPs affect employment (or unemployment) and 
wages in many ways, which are: (i) the ALMPs, through the Public Employment Service 
(PES) and retraining programs increase the effectiveness of matching between job 
seekers (and their skill-sets) and jobs, which increases employees’ job efficiency. The 
increase in job efficiency leads to increased labor productivity, which in turn increases 
labor demand, and thereby, reduces unemployment; (ii) the ALMPs assist in maintaining 
an effective supply of a labor force; the PES, the retraining programs and others 
encourage the unemployed including the long-term unemployed to not to leave the labor 
force, and thereby, maintain effective supply of labor. The effective supply increases 
competition in the labor market, and hence, reduces wage pressure; (iii) the ALMPs, like 
unemployment benefits, also increase wage pressure by reducing the fear of loss of 
income associated with unemployment, and the risk of long-term unemployment. This 
adverse effect of the ALMPs on wage pressure is, however, is said to be countered by the 
effects of the ALMPs on reducing wage pressure that is mentioned in (ii).  
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Measurement 
Public expenditures on labor market programs are distributed between passive and 
active measures. Government’s commitment in the form of its expenditure on the ALMPs 
represents the measure of the ALMPs. Due to the problem of reverse causality between 
unemployment and the expenditure on the ALMPs, some studies use government 
expenditure on the ALMPs per unemployed person relative to GDP per capita as an 
instrumental measure of the total expenditure on the ALMPs (Layard et al. 1991, 2005; 
Scarpetta, 1996). 
3.3 NEGLECTED SOURCES OF WAGE FLEXIBILITY – THE TRANSNATIONAL 
DIMENSION 
When LMF theorists view European countries as independent and isolated 
entities, they find relative wage rigidities, explained by cross-country labor market 
policies and institutions, influencing rise and fall of unemployment rates across the 
countries. But what happens when one views European nations from a pan-European 
perspective? This dissertation answers that the scenario changes, relative wages become 
flexible and employment (or unemployment) rates fluctuate differently across countries, 
not because of the effects of country-specific labor market policies and institutions, but 
because of international-, continental- and global-level factors.  
European countries are integrated and economically interdependent via channels 
namely international trade, international capital and financial market, and international 
foreign exchange market.50 Through these channels, effects of economic changes of one 
                                                 
50 Baker and Schmitt (1999) also discuss on the three channels that interconnect European economies. 
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country are felt by others – as a result of conscious policy choices or endogenous changes 
in macroeconomic factors of a country, employment and wage levels of not only that 
country, but also that of those interconnected with it change. Also, due to the integration 
of European countries at a global level, changes in global-level factors impact the 
economies of all the integrated countries, influencing their employment and wage levels. 
Therefore, because of the integration of European countries at international, continental 
and global levels, cross-country (international or continental) factors and global-level 
factors lead to a rise or fall in wages and employment or unemployment rates across 
European nations.  These cross-border factors and the global-level factors are named in 
this dissertation as transnational variables.  
International trade is one channel that transmits the effects of economic changes 
taking place in one country to its trading partners. When one or more components of 
international trade, viz. exports and imports of goods and services, change in one country, 
the impacts of the change is felt not only by that country, but also by its trading partners. 
Therefore, employment (or unemployment) and wage levels of all the countries change, 
but with different magnitudes. The changes reflect changes in relative employment (or 
unemployment) rates and relative wages across the countries. These changes in relative 
wages display relative wage flexibilities across the countries. Therefore, transnational 
sources related to international trade, such as exports (or imports) of one country relative 
to that of the others, explain both the flexibilities in relative wages and fluctuations in 
relative unemployment rates across countries. 
European countries have remained largely dependent on international trade 
especially inter-European trade from a long period of time. In order to enhance trade 
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across nations, European countries have been involved in abolishing trade barriers 
between them long before the formation of the European Union (EU). International 
organizations such as European Economic Community and European Free Trade 
Association emerged in Europe to enable free trade between their member countries. The 
European Economic Community (EEC), which is also known as the Common Market in 
the UK, was established under the Treaty of Rome signed in 1957 in order to 
economically integrate countries such as Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, 
and the Netherlands. In 1973, Denmark, Ireland, and UK, in 1981, Greece, and in 1986, 
Spain and Portugal, joined the EEC. Later when the EU was created, the EEC was 
absorbed within EU. In 1960, European countries that were either denied or chose not to 
join the EEC created a free trade bloc called the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA)51 in order to liberalize trade between its member countries. The EFTA member 
states also conducted free trade with a number of other countries under jointly concluded 
free trade agreements. With the formation of the European Union, all the trade barriers 
are eliminated between the EU members. Because of the efforts of enhancing cross-
country trade, international trade has always remained an important channel integrating 
European countries and making them economically interdependent.  Therefore, 
transnational variables related to international trade, especially inter-European trade, such 
as relative exports or imports of goods and services (exports and imports of goods and 
                                                 
51 UK, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, and Portugal originally formed the EFTA. In 
1961, Finland entered the EFTA as an associate member and became a full member in 1986. The UK and 
Denmark in 1973 and Portugal in 1986, left EFTA and joined the EEC. Austria, Switzerland and Finland 
left the EFTA in 1995 and joined the EU. In 1970, Iceland, and in 1991, Liechtenstein, joined the EFTA. 
Currently, Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Liechtenstein form the EFTA. 
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services of one country relative to that of another) remain an important source of relative 
wage flexibilities and variations in relative unemployment rates across European nations.  
Trade-related transnational variables are sources of relative wage flexibilities not 
only between countries, but also between sectors, within a country. When the imports of 
goods and services of a trading country increase (decrease), sectors producing import-
competitive products face adverse (favorable) effects on the demand for their products. 
Such effects therefore, lead to changes in the employment and wage levels of those 
sectors relative to that of those which experience different or no effects at all. Similarly, 
when the exports of goods and services increase (decrease), sectors producing export-
products find it favorable (unfavorable) for the demand for their products, and thereby, 
for their employment and wages levels relative to that of those which are differently or 
not affected by the changes in the exports. Hence, changes in international trade 
components emerge as sources of relative wage flexibilities and variations in relative 
employment rates across two or more sectors within a trading nation.  
A second channel that interconnects the economies of two of more European 
nations is the international market of capital and financial items. This international 
market runs on transactions of capital and financial items - assets and liabilities - across 
countries in the forms of inflows and outflows of foreign direct investments (FDI), 
portfolio investments, and other investments in domestic and foreign assets across the 
countries52. The inflows and outflows of the FDI or multinational investments53  involve 
                                                 
52 FDI represent investments in foreign assets in order to gain an ownership or control of at least 10% over 
a business located abroad. Portfolio investment represents investment in foreign stock and bonds or other 
financial assets, where the investors do not possess active control over the securities, unlike FDI. Other 
investment includes transaction of currencies and bank deposits in the foreign exchange market. 
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one economy investing in the assets of another, which affects both the economies, but 
differently.  When a country receives inflows of FDI, its investment goes up, and thereby, 
its employment and wage levels also rise. Because of such favorable effects of FDI, 
countries compete against one another to attract multinational investments. They offer 
incentives in the forms of supplying cheap and skilled labor force, lowering taxes, 
improving sales opportunity, and providing advantageous location for business to 
multinational investors in order to influence them to invest in their country instead of in 
others. The inflows of FDI in one country increase the employment and wage levels of 
that country relative to that of the others. These effects on employment and wages lead to 
relative wage flexibilities (changes in relative wages) and fluctuations in relative 
employment (or unemployment) rates across countries. Even across the sectors of a 
nation, when one sector receives FDI and others do not, the employment and wage levels 
of the former rises relative to that of the latter ones. And, this leads to relative wage 
flexibilities and changes in relative employment levels across the sectors within a 
country. 
European countries appear as substitutes as well as competitors to the 
multinational investors for their investments. Countries which take measures to attract 
                                                                                                                                                 
53 In the book The World is Flat (Friedman, 2005, Chap.1, pg.9), Thomas Friedman describes three eras of 
Globalization out of which he describes the second era “Globalization 2.0”, that he says lasted from 1800 to 
2000, as the era during which multinational companies shrank the world into a size small. He adds that 
during the second era, multinational companies acted as key agents and changed the world. The expansion 
of the Dutch and English joint-stock companies and the Industrial Revolution pioneered the evolution of 
multinationals that went global for markets and labor. In the recent decades, an explosion in the growth of 
multinational companies has surpassed the growth of world trade. This led globalization to be described as 
the growth of multinational companies rather than growth of trade. Therefore, FDI or multinational 




FDI enjoy rising employment rates and wages relative to that of the others. Therefore, 
changes in FDI-related transnational variables such as relative investment or relative FDI 
(investment or FDI of one country relative to that of other) or relative taxes (since, 
changes in taxes influence the inflows and outflows of FDI) across European countries 
make relative wages flexible and lead to variations in relative unemployment rates across 
the countries.  
Besides the FDI, inflows and outflows of other instruments of the international 
capital and financial market also affect the employment and wage levels of the countries 
that participate in the market. These instriments include portfolio investments and other 
inter-country assets investments. When one country changes its tax rates or interest rates 
or its bilateral exchange rate changes, the change influences the volume of portfolio 
investments or other investments flowing in and out of that country.  Investors invest 
(buy stocks and bonds and other financial assets) in the countries which impose lower 
taxes on interest rates or dividends or offer higher interest rates on the investment assets 
or experience currency appreciations (because foreign investors prefer to hold assets 
valued in a stronger currency that in a weaker one). A surplus of net inflows (inflows 
minus outflows) of financial investments (portfolio or others) in a country increases 
effective demand including consumption and investment of that country relative to that of 
those who face no or a different amount of net inflows. The changes in effective demand 
components across countries affect relative employment and wage levels across those 
countries. Therefore, the portfolio and other investments-related transnational variable 
such as relative investment or relative consumption or relative interest rates or relative 
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taxes therefore, explain relative wage flexibilities and fluctuations in relative employment 
rates across countries.  
The international market of foreign exchange is a third channel that interlinks 
countries participating in the market. The foreign exchange market is the world’s largest 
and most liquid financial market in which currencies and bank deposits are traded across 
countries by currency speculators, banks, central banks, multinational companies, 
governments and financial institutions. Changes in the volume of the transactions of 
currencies and bank deposits of the countries that are involved in the transactions affect 
their foreign currency reserves, and thereby, their exchange rates. The fluctuations in 
exchange rates affect the components of international trade as well as international capital 
and financial market. Change in the exchange rate of a country due to the appreciation 
(depreciation) of its currency affects its exports and imports via making its exports 
relatively expensive (cheaper) and its imports relatively cheaper (expensive) in the 
international trading market. When exports become relatively expensive, domestic 
exporters face adverse effects of the appreciation, which reduces the employment and 
wage levels of the exports-producing sectors. Unlike the exporters, the producers of 
import-substituting products experience benefits from the appreciation because 
appreciation makes imported products expensive, reducing their demand, and thereby, 
increasing the demand for the domestically produced import-substituting products. 
Currency appreciations (or depreciations) also affect the economy by affecting the prices 
of imported products such as crude oil and raw materials. Appreciations decrease the 
prices of the imported products, which in turn generates beneficial effects on the 
domestic production of goods and services.  
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Appreciations or depreciations of currencies also affect inflows and outflows of 
FDI and of other international investments in capital and financial assets. By making 
labor expensive in an appreciating country, appreciations can lead to outflows of FDI. 
However, by making the currency stronger, appreciations can attracts inflows of portfolio 
investments or investments in other assets. All these effects of changes in exchanges rate 
via appreciations or depreciations affect the employment and wage levels of the countries 
whose exchange rate changes. The effects of the changes are also transmitted to all the 
other countries that are linked to that country via the channels. Therefore, transnational 
variables related to exchange rates, such as bilateral exchange rate or relative consumer 
price index, explain variations in relative employment and relative wage across countries.  
Western European currencies were pegged with the US dollar under the Bretton 
Woods fixed exchange rate system until 1970. But with the breakdown of the Bretton 
Woods system in the early 1970s, the exchange rate system became a floating one. In 
European exchange rate market, under the floating exchange rate system, the supply and 
demand of the foreign currencies determined the exchange rate, the depreciation and 
appreciation of currencies remained unhindered and exchange rates became volatile. The 
volatility created an uncertain environment for exporters, importers, domestic producers, 
multinational investors and other participants of the foreign exchange market across 
European countries. Exchange rates fluctuated without regulation leading to fluctuations 
in relative employment rates and wages across the European countries. Until 1999, the 
volatility persisted, but the initiation of the euro ended it to a great extent. Today, 
exchange rate volatility persists only between the British pound, the Swiss franc, the 
Scandinavian currencies that remain outside the euro zone, and the currencies of a 
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number of accession countries. Therefore, effects of changes in bilateral exchange rates 
still exist to some extent across European countries.  
3.4 MEASUREMENT OF WAGE FLEXIBILITY AT A CONTINENTAL LEVEL 
The previous section of this chapter describes that across European countries 
transnational factors lead to relative wage flexibilities, and also explain the fluctuations in 
relative unemployment rates because of the economic interdependence between the 
countries. LMF theorists, however, assert that relative wages are not flexible, but rigid 
across European countries because of labor market policies and institutions. For them, the 
variations in relative wages (and thereby, in relative unemployment rates) across the 
European countries are explained only by the differences in their labor market policies 
and institutions. This dissertation therefore, begins with a methodological analysis of 
testing the nature of European wage structure in order to find out whether relative wage 
variations across European nations display flexibility, which may be explained by 
transnational factors, or rigidity, explained by labor market policies and institutions. This 
dissertation performs the test at a continental-level, by treating European countries as 
integrated countries. It does so to find out from the data whether European countries 
appear as separate entities, as assumed by LMF theorists, or as interdependent 
economies, as proposed by this dissertation, in terms of their nature of wages. And, 
knowing the nature of wages, from it, this dissertation explains the evolution of 
unemployment in European countries over the last few decades.  The empirical test is 
presented in the next chapter of this dissertation. 
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Chapter 4:  Toward Measurement of Relative Wage Flexibility in 
Europe 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter presents the methodological approach of measuring flexibility (or 
rigidity) in European wage structure. The findings of this chapter answer the first 
research question of this dissertation that is “What is the nature of European wage 
structure over time? How rigid or flexible is it?” Section 4.2 provides a description of 
construction of a pan-European or a continental-level dataset of average wage that is used 
for measuring relative wage flexibility in Europe. Section 4.3 describes the analytical 
approach of testing the relative wage flexibility. It explains two multivariate analytic 
tools, namely cluster analysis and discriminant function analysis, which are used for the 
test. In addition, this section also talks about the uniqueness, the advantages and the 
limitations of the analytical approach of this dissertation. Section 4.4 presents multiple 
levels of analyses and their results concerning the measurement of relative wage 
flexibility. The final section, Section 4.5, provides the implications and the conclusions 
drawn from the results of the analyses of Section 4.4.  
4.2 DATA DESCRIPTION 
To examine the nature of European wage structure from a pan-European 
perspective, this dissertation examines the patterns of changes in average wages of a 
number of European country-sectors (sectors of a country) over time to find out whether 
the patterns displays relative rigidities or flexibilities across the country-sectors. To 
conduct the examination at a pan-European or a continental-level, this dissertation 
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constructs a continental-level data set of average wage. For the construction of the 
dataset, data on remuneration and employment54 are obtained from the Cambridge 
Econometrics Database55. The data on remuneration and that on employment are 
available for fifteen sectors of seventeen European countries over a period of twenty-six 
years, from 1980 to 2005, in which no data points are missing. The seventeen European 
countries56 for which the sectoral-level data on remuneration and employment are 
available include: Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, UK, – the fifteen 
original European Union (EU) countries – Norway, and Switzerland. And the fifteen 
sectors57 of each of the seventeen countries for which the data on remuneration and 
employment are available include: (i) agriculture, forestry and fishing; (ii) mining and 
energy supply; (iii) food, beverages and tobacco manufacturing; (iv) textiles and clothing 
manufacturing; (v) fuels, chemicals, rubber, and plastic products manufacturing; (vi) 
electronics manufacturing; (vii) transport equipment manufacturing; (viii) other 
manufacturing; (ix) construction; (x) wholesale and retail; (xi) hotels and restaurants; 
(xii) transport and communications; (xiii) financial services; (xiv) other market services, 
and (xv) non-market services. 
                                                 
54 The data on remuneration are measured in millions euro and the data on employment are given in 
thousands. 
55 The Cambridge Econometrics database draws data from the official data available at European and 
national levels. As mentioned in the database, the data undergo a substantial process of updating and 
quality checks in order to improve their consistency, timeliness and coverage. The database also announces 
that their data can be used to make comparisons across cities/regions/countries, to analyze trends over time. 
56 Acronyms of the seventeen countries are presented in Table A.4.1. 




To construct a continental-level data set of average wage from the datasets of 
remuneration and employment of seventeen countries, the datasets are pooled. The 
pooling yields one single panel data set for remuneration and another for employment for 
Europe as a whole (that is, Europe composed of the seventeen countries mentioned 
above). Each of the two resultant data sets consists of 6,630 cells including 255 (17 
countries * 15 sectors) rows and 26 (years from 1980 to 2005) columns. Each cell of the 
data set of remuneration and of employment respectively represents the remuneration and 
the level of employment of a particular sector of a particular country for a particular year. 
From the two pan-European data sets of remuneration and employment, further, a panel 
data set of average remuneration (hereafter called average wage) is constructed by 
dividing each cell component of the remuneration data set by the corresponding cell 
component of the employment data set. The resultant data set of average wage consists of 
6,630 cells including 255 (17 countries * 15 sectors) rows and 26 (years from 1980 to 
2005) columns, like that of the data sets of remuneration and employment. From the data 
set of average wage, finally, a data set of annual rate of change of average wage is 
computed by calculating the annual rate of change of average wage for each of the 255 
cases (where a case represents a sector of a country or a country-sector) over the period 
from 1980 to 2005. The final data set on over-time average wage changes consists of 
6,375 cells arranged in 255 rows, representing the 255 country-sectors, and 25 columns, 
representing the time period from 1980-81 to 2004-05. This data set represents the data 
on over-time annual rate of change of average wages of 255 European country-sectors, or 
said differently, a continental-level data on over-time average wage changes (or average 
wage movements or average wage behaviors). 
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4.3 METHODOLOGY – A FOUR-PART ANALYSIS 
The basic methodological approach of this dissertation begins with a study the 
European wage structure, or in other words, a test of how relative wages behave in 
Europe. Once the behavior is known – relative wages are flexible (or rigid) – the factors 
that may be explaining the flexibility (or rigidity) are determined. Relative wage 
rigidities, and thereby, differential rates of unemployment across European countries are 
already proposed by LMF theorists to be explained by labor market policies and 
institutions. Therefore, if rigidities are found, LMF theorists’ proposition is said to be 
supported and both the rigidities and the evolution of differential rates of unemployment 
across European countries are attributed to the policies and institutions. But in case 
flexibilities are found, sources specifically transnational sources that may explain the 
flexibilities are searched. Once the sources are found, using theoretical arguments, it is 
explained how the sources also explain the evolution of unemployment in Europe.   
The methodological approach of this dissertation can be broadly categorized into 
a four-part analysis, which includes grouping, discrimination, repetition of grouping, and 
discrimination and forensic identification. The grouping groups 255 European country-
sectors into a smaller and manageable number of clusters or groups based on similarities 
(and dissimilarities) in their respective average wage movements over time. The 
discrimination tests whether or not the European country-sectors are classified into 
clusters as predicted by grouping, and it also yields one or more functions of between-
group variations, which discriminate maximally the over-time average wage movements 
between the predicted clusters.  The repetition of grouping and discrimination involves 
removing higher level’s between-group wage variations and repeating the grouping and 
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discrimination to capture variations within-groups at further levels.  And, finally, the 
forensic identification finds out the factors that may be explaining the between-group 
variations across the clusters obtained from the repetitive performances of grouping and 
discrimination. This chapter presents the first three parts of the methodology. The next 
chapter, Chapter Five, presents the fourth and final part of the methodology.   
4.3.1 Grouping – Cluster Analysis 
Cluster analysis58 is a multivariate exploratory data analysis tool, which is 
generally used to develop taxonomies. Given information on a set of characteristics (or 
variables) of a number of cases, a cluster analysis sorts the cases and classifies them into 
groups or clusters on basis of similarities (or dissimilarities) in their characteristics. The 
clusters are formed in such a manner that the cases within a cluster constitute maximum 
similarities in their characteristics, while the characteristics of the cases in separate 
clusters differ maximally. A cluster analysis, therefore, reduces a given number of cases 
into a small number of clusters or groups. It is generally used at the exploratory phase of 
a research, hence, there is neither any a priori hypothesis that is tested, nor there is any 
role for statistical significance testing. 
This dissertation uses cluster analysis to examine relative wage flexibility (or 
rigidity) in European wage structure. There are a number of methods of clustering59 such 
as k-means clustering, two-way clustering, and hierarchical clustering. Out of these 
methods, this dissertation employs the hierarchical clustering method for its analysis. It 
                                                 
58 Cluster Analysis was first used by Tryon (1939). 
59 The various methods of clustering can be found in http://www.statsoft.com/textbook/stcluan.html. 
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does not uses the k-means clustering method because this method requires hypothetical 
information on the number of clusters prior to running the analysis, which is not available 
in the case of this dissertation’s analysis. It also does not uses the two-way joining 
method because this method requires clustering in two ways, that is, clustering both 
cases, row-wise, and variables, column-wise, simultaneously, which is not the objective 
of this dissertation’s analysis.  
Hierarchical clustering method displays grouping results in a tree-plot or diagram, 
which shows how close or how distant cases are in terms of the magnitude of similarities 
or dissimilarities in their characteristics or in their values of criterion variables. The 
formation of the tree-diagram requires firstly, measuring distances between the 
characteristics (or values of the criterion variables) for each possible pair of cases in order 
to assign them into same cluster or separate clusters, and secondly, measuring the 
distances between two or more clusters. In order to measure the distances between the 
values of the criterion variables for each possible pair of cases, a Euclidean distance 
measure is used in this study. This distance measure is not applicable when two variables 
between which distance is to be measured are measured in different scales. This criterion 
of non-applicability is not of a concern in this study because here the values of rate of 
change of average wages are represented in same scale, which is in percentage terms. In 
order to measure the distance between the clusters, a Ward’s clustering rule is employed, 
because it is generally considered to be very efficient (Ward, 1963). The reason for the 
efficiency of the rule is that it evaluates the distances calculated by Euclidean measure 
between clusters and minimizes the Euclidean distance between any two clusters that are 
formed at each step by using an analysis-of-variance approach.  
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This dissertation applies cluster analysis – hierarchical clustering method – on the 
255 European country-sectors’ data on annual rate of change of average wages from 
1980-81 to 2004-05. It does so to measure relative wage flexibilities (or rigidities) across 
the country-sectors over the period. Using a Euclidean distance measure, this clustering 
method computes the distances (or closeness) between the values of criterion variables 
(that is, between the rates of change of average wages over twenty-five year period) of 
each possible pair of cases out of the 255 cases, or, of each case with that of the rest of 
the cases. And, using Ward’s rule, the clustering method progressively assigns cases 
showing minimal distances between one another to a single cluster and those showing 
greater distances to separate clusters. Therefore, in this exercise, the clustering method 
minimizes within-group distances, while maximizing between-group distances. 
4.3.2 Discrimination – Discriminant Function Analysis 
Discriminant function analysis (DFA) is a multivariate analytic technique which 
when applied in combination with a cluster analysis tests whether not cases are classified 
into clusters as predicted by the cluster analysis, and also determines one or more 
functions that discriminate maximally between two or more clusters obtained from the 
cluster analysis. For a given number of cases classified into two or more clusters, and 
given the data on two or more criterion variables (also called, discriminating variables) 
for those cases, which classify the cases into the clusters by a cluster analysis, a DFA 
estimates the contribution of each of those variables in optimally classifying the cases 
into the clusters. Therefore, where cluster analysis only answers the question, “how cases 
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are organized into clusters?” a DFA answers the question, “how cases are best organized 
into clusters and how do the clusters differ?”  
 A DFA is analogous to a multiple regression analysis in which a set of 
independent variables are regressed on a categorical dependent variable to estimate 
regression coefficients. Each estimated (standardized) coefficient shows the partial 
contribution of its corresponding independent variable in predicting the categorical 
dependent variable. In case of a DFA, the variable representing the grouping or 
classification of the cases into clusters is analogous to the categorical dependent variable 
of the multiple regression analysis, and the criterion or discriminating variables of the 
cases are analogous to the independent variables of the multiple regression analysis. DFA 
uses the maximum likelihood method to estimate one or more sets of coefficients of the 
discriminating variables. Each estimated coefficient of a particular set shows the partial 
contribution of the corresponding discriminating variable for classifying each case into a 
particular cluster. In the case of DFA, each set of estimated coefficients forms a linear 
function of the discriminating variables, which is called a discriminant function or a 
canonical score. The discriminant function is expressed in a linear functional form as:  
  Li = c + a1* xi1 + a2* xi2 + ……. + an*xin                (4.1) 
In the equation (4.1), the Li variable is the discriminant function or the canonical 
score for the ith case. It is a linear combination of all the discriminating variables, xj’s. 
The aj’s are unstandardized discriminant coefficients, also called the partial coefficients 
of the xj’s. Each aj represents the partial contribution of its corresponding xj variable in 
predicting the given classification or grouping of the cases or assigning given cases into 
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given categories or clusters, controlling for the contributions of the rest of the xj 
variables. 
The discriminant function(s) of equation (4.1) is expressed in terms of 
standardized coefficients as:  
             Li= b1* xi1 + b2* xi2 + ……. + bn*xin                  (4.2) 
In equation (4.2), the bj’s are the standardized coefficients and they represent the 
standardized partial contributions of xj’s in classifying given cases into given clusters. If 
the cases are classified into k number of clusters, DFA estimates k-1 sets of coefficients 
or bj’s (and also aj’s) and hence, k-1 sets of discriminant functions or canonical scores. 
The DFA uses each set of bj’s to calculate the value of the canonical score (Li), 
corresponding to a particular discriminant function, for each case, such that using the bj’s 
corresponding to the first discriminant function, the values of the first canonical score for 
all the cases are calculated. Similarly, using the bj’s corresponding to the second 
discriminant function, the values of the second canonical score for all the cases are 
calculated and so and so forth.  
It is evident from equations (4.1) and (4.2) that the discriminant function (or a 
canonical score) represents a linear combination of the discriminating variables. The 
contributions from each discriminating variables assign cases into clusters optimally, or 
said differently, discriminate optimally between clusters, such that the first discriminant 
function discriminates maximally between the clusters, the second function discriminates 
maximally after controlling for the first function and so and so forth. Therefore, each 
discriminant function or canonical score represents a dimension along which the clusters 
are discriminated maximally where the dimensions are orthogonal (uncorrelated) to each 
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other. The orthogonal nature of the dimensions means that the contributions of the 
discriminating variables corresponding to a discriminant function in discriminating across 
clusters do not overlap with the contributions corresponding to other dicriminant 
functions. Corresponding to each discriminant function, DFA yields an eigenvalue, which 
shows the ratio of importance of the discriminant function in discriminating between 
clusters. The relative importance of each eigenvalue is presented in terms of percentage 
of variance explained by its corresponding discriminant function. 
In the analysis of this dissertation, cluster analysis produces clusters across the 
255 European country-sector cases. From the cluster analysis, clustering-information, that 
is, which case lies in which cluster, is taken and added as an additional column in the 255 
country-sectors’ over-time average wage change data set. A discriminant function 
analysis60 is performed on that data set to find out whether or not the cases are classified 
into clusters as predicted by the cluster analysis and how the predicted clusters are 
discriminated maximally. The DFA yields discriminant functions or canonical scores, 
which represent dimensions along which the clusters obtained from the cluster analysis, 
are discriminated maximally. In the analysis of this study, the functional form of the 
discriminant function, with standardized coefficients, is expressed as:  
             Li= b1* xi1 + b2* xi2 + ……. + bn*xin                   (4.3)  
                                                 
60 A recent alternative to a discriminant function analysis (DFA) is a logistic or a multinomial logistic 
analysis, which is, in general, preferred over the DFA because the DFA relies on more restrictive 
assumptions. In the analysis of this dissertation, the number of observations (255) is not large enough 
compared to the number of independent variables (25), because of which application of a multinomial 
logistic analysis is not feasible. Hence, DFA appeared as the preferred analytic tool for the analysis of this 
dissertation. Moreover, since in this analysis, it is required to combine a multivariate tool that is cluster 
analysis with another tool to determine cluster discrimination, it seems logical to combine one multivariate 
analytic tool with another multivariate tool that is the DFA. 
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Equation (4.3) is identical to equation (4.2), but in equation (4.3) i = 1, 2,….., 255 
for the 255 European country-sectors. The xj represents the jth discriminating variable that 
is the annual rate of change in average wage in jth year, where j=1, 2, …., 25 for the 
twenty-year time period from 1980-81 to 2004-05. 
4.3.3 Repetition of Grouping and Discrimination – Multilevel Analysis 
The data analysis of this dissertation, mentioned above, starts with a cluster 
analysis followed by a DFA on 255 European country-sectors. Galbraith (1998, Chap.6-
9, pg.89-167) and Calistri and Galbraith (2001, Chap.5, pg.92-105) have also used 
methodological techniques similar to the one mentioned above, that is, performing cluster 
analysis followed by a DFA61, but this dissertation advances over their techniques. It 
does so by developing and adding an innovative method of applying cluster analysis and 
DFA on European country-sectors multiple times. In the multiple applications of the two 
analyses, each time, between-cluster wage variations obtained from an application of the 
two analyses at a level are removed and the analyses are repeated on those cases which 
were clustered together in that level. The basic idea of the repetition is to examine wage-
variations across the cases that remained clustered together concealing wage-variations 
between them at that level. To elaborate further, when the analyses are applied on 255 
country-sectors, small and large clusters are obtained. By removing the country-sectors 
belonging to smaller clusters (here, a smaller cluster refer to the one which comprises 
such a small number of country-sectors that it is not feasible and meaningful to apply 
                                                 
61 Galbraith and Lu (2001) describe the use of cluster analysis and discriminant function analysis as a 
research tool. 
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cluster analysis and DFA on those country-sectors), the analyses are repeated at a further 
level separately on the country-sectors of each of the larger clusters (here, larger cluster 
refers to the one that confines such a number of county-sectors that it is feasible and 
meaningful to apply cluster analysis and DFA on those country-sectors). The application 
of cluster analysis and DFA are repeated multiple times in an identical manner, that is, 
each time the country-sectors of only the larger clusters are subjected to further analysis 
and those of the smaller ones are dropped out. The logic behind repeating the analyses 
multiple times goes as follows: when cluster analysis and DFA are performed on the set 
of 255 country-sectors, relative wage variations – flexibilities (or rigidities) – are 
obtained only across a few subsets of the original set and finer degrees of flexibilities (or 
rigidities) across the country-sectors of a single cluster remain undiscovered. This 
dissertation argues that all information on patterns of over-time average wage changes is 
not revealed by a single cluster analysis and DFA. The magnitude of the forces 
explaining the relative wage variations (flexibilities or rigidities) across the clusters in an 
analysis might be overshadowing the magnitude of factors that may explain relative wage 
variations across the country-sectors, which in that analysis belong to a single cluster 
(showing no wage variations). So, the question arises: how to discover the hidden relative 
wage structures or hidden relative wage flexibilities (or rigidities)? This dissertation 
answers that by repeating the analyses multiple times on larger clusters until clusters 
large enough to render for further analyses appear. This repetition of cluster analysis and 
DFA multiple times therefore, represents repetition of the analyses on progressively 
smaller country-sector sets of the original set of 255 country-sectors, which renders 
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examining relative wage variations at the smallest possible level of disaggregation of the 
original set. 
The multilevel approach of this dissertation, mentioned above, is first of its kind. 
Looking carefully, it shows a similarity with fractal geometry. In the case of fractal 
geometry, the fractal objects appear to comprise complexity within them. But, once one 
begins to view the object by magnifying it at finer levels, information about its parts, that 
is, each part approximately or probabilistically resembles the original object, is revealed. 
In the case of the test of nature of European wage structure of this study, the original 
object is the data set of 255 cases (country-sectors). The data set appears large and 
complex, concealing information on relative wage variations across the 255 cases. When 
cluster analysis and DFA are applied on the original object, sub-sets (parts) of the 
original set become visible. Removing some sub-sets and repeating the cluster analysis 
and DFA on the others reveals greater information on the nature of wages across the 
cases and progressively the complexity of the original set is reduced.   
The first three parts of the methodology of this dissertation that are grouping, 
discrimination, and repetitions of grouping and discrimination find how the average 
wages of 255 European country-sectors change or move over time. One application of the 
cluster analysis followed by a DFA on a number of country-sectors represents an analysis 
of a particular level in this dissertation. In case of an analysis of a particular level, when 
country-sectors that show very similar over time average wage movements cluster 
together (and those which show dissimilar movements cluster separately), a number of 
possible clustering results along-with their respective implications may be found, which 
include: (i) all the country-sectors, subjected to the analysis, cluster together into a single 
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cluster. In such a case, the clustering indicates that there is no difference in the over-time 
average wage changes across European countries and also across their sectors.  This also 
means that there are no visible (measurable) degrees of relative wage flexibilities, 
explained by transnational variables, or rigidities, explained by labor market policies and 
institutions, across the countries; (ii) country-sectors cluster into two or more clusters, 
which are sector-specific, for example, manufacturing sectors of different countries, 
cluster together or market services sectors of different countries cluster together. In such 
a case, the sector-specific clustering indicates that relative wages are not rigid across 
countries because of the effects of cross-country labor market policies and institutions; 
rather, relative wages are flexible across sectors, which may be due to the effects of 
transnational variables; (iii) country-sectors cluster into two or more country-specific 
clusters, for example, one or more countries form one cluster and separate out from other 
countries. In such a case if it is found that countries that have similar labor market 
policies and institutions cluster together and the countries with very differentiated 
policies and institutions cluster separately, the clustering indicates that there exist relative 
wage rigidities across the countries, which may be due to the effects of labor market 
policies and institutions. But, in case countries with much differentiated policies and 
institutions cluster together, it indicates that there exist relative wage flexibilities across 
countries, which may be explained by transnational variables. When relative wage 
flexibilities are found, this dissertation performs the fourth part of its analysis that is 
forensic identification in order to identify whether or not transnational variables explain 
the relative wage flexibilities.  
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4.3.4 Advantages and Limitations of the Methodology 
There are a number of advantages of the methodological approach of this 
dissertation. They are: Firstly, the exploratory analysis of examining relative wage 
flexibility (or rigidity) allows the data to reveal whether relative wages are rigid or 
flexible in Europe, without a priori assuming, like the usual cross-country empirical 
studies, that wages are rigid because of labor market policies and institutions. Thus the 
exploratory analysis allows examining the nature of European wages from an unbiased 
perspective. Secondly, the results from the analysis of this study allows examining 
whether or not labor market policies and institutions explain relative wage variations 
(relative wage rigidities) across European country-sectors, without the necessity of using 
poor quality and unreliable quantitative measures of those policies and institutions. This 
is because, in the analysis, if sectors of countries with similar labor market policies and 
institutions, that is, sectors of countries whose labor market policies and institutions are 
characterized by same social policy model (Nordic model or Anglo-Saxon model or  
Continental model or Mediterranean model62) show similar over-time average wage 
behaviors, it indicates that, as suggested by LMF hypothesis, policies and institutions of 
European countries explain wage rigidity, and thereby, also the trend of their 
unemployment rates. But, if the results of the analysis show otherwise, the hypothesis is 
not supported. Thirdly, the continental-level approach of this study allows examining the 
effects of transnational variables, such as bilateral exchange rates, relative exports, 
relative imports, and relative taxes, on relative wage variations across European country-
                                                 
62 The labor market structures under each social policy model of Europe are described in Section 4.5 of 
this chapter. 
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sectors, and thereby, theoretically explaining their effects on changes in relative 
unemployment rates across European countries because theoretically wage and 
employment or unemployment rate are related, and factors associated with wage changes 
are also, associated with changes in employment or unemployment rates. Finally, the 
methodological approach of this dissertation permits examining the effects of unlimited 
numbers of transnational variables on relative wage variations, and hence, on variations 
in relative employment or unemployment rates across European countries. This is an 
advantage over the methodological approaches of the cross-country studies because the 
econometric models of those studies statistically permit estimation of the effects of only a 
limited number of independent variables on employment or unemployment rates. This is 
because, in order to maintain the statistical power of the econometric analysis, given the 
number of observations the number of independent variables cannot exceed a certain 
count. 
Besides the advantages, there are also certain limitations of the methodology of 
this dissertation. They are: Firstly, The application of cluster analysis and DFA requires a 
large comprehensive data set over a considerably long period of time to generate 
economically meaningful clusters. Similarities of average wage changes over a short 
period of time may not reveal any economically meaningful result. Also, for the cluster 
analysis and DFA, data set should not have even a single missing data. Secondly, adding 
additional years of data into the data set may change the results, and thereby, the 
implications may change. However, in this regard, this dissertation argues that the 
changes in the results will generate findings which would remain economically 
meaningful with respect to the longer period of time. Finally, the findings from the 
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forensic identification part do not reveal whether transnational factors that explain 
relative wage variations actually increase or decrease wages across countries (country-
sectors). But, this limitation is overcome theoretically because based on theoretical 
arguments it can be said how a transnational variable affects wages across countries. 
Moreover, the prime objective this dissertation is to examine whether or not transnational 
variables explain relative wage variations (flexibilities) across European countries and 
not examining whether they increase or decrease the wages across countries.  
4.4 MEASUREMENT OF RELATIVE WAGE FLEXIBILITY – ANALYSES AND FINDINGS 
The test of nature of the European wage structure, or, in other words, the test of 
relative wage flexibility (or rigidity) begins with applying cluster analysis and DFA on 
the over-time average wage change data of 255 European country-sectors. This analysis 
is the analysis at Level One. From this analysis, one large cluster comprising 241 
country-sectors is obtained. Cluster analysis and DFA is repeated on the 241 country-
sectors, which is the analysis at Level Two. From the analysis of Level Two, two large 
clusters, each comprising 108 country-sectors are obtained, each of which are further 
subjected separately to cluster analysis and DFA at a third level or say Level Three. 
Therefore, at the third level, two separate analyses are performed. The first analysis of 
Level Three yields a large cluster consisting 60 country-sectors and the second analysis 
yields one comprising 69 country-sectors. Cluster analysis and DFA are again performed 
separately on the 60 country-sectors and on the 69 country-sectors at a fourth level, 
which represent the first analysis of Level Four and the second analysis of level four, 
respectively. The six analyses of the four levels are presented below:  
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4.4.1 Relative Wage Flexibility at Level One63 
In Level One, cluster analysis is performed on the over-time average wage change 
data of 255 country-sectors or cases. The analysis yields three well-defined clusters. 
Table A.4.3 presents the information on the components of each of the three clusters. The 
table shows that Cluster 1 is a huge cluster comprising 241 out of 255 cases. Cluster 2 
comprises only seven sectors, which include the manufacturing sectors and the 
agricultural, forestry, and fishing sectors of Greece. Cluster 3 also comprises only seven 
sectors, which include the mining and energy supply sector, the manufacturing sectors 
and the agricultural, fishing, and forestry sector of Portugal. Using the clustering 
information (that is which country-sector belongs to which cluster) a DFA is performed 
on the 255 cases. The DFA yields two discriminant functions or canonical scores such 
that the first canonical score separates the three clusters maximally along one dimension 
and the second canonical score separates them maximally along a second dimension. The 
eigenvalue of each canonical score are presented in Table A.4.9, where each eigenvalue 
represents the importance of its corresponding canonical score in separating the clusters 
maximally. Figure 4.1 below shows how the three clusters found in Level One are 
separated maximally along the two dimensions.  
The findings from the analysis of Level One reveal that along the first dimension, 
over-time average wage changes of the sectors of Greece’s cluster, Cluster 2, are 
different from that of the sectors of all the other countries as well as from that of the rest 
                                                 
63 In the case of each analysis at four levels, each cluster is named by a number such that if an analysis 
yields three clusters, one cluster is named as Cluster 1, another cluster is named as Cluster 2 and the last 
cluster is named as Cluster 3. 
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of its sectors that are in Cluster 1. Similarly, along the second dimension, the over-time 
average wage changes of the sectors of Portugal of Cluster 3 are different from that of the 
sectors of all the other countries as well as from that of the rest of its sectors that are in 
Cluster 1. 
Figure 4.1 Canonical Score Plots from Level 1’s Discriminant Function Analysis64 
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At Level One, Cluster 1 comprises 241 cases including sectors of all the 
seventeen European countries. This dissertation argues that factor(s) that separates 
Greece’s cluster from Cluster 1 and Cluster 3 and factor(s) that separates Portugal’s 
                                                 
64 In Figures 4.1 to 4.6, group centroid for each cluster represents the mean of the discriminant functions 
(canonical scores) of the country-sectors of each cluster. 
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cluster from Cluster 1 and Cluster 2 might be overshadowing the effects of factor(s) that 
may separate the country-sectors which are clustered together in Cluster 1. To find out 
whether or not there exists further cluster structures or variations in over-time average 
wage movements across the 241 cases of Cluster 1, country-sectors of Greece’s cluster 
and that of Portugal’s cluster are removed from the data set of 255 cases and cluster 
analysis followed by DFA are performed identically once again, but only on the data set 
of 241 cases of Cluster 1. This is the analysis at Level Two. 
4.4.2 Relative Wage Flexibility at Level Two 
In Level Two, cluster analysis is performed on 241 cases of Level One’s Cluster 
1. The analysis yields four clusters, whose cluster-details (components of the clusters) are 
provided in Table A.4.4. The table shows that Cluster 1 and Cluster 2 are two large 
clusters comprising 108 cases each. Cluster 1 includes the mining and energy supply 
sector, the construction sector, and the market and non-market services sectors of Austria, 
all or most of the sectors of Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, France, the 
Netherlands, 11 out of 15 sectors of Luxembourg and six miscellaneous sectors. Cluster 2 
consists of all or most of the sectors of Spain, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Sweden, 
the mining and energy supply sectors, the construction sector, and the services (both 
market and non-market) sectors of Greece, the services (both market and non-market) 
sectors of Portugal, three sectors of Denmark, three sectors of Luxembourg, and three 
miscellaneous sectors. Cluster 3 comprises the manufacturing sectors of Austria, and 
three miscellaneous sectors. And, Cluster 4 consists of 14 out of 15 sectors of UK, and 
two miscellaneous sectors. The DFA on the 241 cases, grouped into four clusters, yields 
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three canonical scores or dimensions, whose eigenvalues are presented in Table A.4.10. 
Figure 4.2 below shows how the first two canonical scores separate the four clusters 
along their respective dimension.  
Figure 4.2 Canonical Score Plots from Level 2’s Discriminant Function Analysis 
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The findings from the analysis of Level Two show that over-time average wage 
changes of the sectors of UK’s cluster, that is, Cluster 4, are different from that of the 
country-sectors of Cluster 1, Cluster 2, and Cluster 3, along the first dimension. And, 
along the second dimension, over-time average wages movements of the sectors of 
Austria of Cluster 3 are different from that of the country-sectors of Cluster1, Cluster 2, 
and Cluster 4. 
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Since Cluster 1 and Cluster 2 comprise a large number of cases, that is 108 cases, 
they are subjected to further analyses at a third level. However, since the clusters are 
already differentiated at Level Two, two separate analyses are performed on the cases of 
each of the two clusters.   
4.4.3 Relative Wage Flexibility at Level Three – First Analysis 
In third level’s first analysis, cluster analysis is on 108 country-sectors of Cluster 
1 of Level Two. The analysis yields three clusters. The components of the three clusters 
are presented in Table A.4.5, which reveals that Cluster 1 consists of 60 cases that 
include the mining and energy supply sector, the construction sector, and the market and 
non-market service sectors of Austria, the construction sector and the market service 
sectors of Belgium, the agriculture, fishing, and forestry sector and the market services 
sectors of the Netherlands, three market services sectors of Luxembourg, the market and 
non-market services sectors of France, all the sectors of Switzerland, 11 out of 15 sectors 
of Denmark, and two miscellaneous sectors. Cluster 2 consists of the mining and energy 
supply sector, the manufacturing sectors, and the construction sector of France, the 
mining and energy supply sector and the manufacturing sectors of the Netherlands, 12 out 
of 15 sectors of Germany, and three miscellaneous sectors. And Cluster 3 consists of the 
manufacturing sectors and the mining and energy supply sector of Belgium, the 
manufacturing sectors, the construction sector and the non-market services sector of 
Luxembourg and the non-market services sector of the Netherlands. DFA performed on 
the 108 cases yields two canonical scores or dimensions, whose eigenvalues are 
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presented in Table A.4.11. Figure 4.3 below displays how the three clusters are 
discriminated along the two dimensions.  
Figure 4.3 Canonical Score Plots from Level 3’s First Discriminant Function Analysis 























All or most of the sectors of CH and 
DK and Service and other sectors of 
AT, BE, FR, NL and LU
Most of the sectors of DE, 
Manufacturing, Energy and 
Construction sectors of FR and NL
Manufacturing and other sectors of BE 
and LU and Non-market service 
sectors of BE, LU and NL
Group Centroid
 
The results from Level Three’s first analysis show that over-time average wage 
changes are differentiated predominantly across sectors within-country. The over-time 
average wage changes of the sectors of France of Cluster 1 are different from that of its 
sectors of Cluster 2, along the first dimension. Also, along the first dimension, the over-
time average wage changes of the Netherlands’ sectors of Cluster 1 are different from 
that of its sectors of Cluster 2.  Also, over time average wage movements of Belgium’s 
sectors of Cluster 1 are different from that of its sectors of Cluster 3, along the first 
 129
dimension. The findings also reveal discrimination of over-time average wage changes 
between countries, for example, between the sectors of Austria, Switzerland, and 
Denmark of Cluster 1 and the sectors of Germany and the Netherlands of Cluster 2, along 
the first dimension; across the sectors of Austria, Switzerland, and Denmark of Cluster 1 
and the sectors of Belgium and Luxembourg of Cluster 3, along both the first and the 
second dimensions; and across the sectors of Belgium and Luxembourg of Cluster 3 and 
the sectors of Germany and the Netherlands of Cluster 2, along the second dimension. 
4.4.4 Relative Wage Flexibility at Level Three – Second Analysis 
Cluster analysis in Level Three’s second analysis is on 108 cases of Cluster 2 of 
Level Two. The analysis yields three clusters, whose cluster components are shown in 
Table A.4.6. The table shows that Cluster 1 consists of 69 cases, which include the 
market and non-market services sectors of Norway, Sweden, and Portugal, all the sectors 
of Italy, 14 out of 15 sectors of Spain, 13 out of 15 sectors of Ireland, three sectors of 
Luxembourg, and five miscellaneous sectors. Cluster 2 consists of the mining and energy 
supply sector, the construction sector, and the market and non-market services sectors of 
Greece. And, Cluster 3 comprises 12 out of 15 sectors of Finland, 9 out of 15 sectors of 
Norway, and the manufacturing sectors, the construction sector, and the agricultural, 
forestry, and fishing sector of Sweden. The DFA on the 108 cases yields two canonical 
scores, whose eigenvalues are provided in Table A.4.12. Figure 4.4 below shows how the 
three clusters are discriminated along the two dimensions.  
The results from Level Three’s second analysis display variations in over-time 
average wage movements across sectors within-country. Along the second dimension, 
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over-time average wages changes of the sectors of Norway and Sweden of Cluster 1 are 
different from that of their sectors in Cluster 3. However, there are also variations across 
countries such as between the sectors of Italy, Spain, Ireland, and Portugal of Cluster 1 
and the sectors of Greece of Cluster 2, along the first dimension, and across the sectors of 
Italy, Spain, Ireland, and Portugal of Cluster 1 and the sectors of Finland of Cluster 3, 
along the second dimension.  
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4.4.5 Relative Wage Flexibility at Level Four – First Analysis   
The first analysis of Level Four is on 60 cases of Cluster 1 of Level Three’s first 
analysis. The cluster analysis on the 60 cases yields four clusters, whose cluster-details 
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are given in Table A.4.7. The table displays that, Cluster 1 consists of the market services 
sectors of Austria and the Netherlands, and also the construction sector of Austria. 
Cluster 2 comprises five sectors of Denmark (mostly manufacturing), the market and 
non-market services sectors of France, three market services sectors of Luxembourg, two 
market services sectors of Belgium, the mining and energy supply sectors and the non-
market services sectors of Austria, and two miscellaneous sectors. Cluster 3 consists of 
the construction sector and the market services sectors of Denmark and the construction 
sector and two market services sectors of Belgium, and two miscellaneous sectors. And, 
Cluster 4 consists of all the sectors of Switzerland and a couple of miscellaneous sectors. 
The DFA on the 60 cases yields three canonical scores, whose eigenvalues are presented 
in the Table A.4.13. Figure 4.5 below shows how the clusters are discriminated along the 
first two scores or dimensions.  
The findings from Level Four’s first analysis display relative wages variations 
across sectors within-country. For example, over-time average wages movements of the 
sectors of Denmark of Cluster 2 are different from that of its sectors of Cluster 3, along 
the second dimension, and over-time average wages changes between the sectors of 
Belgium of Cluster 1 and that of its sectors of Cluster 2 are different, along the second 
dimension.  Relative wage variations are also seen across countries in this analysis, for 
example, across the sectors of Switzerland of Cluster 4 and the sectors of other countries 
in Cluster 1, along the first dimension, and across the sectors of Switzerland of Cluster 4 




Figure 4.5 Canonical Score Plots from Level 4’s First Discriminant Function Analysis 
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4.4.6 Relative Wage Flexibility at Level Four – Second Analysis 
The second analysis of Level Four is on 69 cases of Cluster 1 of Level Three’s 
second analysis. The cluster analysis on the 69 cases yields five clusters, whose cluster-
details are presented in Table A.4.8. The table shows that Cluster 1 consists of all the 
sectors of Italy and 14 out of 15 sectors of Spain. Cluster 2 consists of the market and 
non-market services sectors of Sweden. Cluster 3 consists of the market and non-market 
services sectors of Norway and the construction sector and three market services sectors 
of Ireland. Cluster 4 consists of the mining and energy supply sector, the manufacturing 
sectors, and the financial services sector of Ireland. Cluster 5 consists of the market and 
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non-market services sectors of Portugal, the wholesale and retail services sector and the 
non-market services sector of Ireland, two manufacturing sectors of Denmark, couple of 
market services sectors of Luxembourg, and two miscellaneous sectors. DFA on the 69 
cases yields four canonical scores of dimensions, whose eigenvalues are given in Table 
A.4.14. Figure 4.6 below displays how the five clusters are discriminated along the first 
two dimensions. 
Figure 4.6 Canonical Score Plots from Level 4’s Second Discriminant Function Analysis 
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The results of Level Four’s second analysis show variations in over-time average 
wage changes across sectors within-country. For example, over-time average wage 
changes of the sectors of Ireland of Cluster 3 are different from that of its sectors of 
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Cluster 4 and also from that of its sectors of Cluster 5, along the second dimension. The 
findings also reveal variations across countries, for example, across the sectors of Sweden 
of Cluster 2 and the sectors of Norway of Cluster 3, along the first dimension, across the 
sectors of Sweden of Cluster 2 and the sectors of Portugal of Cluster 4, along the first as 
well as second dimensions, and also across the sectors of Norway of Cluster 3 and the 
sectors of Portugal of Cluster 4, along the first dimension. 
4.5 IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The four levels of analyses, presented above, show over-time differences in the 
patterns of average wage changes, or, in other words, show that there exist relative wage 
variations across European country-sectors (across sectors within-country and across 
countries). As mentioned before in this chapter, if sectors of European countries with 
similar labor market policies and institutions cluster together and those with 
differentiated labor market policies and institutions cluster separately, it indicates that the 
relative wage variations between the clusters may be explained by differences in labor 
market policies and institutions across the countries belonging to separate clusters, which 
is the basic argument of LMF hypothesis. And, then, the relative wage variations are said 
to display relative wage rigidities across countries (or country-sectors). However, if 
European countries with differentiated labor market policies and institutions cluster 
together, the LMF hypothesis is not supported. And, as argued before in this chapter, if 
the cluster structures display meaningful patterns of relative wage variations that do not 
support the LMF hypothesis, the relative wage variations are said to display relative wage 
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flexibilities across the clusters. And, it also indicates that transnational variables may 
explain the flexibilities across the country-sectors of separate clusters.   
Ferrera (1998) and Beori (2000) define four social policy models prevailing in 
European countries during the last part of the 20th century. These models are: the Nordic 
model, the Anglo-Saxon model, the Continental model, and the Mediterranean model. 
The Nordic model’s features that are related to the labor market include: generous 
unemployment benefits generating compressed wage structures; presence of powerful 
trade unions’ in the workplace and their involvement in the bargaining, which ensure 
limited wage disparities; highly developed and variety of active labor market policies; 
and high tax rates with considerable tax wedges. Denmark, Finland, and Sweden from the 
European Union (EU) are said to follow the features of this model. Also Norway, which 
is not an EU member, is classified as a Nordic model. The Netherlands shows mixed 
features of the Nordic and the Continental models, but over time it has moved toward the 
Nordic one. Hence, the Netherlands is classified as a Nordic model.  
The Anglo-Saxon model includes UK and Ireland. This model’s features that are 
related to the labor market are characterized half-way between Europe and the United 
States. The features include: weak employment protection legislation; strict eligibility 
criterion for the recipients of unemployment benefits who are forced to actively search 
for employment in order to receive the benefits; low levels of unionization; and a wide 
dispersion in wages between the very low pay and the very high salaries.  
The Continental model prevails in Austria, France, Germany, Belgium, and 
Luxembourg. The features of this model that are related to the labor market include: 
extensive insurance-based unemployment benefits implying transfer on unconditional 
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entitlements, which are said to increase the disincentives of the unemployed to search 
actively for jobs; falling trade union membership rates, but the influence of the unions are 
maintained artificially by the extension of collective bargaining agreements to non-union 
members, much beyond the presence of the unions; and a relatively low income-disparity. 
Switzerland is said to have features somewhere between the Anglo-Saxon model and the 
Continental Model. 
The Mediterranean model’s features related to the labor market include: strict 
employment protection legislation; a relatively low coverage of unemployment benefits; 
strong influence of the unions that is preserved artificially by extending collective 
bargaining coverage agreements; and rigid wage bargaining structure in the formal 
economy, which generates a highly compressed wage structure. This model prevails in 
Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal.  
The four social policy models define four separate degrees of rigidities 
(generosity and strictness) of the labor market policies and institutions. Countries 
belonging to the same model hence, have similar labor market policies and institutional 
structures. Therefore, according to the proposition of the LMF theorists, countries 
belonging to the same model should display similar wage behaviors over time. In the test 
of nature of European wage structure, if countries belonging to the same model display 
similar relative wage behaviors over time and cluster together, the LMF hypothesis is 
supported, or else, it is not.   
Implications 
In Level One, countries following four different models show similar over-time 
average wage changes, or, in other words, show no relative wage variations, and cluster 
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together in Cluster 1. This finding does not show support for the LMF hypothesis. 
Furthermore, at this level, all the sectors of Greece and Portugal do not show similar 
over-time average wage changes – some sectors of Greece and that of Portugal separate 
out from rest of their sectors – that again do not support the LMF hypothesis. This is 
because, according to the hypothesis, labor market policies and institutions explain the 
relative wage variations across the sectors of different countries, which follow different 
models, and not across the sectors of same country.  
In Level Two, sectors of Anglo-Saxon UK separate from the sectors of rest of the 
countries. Looking at this, an LMF theorist may say that this finding shows support for 
the LMF hypothesis, but in fact, it does not because at this level, sectors of Anglo-Saxon 
Ireland neither clusters with the sectors of Anglo-Saxon UK nor separately, but clusters 
with the sectors of Mediterranean Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy and Nordic Finland, 
Sweden, and Norway. This clustering also shows that Mediterranean countries and 
Nordic countries cluster together, which is contrary to the LMF hypothesis. Also, in this 
level, sectors of Continental Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, and Luxembourg 
cluster with the sectors of Nordic Denmark and Netherlands and sectors of Anglo-Saxon 
with Continental Switzerland. All these clustering do not support the LMF hypothesis. 
The result showing relative wage variations across the sectors of Austria of Cluster 1 and 
Cluster 3 also does not support the LMF hypothesis. 
Like the findings of previous levels, findings from Level Three’s first analysis do 
not support the LMF hypothesis. This is because, the findings at this level’s analysis 
show differences in over-time average wage changes across the sectors of same country, 
such as across the sectors of France, across the sectors of the Netherlands, and across the 
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sectors of Belgium. This level also shows that sectors of Continental Austria, Belgium 
and France are clustered with sectors of Nordic Denmark and Netherlands and with 
sectors of Anglo-Saxon with Continental Switzerland. Also, in Cluster 2 of this level, 
sectors of Continental Germany and France are clustered with the sectors of Nordic 
Netherlands. These cross-country clustering do not support the LMF hypothesis.   
The second analysis of Level Three separates sectors of Mediterranean Greece 
from the sectors of other countries. This finding does not support the LMF hypothesis 
because in this level, sectors of Mediterranean Spain, Italy and Portugal, instead of 
clustering separately or clustering with the sectors of Greece, cluster with the sectors of 
Anglo-Saxon Ireland and sectors of Nordic Norway and Sweden. At this level, looking at 
the sectors of Nordic Finland, Norway and Sweden clustered together in Cluster 3, an 
LMF theorist may argue that the LMF hypothesis holds, but the hypothesis is rejected 
because some sectors of Nordic Norway and Sweden cluster with sectors of 
Mediterranean Spain, Italy, and Portugal, and not with their rest of the sectors and also, 
not with the sectors of Nordic Finland. 
The first analysis at Level Four separates sectors of Anglo-Saxon with 
Continental Switzerland from the rest of the countries. Viewing this, an LMF theorist 
may argue that their hypothesis is supported. However, in this case, the LMF hypothesis 
would be supported when the sectors of Switzerland are separated from the sectors of 
Continental countries clustered together and from the sectors of Nordic countries 
clustered together. But at this level, the sectors of Switzerland separate out from the 
sectors of Continental Austria clustered with Nordic Netherlands, and from the sectors of 
Nordic Denmark clustered, not with the sectors of Nordic Netherlands, but with the 
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sectors of Continental Austria, Belgium, France, and Luxembourg. And, these clustering 
features clearly do not support the LMF hypothesis. 
In Level Four’s second analysis, sectors of Mediterranean Spain and Italy separate 
out from the sectors of the rest of countries. This finding would support the LMF 
hypothesis if the sectors of Mediterranean Spain and Italy are separated from the sectors 
of Nordic Norway and Sweden and from the Anglo-Saxon Ireland. But the findings 
reveal that sectors of Nordic Norway are separated from the sectors of Nordic Sweden 
and clustered with the sectors of Anglo-Saxon Ireland. Also, it is evident at this level that 
sectors of Anglo-Saxon Ireland cluster separately and display relative wage variations 
across its sectors. Some sectors of Ireland cluster with the sectors of Nordic Norway in 
one cluster and with the sectors of Mediterranean Portugal, in another. Also, in this level, 
the sectors of Mediterranean Portugal are clustered with few sectors of Nordic Denmark, 
Anglo-Saxon Ireland, and Continental France and Luxembourg, and not with the sectors 
of Mediterranean Spain and Italy. Therefore, the findings of Level Four’s second analysis 
do not support the LMF hypothesis. 
Conclusion 
The results of the analyses of the four levels do not support the LMF hypothesis. 
The analyses do not find that the differences in over-time average wage changes or 
relative wage variations across country-sectors are explained by cross-country differences 
in labor market policies and institutions. Therefore, it may be concluded that cross-
country labor market policies and institutions neither explain the relative wage variations 
across countries in each analysis, nor can thereby explain the differences in the evolution 
of high rates of unemployment across the European countries, as proposed by the LMF 
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theorists. In the four levels, the relative wage variations across the country-sectors 
therefore, do no imply relative wage rigidities, but imply relative wage flexibilities. As 
mentioned in section 3.3, transnational variable lead to relative wage variations – referred 
as relative wage flexibilities – both within countries (between sectors within each 
country) and between countries that are economically interdependent like European 
countries. Therefore, the relative wage variations across the country-sectors (grouped in 
clusters) in the four levels of analyses may be attributed to transnational variables. From 
the explanations presented in Section 3.3 of Chapter Three, this dissertation argues that 
transnational variables not only may explain relative wage variations but also the 
fluctuations in relative employment or unemployment rates across countries. Hence, 
transnational variables explaining relative wage flexibilities across European countries 
should explain the evolution of heterogeneous rates on unemployment across European 
countries. To determine whether or not transnational variables explain the relative wage 
variations across European country-sectors in each of the four levels of analyses, this 












Chapter 5:  Toward a Search for Sources of Relative Wage Flexibility in 
Europe – A Forensic Identification 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
It is evident from Chapter Four that relative wages are not rigid both within and 
between European countries. The discussion presented in Section 3.3 of Chapter Three 
already describes why and how transnational variables lead to variations in relative wages 
– defined as relative wage flexibilities – and in relative employment rates both across 
economically interdependent countries (and also, across their sectors). Therefore, the 
sources of relative wage variations or flexibilities between European country-sectors 
found in Chapter Four may be transnational variables. This chapter focuses on identifying 
whether or not transnational variables are associated with the flexibilities across the 
European country-sector clusters in the four levels of analyses of Chapter Four. Section 
5.2 selects a number of variables, which are theoretically associated with both wages and 
employment rates, and whose transnational counterparts are associated with variations in 
relative wage and employment (or unemployment) rates across interdependent economies 
(and also, across their sectors). Section 5.3 describes how using those variables their 
transnational counterparts are created so that the associations of the transnational 
variables with the relative wage variations across clusters can be tested. It also describes 
the methodology that is developed specifically to examine the associations.  Section 5.4 
presents the analyses of identifying “forensically” the sources of the relative wage 
variations at the four levels presented in Chapter Four. And, finally, Section 5.5 presents 
the implications and conclusions of the findings obtained in Section 5.4. This chapter 
answers the final two research questions of this dissertation, which are: “What are the 
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factor(s) that lead to flexibility (or rigidity) in European wage structure?” And, “Why 
and how do the factor(s) that lead to flexibility (or rigidity) in European wage structure 
explain the evolution of unemployment in European economies during the last few 
decades? The previous chapter already found that the European wage structure is not 
rigid, but flexible. Hence, this chapter searches for the sources explaining the flexibility, 
and theoretically explains how those sources also explain the evolution of European 
unemployment. 
5.2 POSSIBLE SOURCES OF RELATIVE WAGE FLEXIBILITY 
The relative wage variations across European country-sectors found in the four 
levels of analyses of Chapter Four imply that labor market policies and institutions do not 
explain the variations, as suggested by the LMF theorists, and hence, it is concluded that 
the policies and institutions also cannot explain the high and differential rates of 
unemployment across European countries. So, if labor market policies and institutions do 
not explain the variations in relative wages across European country-sectors, what factors 
might explain them?  According to the discussion of Section 3.3, the factors may be 
transnational variables – international-, continental- and global-level variables. As 
Section 3.3 mentions, transnational variables explain both relative wage variations as 
well as fluctuations in relative unemployment rates across economically interdependent 
European countries. This explanation is based on Keynesian theory of unemployment, 
which is presented in Section 2.3 of Chapter Two. This Chapter focuses on identifying 
whether or not transnational variables are associated with relative wage flexibilities at the 
four levels of analyses to draw implications for Europe’s unemployment problem.   
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Identification of transnational variables that may explain relative wage 
flexibilities across European country-sector clusters requires examining associations of 
transnational variables with the flexibilities. Given the relative wage flexibilities or 
variations of the four levels of analyses of Chapter Four, only transnational variables are 
needed for the examination of the associations. Since transnational variables theoretically 
affect relative wages and relative employment rates within and between countries, they 
can be constructed by using data on variables that affect wages and employment rates. 
Theories presented in Section 2.3 suggest several such variables. Based on the theoretical 
suggestions, this study selects a number of macroeconomic, demographic, and labor 
market variables. The list of the variables65 include: (i) investment; (ii) household 
expenditure; (iii) gross domestic product (GDP); (iv) government net lending; (v) 
government net lending as a percentage of GDP; (vi) total direct taxes; (vii) taxes on 
income and profits as a percentage of GDP; (viii) indirect taxes; (ix) taxes on goods and 
services as a percentage of GDP; (x) total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP; (xi) social 
security contributions received by government; (xii) social benefits paid by government; 
(xiii) exports in goods and service; (xiv) imports in goods and services; (xv) net exports 
in goods and services; (xvi) trade in goods and services as a percentage of GDP; (xvii) 
bilateral exchange rate; (xviii) consumer price index (CPI); (xix) nominal oil price; (xx) 
real oil price; (xxi) net migration; (xxii) share of youth (age-group 15-24) in population; 
(xxiii) female civilian labor force participation rate; (xxiv) male civilian labor force 
participation rate; (xxv) all-person civilian labor force participation rate; (xxvi) 
                                                 
65 The description of each of these variables is given in the glossary of this dissertation. 
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employment rate of youth (age between 15 to 24); (xxvii) male employment rate; (xxviii) 
female employment rate; and (xxix) total employment rate66.  
Factors such as investment, consumption, government expenditure, taxes, exports, 
and imports are demand-side factors, which according to Keynesian theory influence 
employment levels and wages in an economy. Keynesian theory asserts that investment, 
consumption, government expenditure and exports increase output, employment and 
wages, while increases in taxes and imports decrease the same.  Since European countries 
are integrated and interdependent, the effects of changes in one or more of these factors, 
due to exogenous policy decisions or endogenous economic reasons, in one country are 
felt by others. These direct and indirect effects on more than one country influence 
relative employment and wage levels across those countries. The overall effects of 
changes in demand-side variables across countries are also captured by changes in the 
relative GDP of the countries. 
The government’s net lending variable in the list represents government deficits, 
which is government expenditure less government revenue. The effects of changes in 
government expenditure can result from changes in one or more of its components, which 
include government investments, government consumption expenditure, social benefits 
paid by government and others forms of payments made by government; while the effects 
of changes in government revenue can be brought by changes in one or more of its 
components that includes taxes, social security contributions and other forms of payments 
received by government. Therefore, changes in one or more of these components of 
                                                 
66 Civilian labor force participation rate variables are included because in the case of many countries the 
data on the employment rates are missing. 
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government expenditure and revenue across countries in Europe can bring fluctuations in 
relative employment and relative wages of the countries.  And, in countries, where the 
share of government’s net lending or of taxes in GDP is high, changes in net lending or in 
taxes will generate greater impacts on their employment and wage levels relative to that 
of those countries with lesser share.  
Changes in the components of international trade such as exports and imports of 
goods and services across European countries also bring changes in their relative 
employment and wage levels. Since international trade in goods and services is a major 
channel through which the countries are economically interdependent, impacts of the 
trade variables generate important implications for changes in relative employment and 
relative wages across European countries. And, the greater the importance of 
international trade for an economy, the greater are the effects of the changes in exports 
and imports on the employment rates and wages of that economy relative to that of the 
others.  
Factors such as bilateral exchange rate and relative consumer price index (CPI) 
represent the international competitiveness of a nation. Compared to bilateral exchange 
rate, relative CPI represents real exchange rate, which accounts for both the changes in 
market exchange rates and the variations in relative price levels. Fluctuations in bilateral 
exchange rate or in the CPI indicate changes in a country’s price competitiveness (in both 
prices of goods and services and in labor, in nominal and real terms) in the international 
market, which affect inflows of multinational investments, inflows of other international 
capital and financial investments and most importantly, trade factors such as exports and 
imports of goods and services. Hence, changes in these international competitiveness 
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factors bring fluctuations in relative employment and relative wages of European 
countries.  
Crude oil price is a global factor whose fluctuations impact all the economies 
around the world. However, the fluctuations affect oil exporting countries and oil 
importing countries differently. Rise in oil price is beneficial for oil exporting countries, 
such as Norway in Europe, and detrimental to the oil importing ones. In an oil-exporting 
nation, a rise in crude oil price increases the revenue collected from exporting oil, which 
generates demand in its economy and thereby, raises employment and wage levels. In an 
oil importing country, on the other hand, the rise in oil price generates detrimental 
effects, leading to a fall employment and wage levels. Since crude oil is a basic input of 
production, an increase in oil price increases the cost of production, which in turn induces 
a fall in employment levels and wages. Also, the increase in cost of production raises the 
general price level, reducing the purchasing power of the people, which in turn reduces 
consumption demand, and thereby, employment and wages in the oil importing economy. 
Therefore, change in oil price changes relative employment and wage levels of the 
countries. 
People often migrate from one county to another in search of jobs. In theory, it is 
generally asserted that most of those who migrate are predominantly low-waged workers, 
who do so in search of jobs with higher wages. So, what factors lead to emigration and 
immigration? From a Keynesian perspective, countries experiencing higher growth, 
rising employment and rising wages experience positive net migration while the countries 
facing lower growth, falling employment and falling wage experience negative net 
migration.  
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In any economy, the youth and the female working groups generally represent the 
low-wage groups. Hence, increase in the youth or female employment rates are 
associated with decrease in relative wages. But increase in male employment rate (or total 
employment rate) is associated with increase in relative wages. From a Keynesian 
perspective, an increase in demand in the economy increases the employment rates for all 
and also increases wages in general. 
From the perspective of LMF theorists, whose arguments rely on classical and 
neoclassical economic principles, employment and wages are not driven by demand; 
rather, changes in wages lead to changes in employment levels and thereby in demand-
side factors viz. investment, consumption, exports, imports and also GDP. For an LMF 
theorist, components of government expenditure and revenue affect wages or induce a 
decrease in the incentive to work, and hence, generate negative impacts on employment. 
For example, increase in government-paid social benefits are said to reduce the gap 
between wages and benefits, which decreases the incentive of the unemployed 
beneficiaries to look for a job or take up one. Increase in social security contributions 
made by employees are said to reduce the take-home pay, and thereby, the gap between 
pay and unemployment benefits. The smaller gap raises reservation wages of the 
employees, inducing them to increase wage claims. Therefore, from the perspective of an 
LMF theorist, increase in social benefits, social contributions, etc. affect wages and 
increase unemployment.  
Effects of fluctuations in bilateral exchange rate, relative consumer price index 
and in crude oil prices on employment, from the perspective of an LMF theorist, are 
dependent on wages. The changes in these factors are said to affect labor demand, for 
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example, appreciation of bilateral exchange rate make labor expensive for a multinational 
investor reducing their demand for the labor of the appreciating country; appreciation 
also makes exports expensive in the international market leading to a fall in exports, and 
hence, a fall in labor demand of the appreciating nation. Also, rise in crude oil price, 
which increase the cost of production, decreases labor demand. From the perspective of 
an LMF theorist, in the face of a fall in labor demand, if the wages do not fall the level of 
employment falls.  
From the perspective of LMF theorists, migration is driven by wages. High-wage 
countries experience greater rates of immigration than the low-wage ones. But the effect 
of increases in immigration on employment depends on the flexibility of wages. If wages 
are downwardly flexible, unemployment is low not only for the immigrants, but also for 
the youth, female and male working groups.  
For an LMF theorist the change in variables such as investment, exports, GDP, 
exchange rates, CPI, migration, employment rates of the European countries is associated 
with change in employment or unemployment rate, which in turn is associated with 
change in wage. And, in the context of Europe, the wage changes turn are explained by 
labor market policies and institutions. But, it is evident from the test of nature of 
European wage structure that the patterns of relative wage changes across European 
country-sectors are not explained by the policies and institutions. Hence, from the 
perspective of an LMF theorist, changes transnational variables such as relative 
investment, relative exports, relative GDP, bilateral exchange rates, relative CPI, relative 
migration, relative employment rates between European countries should not be 
associated with the relative wage variations across European country-sectors, which are 
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not explained by labor market policies and institutions. But, if it is found otherwise, that 
is, changes in these transnational variables show high and statistically significant 
associations with relative wage variations, it will imply that transnational variables 
seemingly explain the relative wage variations. And, relying on the arguments of this 
dissertation presented above in this section and also in Section 3.3, which are based on 
Keynesian theory of unemployment, it will be concluded that those transnational 
variables also explain the high and differential rate of unemployment across European 
countries.  
5.3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
In order to identify factors associated with relative wage flexibilities across 
European country-sector clusters, this dissertation uses data on several macroeconomic, 
demographic and labor market variables listed in the previous section. It develops a 
methodological technique to test the associations of these variables (their transnational 
counterpart) with the relative wage variations across the clusters. The description of the 
data and methodology are presented below. 
 
5.3.1 Data Description 
The data on macroeconomic, demographic, and labor market variables, mentioned 
above, are annual time series from 1980 to 2005 for the seventeen European countries, 
which are included in the analysis of this dissertation. The data on investment, household 
expenditure, and gross domestic product (GDP) are obtained from the Cambridge 
Econometrics database. There are no missing data in these annual time series. The 
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investment data are available at the sectoral-level, that is, for the fifteen sectors of all the 
seventeen European countries. In the four levels of analyses, in many cases, a number of 
sectors of a country cluster separately from the rest of its sectors, displaying relative 
wages flexibilities across sectors. The sectoral-level data on investment allows testing 
whether or not the flexibilities across the sectors are explained by changes in relative 
investments across those sectors. Also, the data allow testing whether or not the 
flexibilities across the sectors of two or more countries are explained by changes in 
relative investments across those sectors of the two or more countries. 
The data on macroeconomic, demographic and labor market variables, excluding, 
the data on investment, household expenditure, and GDP, nominal and real oil prices, are 
extracted from the OECD database. In the annual time series for total direct taxes, 
indirect taxes, social security contributions received by government, social benefits paid 
by government, government net lending, and share of government net lending in GDP, 
data points are missing for Germany, Luxembourg, and Switzerland. In case of the time 
series for exports of goods and services, imports of goods and services, and net exports of 
goods and services, data points are missing for Germany, and in case of the time series 
for employment rates - female, male, total, and youth of age-group 15 to 24 – data points 
are missing for countries including, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Switzerland, and UK. Therefore, to proxy for the male, female, total and 
youth employment rates data in case of these countries, data on male, female, all-person 
civilian labor force participation rates, and share of youth in total population are used, 
respectively. The nominal and real oil price data are obtained from the CountryWatch 
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Energy Forecast website. The oil prices represent the prices of crude oil expressed in US 
dollar per barrel of crude oil.  
To identify sources explaining relative wage flexibilities across European 
country-sector clusters, the data on each variable from the list67 are used to construct data 
on transnational variables. The transnational variables take forms of relative variables 
such as exports of one country in one cluster relative to that of another country in another 
cluster or government expenditure of one country in one cluster relative to that of another 
country in another cluster or investment of certain sectors of a country in one cluster 
relative to that of the sectors of another country in another cluster. Once the data series on 
relative variables (from 1980-2005) are constructed, those series are converted into their 
annual rate of change series (from 1980-81 to 2004-05), which are then used for the 
identification of sources explaining relative wage flexibilities.  
5.3.2 Methodology – Construction of Pseudo scores from Canonical Scores and 
Forensic Identification of Sources of Relative Wage Flexibility 
In Chapter Four, six analyses performed in four levels, show how seventeen 
European countries and their sectors are separated on the basis of maximal variations in 
their patterns of average wage movements from 1980 to 2005. In each analysis, the 
discriminant function analysis (DFA) produced one set of standardized coefficients 
corresponding to each of the canonical scores. The coefficients represent the contribution 
of annual rate of change of average wage of each country-sector in a particular year to 
                                                 
67 In the case of nominal oil price and real oil price, no relative variables are calculated. These variables 
are world crude nominal and real oil prices, whose rate of change may be associated with relative wage 
changes over time. Therefore, these variables are converted into their rate of change form and used for the 
analysis. 
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discriminate maximally across country-sector clusters, or, in other words, to assign each 
country-sector into a specific cluster. This dissertation argues that the sets of coefficients, 
which appear like arbitrary measures, depict meaningful variables (more specifically, rate 
of change in variables), which explain the patterns of average wages changes of country-
sectors over the years that assign the country-sectors into specific clusters. In order to 
identify which variable(s) do each set of coefficient depict, variables from the list, 
mentioned in Section 5.2, are subjected to an analysis, which is developed by extending 
the results from each of the DFA of the four levels of Chapter Four. 
A canonical score from the DFA of four levels represents a dimension along 
which clusters are maximally separated. Therefore, the set of coefficients corresponding 
to a canonical score represents a factor(s) associated with relative wage flexibilities 
across clusters along the dimension represented by the canonical score. As mentioned in 
Chapter Four, the first two canonical scores maximally discriminate across clusters along 
two orthogonal dimensions. This dissertation focuses on the first two dimensions or 
canonical scores and investigates which transnational variable(s) the set of coefficients 
corresponding to each of the two canonical scores represent.  
Equation (4.3)68 of Section 4.3 represents the functional form of a canonical score 
in terms of its standardized coefficients. In matrix form, the equation of the canonical 
score is expressed as: 
                                                 
68 The functional expression of a canonical score is: Li= b1* xi1 + b2* xi2 + ……. + bn*xin, where the bj’s 
are standardized coefficients showing the partial contribution of independent variables (that are annual rate 
of change of average wage of each year) in classifying a particular case into a particular cluster. 
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  (5.1) 
In equation (5.1), L is a column vector of the canonical score, which is of m*1 
dimension. The m in the dimension represents the number of cases (country-sectors) that 
are included in the analysis, which yields the canonical score. For example, in case of the 
four levels of analyses, at Level One m equals 255, at Level 2 m equals 241 and so and so 
forth. Therefore, m varies from one analysis to another. The column vector b represents 
the vector of standardized coefficients corresponding to the canonical score. The 
dimension of each b vector is n*1, where n equals the number of years, which is 25 for 
the twenty-five year period from 1980-81 to 2004-05. The X matrix represents the matrix 
of annual rate of change of average wages for the m cases (country-sectors) over n years. 
Therefore, the dimension of X is m*n, that is, m*25.  
In order to identify which variables the standardized coefficients of each 
canonical score might be depicting, this study develops a methodological analysis by 
extending the DFA performed at each of the analyses at the four levels. Each set of 
standardized coefficients, corresponding to each canonical score, are the coefficients of 
annual rates of change of average wages for twenty-five years. Therefore, each set of 
standard coefficients (bj’s) by construction represent a set of year-to-year coefficients, or, 
said differently, represent a constructed time-series. To find out which variable(s) each 
set of bj’s might be depicting, each set is replaced by annual time series of transnational 
variables that are constructed from the list of variables. But before replacing the bj’s by 
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an annual time series of each transnational variable, each annual time series is converted 
into its annual rate of change series because each set of bj’s take negative or positive 
values, depicting values akin to rate of change values. 
From each variable from the list, data series for transnational variables are 
constructed. The transnational variables are then converted into their rate of change series 
and replaced in the place of the bj coefficients in the canonical score equation one-after- 
another. Solving the equation for each transnational variable, a pseudo score 
corresponding to each variable is computed. To elucidate further, the b vector in the 
equation (5.1) is replaced by a p vector, such that the p vector represents a time-series of 
rate of change of a transnational variable. After the replacement, the matrix multiplication 
of the X matrix with the p vector yields a column vector P, which is analogous to the L 
vector (or canonical score). The P vector is named as a pseudo score. In matrix form, the 
equation of a pseudo score is expressed as: 














































































In the case of each analysis at the four levels, multiple pseudo scores are 
calculated by using multiple transnational variables corresponding to each of the first two 
canonical scores. After that, correlation coefficient between a canonical score and each of 
its corresponding pseudo scores are calculated. The transnational variable for which its 
corresponding pseudo score shows the highest and statistically significant magnitude of 
association with the canonical score, that variable is identified as the factor best 
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associated with relative wage flexibilities across the clusters along the dimension 
represented by the canonical score. In this way, the candidate transnational variables best 
associated with relative wage flexibilities in each of the four levels are obtained.  
5.4 PSEUDO SCORES VIS-À-VIS CANONICAL SCORES – ANALYSES AND FINDINGS 
This section presents four levels of analyses in each of which transnational 
variables which show the highest magnitude of associations with cross-cluster relative 
wage flexibilities are identified. In order to explain how analysis or analyses in each of 
the four levels are performed in general, a hypothetical example is presented below. 
5.4.1 Pseudo score Analysis – Hypothetical Example 
Suppose a test of nature of wage structure, similar to one of the analyses of the 
four levels presented in Chapter Four, is performed on a number of sectors of five 
countries say, Country A, Country B, Country C, Country D and Country E. Also, 
suppose that the analysis produces three clusters such that Cluster 1 comprises sectors of 
Country A and some sectors of Country B, Cluster 2 comprises sectors of Country C, 
Country D and the rest of the sectors of Country B, and Cluster 3 comprises sectors of 
Country E. Suppose that DFA shows that Cluster 1 is discriminated maximally from the 
Cluster 2 and Cluster 3 along the first dimension (first canonical score) and Cluster 3 is 
discriminated maximally from Cluster 1 and Cluster 2 along the second dimension 
(second canonical score). The cluster-discrimination is represented in figure 5.1, which is 
shown below. Suppose theory suggests that two variables viz. Variable X and Variable Y 
affect wages. Therefore, the variables X and Y are used to test for their associations with 
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relative wage variations across the three clusters, along the two dimensions represented 
by the two canonical scores. 
Figure 5.1 Hypothetical Example of Cluster Discrimination 
 
In the hypothetical example, along the first dimension, Cluster 1, comprising 
sectors of Country A and some sectors of Country B, is separated from Cluster 2 and also 
from Cluster 3. To find out which variable, out of X and Y, may be best associated with 
the relative wage variations or flexibilities across the clusters, one cluster say, Cluster 1, 
is selected as a reference cluster and the variations are examined across the clusters with 
reference to the components of Cluster 1. With Cluster 1 as the reference cluster, relative 
wage variations are examined (i) between Country A of Cluster 1 and each of the 
countries of Cluster 2, that is Country C, Country D and Country B, and Country E of 
Cluster 3; and (ii) between Country B of Cluster 1 and each of the countries of Cluster 2, 
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that is Country C, Country D and Country B of Cluster 2, and Country E of Cluster 3. In 
order to examine which variable is best associated with the relative wage variations in the 
cases of (i) and (ii), variables X and Y are tested. In the case of (i), with reference to 
Country A of Cluster 1, Variable X and Variable Y are used to construct relative 
variables such as: (a) ratio of Variable X of Country A to that of Country C (of Cluster 
2); (b) ratio of Variable X of Country A to that of Country D (of Cluster 2); (c) ratio of 
Variable X of Country A to that of Country B (of Cluster 2, since some sectors of B lies 
in this cluster); and (d) ratio of Variable X of Country A to that of Country E (of Cluster 
3). Similarly, the Variable Y is used to construct analogous relative variables. 
In the case of (ii), with reference to Country B of Cluster 1, again the X and Y 
variables are used to construct relative variables such as: (a) ratio of Variable X or Y of 
Country B to that of Country C (of Cluster 2); (b) ratio of Variable X or Y of Country B 
to that of Country D (of Cluster 2); and (c) ratio of Variable X or Y of Country B to that 
of Country E (of Cluster 3). Assuming that the data on Variable X is available as an 
aggregate measure for each country (like, GDP of a country or exports of a country), 
relative variable is not constructed using Variable X; rather, Variable X is used as it is 
(that is, in aggregate form) to examine its association with relative wage variations 
between sectors of Country B of Cluster 1 and sectors of Country B of Cluster 2. But 
assuming that the data on Variable Y is available sector-wise for each country (like, the 
investment variable used in this study, whose data is available for each country-sector), 
the relative variables for Variable Y are constructed to examine their associations with 
relative wage variations between sectors of Country B of Cluster 1 and sectors of each of 
the countries in Cluster 2 and also of Country E of Cluster 3.  
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Once relative variables are constructed, each set of relative variables – one set 
corresponding to Variable X and another set corresponding to Variable Y – are used to 
compute a set of pseudo scores. In order to do this, first, the data series of each relative 
variable is converted into its data series of annual rate of change, and then the latter is 
replaced in the place of the standardized coefficients in the first canonical score’s 
equation. The equation is solved and one pseudo score corresponding to each relative 
variable is obtained. Once a set of the pseudo scores are obtained corresponding to each 
of the X and Y variables, a correlation coefficient is calculated between each pseudo 
score and the first canonical score. The relative variable corresponding to which the 
correlation coefficient between its pseudo score and the first canonical score is of the 
greatest magnitude69 and is also statistically significant, that variable is identified as the 
prime factor that seemingly explains relative wage variations across the countries under 
examination along the first dimension. In this way, the major factors explaining relative 
wage variations between each country of the reference cluster, Cluster 1, and that of each 
country of Cluster 2 and of Cluster 3 are identified along the first dimension.  
In order to find out major factors that seemingly explain relative wage variations 
across each country of Cluster 1 and the Cluster 2 as a whole, a mean of absolute values 
of all the correlation coefficients associated with all the countries of Cluster 2, 
corresponding to each relative variable are calculated. The means are then compared 
                                                 
69 When examining the degree of association, only the magnitude and not the sign of the correlation 
coefficients are taken into consideration. The reason for this is that in case the numerator and the 
denominator of a relative variable (ratio) is reversed, the sign of the correlation coefficient changes, but the 
magnitude remains the same. In other words, in case the reference country is changed, the sign of the 
correlation coefficients are reversed, but the magnitude remains the same. Since, here the aim is to find the 
best association between the changes and not whether the association is negative or positive, the absolute 
values of the correlation coefficients are taken into consideration. 
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across the variables. The variable corresponding to which the magnitude of the mean is 
the highest, that variable is identified as the major factor seemingly explaining relative 
wage variations across a country of Cluster 1 and the Cluster 2 as a whole. Since, in this 
example, Cluster 3 comprises the sectors of only Country E, the factor best associated 
with relative wage variations across a country of Cluster 1 (Country A or Country B) and 
Country E, is held as the major factor seemingly explaining relative wage variations 
across the country of Cluster 1 and Cluster 3 as a whole. 
Along the second dimension of the hypothetical example, Cluster 3, comprising 
only the sectors of Country E, is discriminated from Cluster 1 and also, from Cluster 2. 
To find out which variable out of Variable X and Variable Y is best associated with 
relative wage variations between the clusters along the second dimension, an analysis 
identical to the one of the first dimension is performed. Cluster 3 is selected as a 
reference cluster and relative variables are constructed accordingly, and those relative 
variables are subjected to constructing pseudo scores. After that, correlations between 
each pseudo score and the second canonical score is computed. The correlations are 
examined to identify the factors best associated with relative wage variations between 
Country E of Cluster 3 and each of the countries of Cluster 1 and Cluster 2. In order to 
find out the sources that may explain relative wage variations between Cluster 3 and 
Cluster 1 as a whole, a mean of the absolute values of all the correlation coefficients 
associated with all the countries of Cluster 1 is computed corresponding to each relative 
variable. The means are compared across the variables and the variable corresponding to 
which the mean is highest, that variable is identified as the major factor that seemingly 
explains relative wage variations across Cluster 3 (Country E) and Cluster 1 as a whole.  
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To identify the sources of relative wage variations, or to say the sources of 
relative wage flexibilities across the clusters obtained at each of the six analyses of four 
levels, analyses analogous to the hypothetical example’s analysis are performed at each 
of the four levels. The analyses and their findings at the four levels are presented below: 
5.4.2 Pseudo score Analysis at Level One 
At Level One, to find out factors best associated with relative wage variations 
along the first dimension Greece’s cluster is selected as the reference cluster and pseudo 
score analogous to the first canonical score are computed by using relative variables, 
which are constructed from each of the variables mentioned in the list in Section 5.2. 
After that, correlations between each of the pseudo scores and the first canonical score 
are calculated. Table A.5.1 (Part I and Part II) presents the correlations. The top four 
correlations corresponding to individual countries are highlighted in the Table A.5.1 (Part 
I and Part II). The variables corresponding to these correlations represent the four factors 
that are best associated with relative wage flexibility across Greece and each of the 
individual countries of Cluster 1 and Cluster 3.  
Along the second dimension of Level One’s analysis, Portugal’s cluster is 
selected as the reference cluster and a pseudo score analysis analogous to the one 
explained in the hypothetical example is performed. The correlations between each of the 
pseudo scores and the second canonical score are presented in Table A.5.2 (Part I and 
Part II). The top four correlations corresponding to individual countries are highlighted in 
Table A.5.2 (Part I and Part II). The variables corresponding to these correlations 
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represent the four factors that are best associated with relative wage flexibility across 
Portugal and each of the individual countries of Cluster 1 and Cluster 2.  
Along the first dimension, to find out the source of relative wage flexibility across 
Greece’s cluster and Cluster 1 as a whole, a mean of the correlations associated with all 
the countries of Cluster 1 is calculated corresponding to each relative variable. And, in 
order to determine the source of relative wage flexibility between Greece’s cluster and 
Portugal’s cluster, all the correlations associated with Portugal are compared across all 
the relative variables. The means of the correlations and the correlations are presented in 
Table A.5.1 (Part I and Part II).    
Table 5.1 Four Major Sources of Relative Wage Flexibility in Level One70 
Major Sources: Transnational Factors Dimension Reference Country 
Relative 
to Cluster 1 2 3 4 
Cluster 1 Investment (0.597) 
Share of Trade 
in goods and 
services in 
GDP (0.573) 
Share of Taxes 










Share of Trade 














































Net Lending  
(0.626) 
 
                                                 
70 In Tables 5.1-5.6, the figures in parentheses show the magnitude of associations of the corresponding 
variable with relative wage flexibility across two clusters. 
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Similarly, along the second dimension, means of correlations are calculated to 
find out the source of relative wage flexibility across Portugal’s cluster and Cluster 1. 
And, the correlations associated with Greece are compared across all the variables to find 
out the source of relative wage flexibility across Portugal’s cluster and Greece’s cluster. 
The means of the correlations and the correlations are presented in Table A.5.2 (Part I 
and Part II).  
Examining the magnitude of correlations and that of their means in Table A.5.1 
(Part I and Part II) and Table A.5.2 (Part I and Part II), a summary of the findings from 
Level One’s pseudo score analysis is presented in Table 5.1 of this section. The table 
shows the four factors that show the four highest magnitudes of associations with relative 
wage variations across each of the reference clusters and other clusters along the first and 
second dimensions. These factors can be identified as the major four sources of relative 
wage flexibilities across clusters in Level One. 
5.4.3 Pseudo score Analysis at Level Two 
Along the first dimension of Level Two’s analysis, UK’s cluster is chosen as the 
reference cluster and pseudo score analysis is performed. The correlations between each 
of the pseudo scores and the first canonical score are presented in Table A.5.3 (Part I and 
Part II). In Table A.5.3 (Part I and Part II), the top four correlations corresponding to  
individual countries are highlighted, and the variables corresponding to these correlations 
represent the four factors that are best associated with relative wage flexibility across UK 
and each of the individual countries of Cluster 1, Cluster 2, and Cluster 3.  
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Table 5.2 Four Major Sources of Relative Wage Flexibility in Level Two71 
Major Sources: Transnational Factors 
Dimension Reference Country 
Relative to 
Cluster 1 2 3 4 
Clusters 1, 
2 and 3 
Share of Trade 
in goods and 















Share of Trade 
in goods and 


























1 UK's Cluster 4 
Austria's 
Cluster 3 
Share of Trade 
in goods and 




























































Share of Taxes 
on goods and 












At Level Two, along the second dimension, Austria’s cluster is selected as the 
reference cluster and pseudo score analysis is performed. Table A.5.4 (Part I and Part II) 
                                                 
71 The acronyms of countries used in Table 5.1-5.6 are given in Table A.4.1. 
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presents the correlations between each of the pseudo scores and the second canonical 
score.  The top four correlations for individual countries that are highlighted in Table 
A.5.4 (Part I and Part II). The variables corresponding to those correlations represent the 
four factors that are best associated with relative wage flexibility across Austria and each 
of the individual countries of Cluster 1, Cluster 2, and Cluster 4.  
To find out the sources of relative wage flexibilities across clusters along the two 
dimensions, means of absolute values of the correlations are computed, which are 
presented in Table A.5.3 (Part I and Part II) and Table A.5.4 (Part I and Part II). 
Comparing the magnitude of correlations and that of their means in these tables, a 
summary of the findings from Level Two’s pseudo score analysis is presented in Table 
5.2 of this section. In Table 5.2, the four factors that show the highest four magnitudes of 
associations with relative wage variations across each of the reference clusters and other 
clusters along the first and second dimensions are presented. These factors can be 
identified as the prime four sources of relative wage flexibilities across clusters in Level 
Two. 
5.4.4 First Pseudo score Analysis at Level Three 
Along the first dimension of Level Three’s first analysis, Cluster 2 comprising 
sectors of Germany, France, and the Netherlands is selected as the reference cluster and 
treating each country of Cluster 2 as a reference country pseudo score analysis is 
conducted. Tables A.5.5, A.5.6, and A.5.7 present the correlations between each of the 
pseudo scores and the first canonical score when the reference countries are Germany, 
France, and the Netherlands, respectively. In the tables, the top four correlations are 
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highlighted corresponding to individual countries. The variables corresponding to these 
correlations represent the four factors that are best associated with relative wage 
flexibility across each of the reference country of Cluster 2 and each of the individual 
countries of Cluster 1 and Cluster 3. 
Along the second dimension of Level Three’s first analysis, Cluster 3 comprising 
sectors of Belgium and Luxembourg is chosen as the reference cluster. Treating each 
country of Cluster 3 as a reference country, pseudo score analysis is performed. Tables 
A.5.8 and A.5.9 present the correlations between each of the pseudo scores and the 
second canonical score when the reference countries are Belgium and Luxembourg, 
respectively. In the tables, the highest four correlations corresponding to individual 
countries are highlighted. The variables corresponding to these correlations represent the 
four factors that are best associated with relative wage flexibility between each reference 
country of Cluster 3 and each of the individual countries of Cluster 1 and Cluster 2.  
To find out the sources of relative wage flexibilities across clusters along the two 
dimensions, means of absolute values of the correlations are computed, which are 
presented in Tables A.5.5 to A.5.9. Looking at the magnitude of correlations and that of 
their means in the Tables A.5.5 to A.5.9, a summary of the findings from Level Three’s 
first pseudo score analysis is presented in Table 5.3 of this section. In Table 5.3, the four 
factors that show the top four magnitudes of associations with relative wage variations 
across each of country of the reference cluster and other clusters along the first and 
second dimensions are presented. These factors can be identified as the major four 
sources of relative wage flexibilities across each country of the reference cluster and 
other clusters in Level Three’s first analysis. In Table 5.3, the factors that are common 
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sources of relative wage flexibilities between each of the countries of the Cluster 2 and 
each of the other clusters can be identified as the sources of relative wage flexibilities 
between Cluster 2 (including, Germany, France, and the Netherlands) as a whole and 
each of the other clusters, along the first dimension. Similarly, the common sources 
corresponding to each of the countries of Cluster 3 (including, Belgium and 
Luxembourg) can be identified as the sources of relative wage flexibilities between 
Cluster 3 as a whole and each of the other clusters, along the second dimension. 
Table 5.3 Four Major Sources of Relative Wage Flexibility in Level Three’s First 
Analysis 
Major Sources: Transnational Factors 
Dimension Reference Country 
Relative to 
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Cluster 1  Investment (0.607) 
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Dimension Reference Country 
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5.4.5 Second Pseudo score Analysis at Level Three 
Along the first dimension of Level Three’s second analysis, Cluster 2 consisting 
Greece’s sectors is selected as the reference cluster and pseudo score analysis is 
performed. The correlations between each of the pseudo scores and the first canonical 
score are presented in Table A.5.10, in which the top four correlations corresponding to 
individual countries are highlighted. The variables corresponding to these correlations 
represent the four factors that are best associated with relative wage flexibility across 
Greece and each of the individual countries of Cluster 1 and Cluster 3.  
Along the second dimension of Level Three’s second analysis, Cluster 3 
comprising sectors of Finland, Sweden, and Norway of Cluster 3 is chosen as the 
reference cluster. With reference to each country of the reference cluster, pseudo score 
analysis is performed. Tables A.5.11, A.5.12, and A.5.13 provide the correlations 
between each of the pseudo scores and second canonical score when the reference 
countries are Finland, Sweden, and Norway, respectively. In the tables, the four highest 
correlations corresponding to individual countries are highlighted. The variables 
corresponding to these correlations represent the four factors that are best associated with 
relative wage flexibility across each country of the reference cluster and each of the 
individual countries of Cluster 1 and Cluster 2. 
To find out the sources of relative wage flexibilities across clusters along the two 
dimensions, means of absolute values of the correlations are computed, which are 
presented in Tables A.5.10 to A.5.13. Examining the magnitude of correlations and that 
of their means in Table A.5.10 to A.5.13, a summary of the findings from Level Three’s 
second pseudo score analysis is presented in Table 5.4 of this section. 
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Table 5.4 Four Major Sources of Relative Wage Flexibility in Level Three’s Second 
Analysis  
Major Sources: Transnational Factors 
Dimension Reference Country 
Relative 
to Cluster 1 2 3 4 
Clusters 1 
and 3 
Share of Trade 






























1 Greece of Cluster 2 
Cluster 3 
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Table 5.4 shows the four factors that show the greatest magnitudes of associations 
with relative wage variations (i) across the reference cluster (Greece’s cluster) and other 
clusters along the first dimension, and (ii) across each of country of the reference cluster 
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and other clusters along the second dimensions. The factors in the case of (i) can be 
identified as the four major sources of relative wage flexibilities across the reference 
cluster and other clusters along the first dimension. And, the factors in the case of (ii) can 
identified and the four major sources of relative wage flexibilities between each of the 
country of reference cluster and other clusters along the second dimension. In Table 5.4, 
the common sources of relative wage flexibilities corresponding to each of the countries 
of Cluster 3 can be identified as the sources of relative wage flexibilities between Cluster 
3 (including, Finland, Sweden and Norway) as a whole and each of the other clusters, 
along the second dimension.  
5.4.6 First Pseudo score Analysis at Level Four 
Along the first dimension of Level Four’s first analysis, Cluster 1 comprising 
Austria’s sectors and the Netherlands’ sectors is selected as the reference cluster and 
pseudo score analysis is conducted. Tables A.5.14 and A.5.15 present the correlations 
between each of the pseudo scores and the first canonical score when Austria and the 
Netherlands are the reference countries, respectively. The top four correlations 
corresponding to individual countries are highlighted in the tables, where the variables 
corresponding to these correlations represent the four factors that are best associated with 
relative wage flexibility across each country of the reference cluster and each of the 
individual countries of Cluster 2, Cluster 3, and Cluster 4. 
Along the second dimension of Level Four’s first analysis, Cluster 3 comprising 
sectors of Belgium and Denmark is selected as the reference cluster and pseudo score 
analysis is performed. Tables A.5.16 and A.5.17 provide the correlations between each of 
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the pseudo scores and the second canonical score when Denmark and Belgium are treated 
as the reference country, respectively. In the tables, the top four correlations 
corresponding to individual countries are highlighted, and the variables corresponding to 
these correlations represent the four factors that are best associated with relative wage 
flexibility across Denmark and each of the individual countries of Cluster 1, Cluster 2, 
and Cluster 4. 
Table 5.5 Four Major Sources of Relative Wage Flexibility in Level Four’s First Analysis 
Major Sources: Transnational Factors 
Dimension Reference Country 
Relative to 













































































































Major Sources: Transnational Factors 
Dimension Reference Country 
Relative to 
Cluster 1 2 3 4 
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To find out the sources of relative wage flexibilities across clusters along the two 
dimensions, means of absolute values of the correlations are computed, which are 
presented in Tables A.5.14 to A.5.17. Comparing between the magnitude of correlations 
and that of their means in Table A.5.14 to A.5.17, a summary of the findings from Level 
Four’s first pseudo score analysis is presented in the Table 5.5 of this section.  The table 
displays the four factors that show the top four magnitudes of associations with relative 
wage variations across each country of the reference cluster and the rest of the clusters 
along the first and second dimensions. These factors can be identified as the four major 
sources of relative wage flexibilities across each country of the reference cluster and the 
rest of the clusters at Level Four’s first pseudo score analysis. In Table 5.3, the factors 
that are common sources of relative wage flexibilities corresponding to each country of 
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Cluster 1 (including, Austria and the Netherlands) can be identified as the sources of 
relative wage flexibilities between Cluster 1 as a whole and each of the other clusters, 
along the first dimension. And, similarly, the common sources corresponding to each of 
the countries of Cluster 3 (including, Denmark and Belgium) can be identified as the 
sources of relative wage flexibilities between Cluster 3 as a whole and each of the other 
clusters, along the second dimension. 
5.4.7 Second Pseudo score Analysis at Level Four 
Along the first dimension of Level Four’s second analysis, Cluster 2 comprising 
Sweden’s sectors is selected as the reference cluster and pseudo score analysis is 
performed. Table A.5.18 presents the correlations between each of the pseudo scores and 
the first canonical score. In the table, the highest four correlations corresponding to 
individual countries are highlighted. The variables corresponding to these correlations 
represent the four factors that are best associated with relative wage flexibility between 
Sweden and each of the individual countries of Cluster 1, Cluster 3, Cluster 4, and 
Cluster 5. 
Along the second dimension of Level Four’s second analysis, firstly, Cluster 2 
comprising Sweden’s sectors of Cluster 2 is selected as the reference cluster and pseudo 
score analysis is performed. The correlations between each of the pseudo scores and the 
second canonical score are presented in Table A.5.19, in which the top four correlations 
corresponding to individual countries are highlighted. The variables corresponding to 
these correlations represent the four factors best associated with relative wage flexibility 
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across Sweden and each of the individual countries of Cluster 1, Cluster 4 and Cluster 5, 
along the second dimension. 
Along the second dimension of Level Four’s second analysis, also, Cluster 3 
comprising sectors of Norway and Ireland is treated as the reference cluster and pseudo 
score analysis is conducted by treating Norway as the reference country. The correlations 
between each of the pseudo scores and the second canonical score are presented in Table 
A.5.20, in which the top four correlations corresponding to individual countries are 
highlighted. The variables corresponding to these correlations represent the four factors 
that are best associated with relative wage flexibility across Norway and each of the 
individual countries of Cluster 1, Cluster 4, and Cluster 5.  
To find out the sources of relative wage flexibilities across clusters along the two 
dimensions, means of absolute values of the correlations are computed, which are 
presented in Tables A.5.18 to A.5.20. Looking at the magnitude of correlations and that 
of their means in Table A.5.18 to A.5.20, a summary of the findings from Level Four’s 
second pseudo score analysis is presented in the Table 5.6 of this section. The table 
shows the four factors that show the four highest magnitudes of associations with relative 
wage variations across (i) Sweden’s cluster and rest of the other clusters along the first 
dimension, (ii) Sweden’s cluster and rest of the other clusters along the second 
dimension, and (ii) Norway of Cluster 3 and the rest of the clusters along the second 
dimensions. These factors can be identified as the four major sources of relative wage 




Table 5.6 Four Major Sources of Relative Wage Flexibility in Level Four’s Second 
Analysis 
Major Sources: Transnational Factors Dimension Reference Country 
Relative 
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5.5 IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
For an LMF theorist, in Europe, changes in transnational variables should not be 
associated with relative wage variations that are not explained by the cross-country 
differences in labor market policies and institutions. But the findings from the four levels 
of analyses presented in the previous section, contrary to the LMF theorists’ argument, 
reveal strong and highly significant associations of several transnational variables with 
relative wage variations between European country-sector clusters, or to say between 
European countries and also, between their sectors. These findings therefore, support the 
argument of dissertation, which is transnational variables explain relative wage variations 
across European country-sectors. Therefore, in Tables A.5.1 to A.5.20, the variables 
corresponding to the top four correlations associated with individual countries can be 
identified as the four major sources of relative wage flexibility across a country from the 
reference cluster and each of the individual countries from the rest of the clusters. The 
variables corresponding to the top four means are the four prime sources of relative wage 
flexibilities across clusters. 
Table 5.1 presented in the previous section reveals that at Level One, 
transnational variables related to investment, importance of trade in goods and services in 
GDP, share of indirect taxes in GDP, and consumption are seemingly the major sources 
of relative wage flexibilities between Greece’s cluster and the rest of clusters. Also, in 
this level, transnational variables related to international competitiveness (bilateral 
exchange rate and relative CPI), indirect taxes, government deficits and their share in 
GDP, social security contributions received by government, and social benefits paid by 
government appear as the prime sources of relative wage flexibilities across Portugal’s 
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cluster and the rest of the clusters. From Table A.5.1 (Part I), it can be said that 
transnational variables related to investment and importance of trade in goods and 
services in GDP are seemingly the major sources of relative wage flexibilities across 
sectors of Greece of Cluster 2 and Cluster 3. And, Table 5.2 (Part II) reveals that 
transnational variables related to government deficit and exports and imports of goods 
and services are seemingly the prime sources of relative wage flexibilities between 
Portugal’s sectors of Cluster 3 and its sectors of Cluster 1. 
Table 5.2 shows that in Level Two, the major apparent sources of relative wage 
flexibilities between UK’s cluster and the other clusters are transnational variables related 
to importance of trade in goods and services, exports and imports of goods and services, 
bilateral exchange rate, nominal oil price, and net migration. In this second level, 
transnational variables related to indirect taxes and their share in GDP, GDP, 
international competitiveness (relative CPI and bilateral exchange rate), and civilian labor 
force participation of males are appear to be the prime sources of relative wage 
flexibilities between Austria’s cluster and the rest of the clusters. And, Table A.5.4 (Part 
I) shows that transnational variables related to all-person civilian labor force participation 
rate, consumer price index, social benefits, and social contributions are apparently the 
major sources of relative wage flexibilities across Austria’s sectors of Cluster 3 and its 
sectors of Cluster 1. 
Table 5.3 presents that in Level Three’s first analysis, transnational variables 
related to population share of the youth, their employment rate, consumption, GDP, and 
female and male civilian labor force participation rates appear to be the prime sources of 
relative wage flexibilities between Germany’s sectors of Cluster 2 and the rest of the 
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clusters72.  In the same analysis, transnational variables related to investment, imports of 
goods and service, youth-employment rate, and female labor force participation rate seem 
to be the major sources of relative wage flexibilities between France’s sectors of Cluster 
2 and the rest of the clusters. Also, in the same analysis, transnational variables related to 
youth’s share in the population and their employment rate, share of direct taxes in GDP, 
government deficits and their share in GDP, and women’s employment rate are 
apparently the major sources of relative wage flexibilities between the Netherlands’s 
sectors of Cluster 2 and the rest of the clusters. Examining the major sources 
corresponding to Germany, France, and the Netherlands in Table 5.3, the sources that are 
common for the three countries appear to be employment rate of the youth, youth’s 
population share and labor force participation rate of female. These transnational 
variables can be identified as the factors best associated with relative wage variations 
between Cluster 3 (comprising, sectors of Germany, France, and the Netherlands) and the 
rest of the clusters, along the first dimension. 
Table A.5.6 reveals that, in Level Three’s first analysis, transnational variables 
related to investment, youth’s population share, and exports and imports of goods and 
services appear as the prime sources of relative wage flexibilities across the sectors of 
France in Cluster 2 and in Cluster 1. And, Table A.5.7 shows that the apparent sources of 
relative wage flexibilities across the sectors of the Netherlands in Cluster 2 and in Cluster 
                                                 
72 It should be noted here that in the case of Germany, the data on several variables are missing. Therefore, 
in case the data on all the variables included in the analysis would have been available, there could have 
been differences in these results that is other relative variables could have appeared as major sources. 
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1 are transnational variables related to exports and imports of goods and services, youth’s 
population share, and indirect taxes. 
Along a second dimension of Level Three’s first analysis, Table 5.3 reveals that 
transnational variables related to international competitiveness (bilateral exchange rate 
and relative CPI), the importance of trade in goods and services in GDP, oil price and 
indirect taxes and their share in GDP are seemingly the major sources of relative wage 
flexibilities between Belgium’s sectors of Cluster 3 and the rest of the clusters. And, 
transnational variables related to the share of indirect taxes in GDP, investment, 
international competitiveness (bilateral exchange rate and CPI), oil price, and importance 
of trade in goods and services in GDP appear to be the major sources of relative wage 
flexibilities between Luxembourg’s sectors of Cluster 3 and the rest of the clusters. 
Looking at the major sources corresponding to Belgium and Luxembourg in Table 5.3, 
the sources that are common for the two countries appear to be bilateral exchange rate, 
CPI, importance of trade in GDP and share of indirect taxes in GDP. These transnational 
variables can be identified as the factors best associated with relative wage variations 
between Cluster 3 (comprising, sectors of Belgium and Luxembourg) and the rest of the 
clusters, along the second dimension. 
In the case of Level Three’s second analysis, Table 5.4 reveals that transnational 
variables related to the importance of trade in goods and services in GDP, youth’s share 
in the population, direct taxes, and the share of total tax revenue in GDP, and net 
migration are apparently the prime sources of relative wage flexibilities between 
Greece’s cluster and the rest of the clusters. In the same analysis, along the second 
dimension, the seemingly major sources of relative wage flexibilities across Finland’s 
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sectors of Cluster 3 and the rest of the clusters are transnational variables related to 
bilateral exchange rate, CPI, net migration, and net exports of goods and services. The 
prime sources of relative wage flexibilities between Sweden’s sectors of cluster 3 and the 
rest of the clusters appear to be transnational variables associated with CPI, social 
benefits paid by government, investment, net migration, and indirect taxes. And, 
transnational variables related to bilateral exchange rate, CPI, importance of trade in 
goods and services in GDP, investment, and indirect taxes appear to be the prime sources 
of relative wage flexibilities between Norway’s sectors of Cluster 3 and the rest of the 
clusters. Looking at the major sources corresponding to Finland, Norway, and Sweden in 
Table 5.4, the sources that are common for the three countries appear to be bilateral 
exchange rate and CPI. These transnational variables can be identified as the factors best 
associated with relative wage variations between Cluster 3 (comprising, sectors of 
Finland, Norway, and Sweden) and the rest of the clusters, along the second dimension. 
Table A.5.12 reveals that transnational variables related to net migration, GDP, 
direct taxes, and social security contributions are seemingly the prime sources of relative 
wage flexibilities across the sectors of Sweden in Cluster 3 and in Cluster 1. And, Table 
A.5.13 shows that the major sources of relative wage flexibilities between Norway’s 
sectors of Cluster 3 and of Cluster 1 appear to be transnational variables related to CPI, 
direct and indirect taxes, and social benefits paid by government. 
Table 5.5 reveals that in Level Four’s first analysis, transnational variables 
associated with international competitiveness (bilateral exchange rate and CPI), social 
security contributions received by government, and GDP appear as the major sources of 
relative wage flexibilities between Austria’s sectors of Cluster 1 and the rest of the 
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clusters. And the prime sources of relative wage flexibilities between the Netherlands’s 
sectors of Cluster 1 and the rest of the clusters appear to be transnational variables 
associated with international competitiveness (bilateral exchange rate and relative CPI), 
labor force participation rate of females and their employment rate, exports and net 
exports of goods and services, and net migration. Examining the major sources 
corresponding to Austria and the Netherlands in Table 5.5, the sources that are common 
for the two countries appear to be bilateral exchange rate and CPI. These transnational 
variables can be identified as the factors best associated with relative wage variations 
between Cluster 1 (comprising, sectors of Austria and the Netherlands) and the rest of the 
clusters, along the first dimension. 
In Level Four’s first analysis, along a second dimension, transnational variables 
related to indirect taxes and their share in GDP, and government deficits and their share 
in GDP are seemingly the major sources of relative wage flexibilities between Denmark’s 
sectors of Cluster 3 and the rest of the clusters. And the major sources of relative wage 
flexibilities between Belgium’s sectors of Cluster 3 and the rest of the clusters appear to 
be transnational variables related to investment, share of indirect taxes in GDP, direct 
taxes, and social benefit payments made by government. Looking at the major sources 
corresponding to Denmark and Belgium in Table 5.5, the sources that are common for the 
two countries appear to be variables related to share of indirect taxes in GDP. These 
transnational variables can be identified as the factors best associated with relative wage 
variations between Cluster 3 (comprising, sectors of Denmark and Belgium) and the rest 
of the clusters, along the second dimension. 
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Table 5.6 shows that, in Level Four’s second analysis, transnational variables 
associated with social security contributions, share of government deficits in GDP, social 
benefits paid by government, real oil price, importance of trade in goods and services in 
GDP, various employment rates (of youth, women and total) and female labor force 
participation rate are apparently the prime sources of relative wage flexibilities between 
the Sweden’s cluster and the rest of the sectors, along the first dimension. Along the 
second dimension, transnational variables related to oil price, consumption, investment, 
GDP, and share of taxes (total, direct and indirect) in GDP appear as major sources of 
relative wage flexibilities across the Sweden’s cluster and the rest of the clusters. And, in 
the same analysis, along the second dimension, transnational variables associated with 
direct and indirect taxes and their share in GDP seem to be the prime sources of relative 
wage flexibilities between Norway’s sectors of Cluster 3 and the rest of the clusters. 
It is evident from the above discussion of this section that at each of the four 
levels, transnational factors seemingly explain the relative wage flexibilities between 
European countries, and also between sectors within the countries. These transnational 
factors are related to: macroeconomic variables such as investment, consumption, taxes, 
other government revenues, government expenditures; variables related to international 
competitiveness such as bilateral exchange rate and consumer price index; global factor 
such as crude oil price. In Sections 3.3 and 5.2, it is argued that in economically 
interdependent economies such as European countries, transnational variables explain 
changes in relative employment or unemployment rates along with explaining change in 
relative wages both between sectors within-country and between countries. Therefore, 
based on the theoretical arguments presented in those sections and looking at the findings 
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of this chapter, it can be said that the apparent transnational sources of relative wage 
flexibilities between European countries (and between sectors within-country) explain 
variations in relative employment or unemployment rates in those countries. And, it can 
be concluded that the high and differential rates of unemployment in European countries 
are explained by the cross-country differences in their levels of macroeconomic 
performance (represented by macroeconomic variables), levels of international 
competitiveness, and by global-level factors. It can also be concluded that the 
transnational variables related to demographic factors and labor market variables show 
strong and highly significant association with relative wage flexibilities between 
European countries and also between sectors within-country because these transnational 
variables are influenced by the macroeconomic performance of the countries. The effects 
of the identified sources of relative wage flexibilities on the unemployment rates of the 
European countries are dependent on the policy-choices made by each country and also 
by the European Union. Hence, this dissertation makes certain policy recommendations 
to reduce the differential and high rates of unemployment in Europe. The policy 







Chapter 6:  General Findings and Policy Recommendations 
This chapter summarizes the general findings from all the chapters of this 
dissertation in its first section and proposes a series of policy recommendations, based on 
the general findings, in its second section.   
6.1 GENERAL FINDINGS  
The literature on the study of European problem of high unemployment is 
dominated by studies performing country-level analysis, focusing exclusively on country-
specific sources of the problem namely labor market policies and institutions. These 
studies hold national labor market policies and institutions responsible for making wages 
rigid, and thereby, increasing unemployment rates and also leading to persistence of high 
rates of unemployment in European countries. The second chapter of this dissertation, 
which reviews the literature, finds that mainstream academia as well as the policy field 
remains dominated by the notion of “wage rigidity”. Theorists from the academia and the 
policy field argue that differences in labor market policies and institutional structures 
across European countries explain the differences in the degrees of wage rigidities, and 
hence, the heterogeneous rates of unemployment across those countries. These theorists 
are known as “labor market flexibility” (LMF) theorists.  
The second chapter finds that, LMF theorists, in their empirical analyses, test the 
effects of labor market policy and institutional variables on unemployment (or 
employment) rates using cross-country econometric models. While reviewing the 
empirical studies of the LMF theorists, the second chapter finds a lack of diversity in the 
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methodological approaches of those studies. This is because, in most of the cases, the 
newer studies build their models on the existing ones. Moreover, all the studies use 
quantitative data measures of labor market policies and institutions, which remain under 
profound criticisms. LMF theorists have constructed the data measures to represent 
qualitative labor market policies and institutions quantitatively. And, since the policies 
and institutions are complex and involve intricacies in their designs, the accuracy of their 
quantitative counterparts in capturing their actual nature by some numerical or 
categorical scores remains doubtful. 
Chapter Three examines the “notion of wage rigidity”, which is popular in the 
literature on the study of Europe’s high unemployment problem. This chapter recognizes 
that since the LMF theorists have treated each European country as an isolated entity, 
their focus has remained on county-specific sources of wage rigidity or barriers to wage 
flexibility, which are labor market policies and institutions. This chapter argues that when 
one views European countries as integrated and economically interdependent countries 
from a continental perspective, the sources of the problem of high unemployment are 
directed toward transnational factors. The chapter explains that transnational factors, 
which imply international, continental and global factors, such as relative investment, 
relative trade in goods and services, relative taxes, bilateral exchange rates, and world 
crude oil price, impact relative wages and relative employment (or unemployment) rates 
across interdependent economies like European nations. Therefore, in the study of the 
problem of high unemployment in Europe, a change in perspective from country-level to 
a continental-level in needed in order to capture the effects of transnational variables on 
wages and unemployment rates. Chapter Three explains that when Europe is viewed from 
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a country-level perspective, like the LMF theorists do, relative wages appear rigid across 
European countries because of the cross-country differences in labor market policies and 
institutional structures. But if Europe is viewed from a continental-level perspective, 
relative wages appear flexible due to the effects of transnational factors. Therefore, 
Chapter Three advocates examining the nature of European wage structure and test 
whether relative wages are actually rigid or flexible in Europe and from there draw 
implications for Europe’s high unemployment problem. 
Chapter Four develops a unique methodological approach to study the nature of 
European wage structure. Without imposing any theoretical preconditions, it tests 
whether the European wage structure if rigid or flexible. For this, it constructs and uses a 
continental-level data set of average wages of 255 European county-sectors over the 
period 1980-2005. It applies two multivariate techniques, namely cluster analysis and 
discriminant function analysis, to test the nature of the European wage structure. The 
uniqueness of the methodology comes from the multiple repetitions of the two analyses 
on progressively smaller numbers of European country-sectors, which is done in order to 
capture the nature of wage structure across smallest possible groups of European country-
sectors. This chapter finds that the multiple repetitions render six analyses at four levels – 
two analyses at the third and the fourth levels and one at each of the other two levels. 
From the four levels of analyses, Chapter Three finds that relative wages are not rigid 
across European countries. Rather, there exist considerable relative wage flexibilities 
both within and across the countries. This is because, this chapter finds that in each 
analysis of the four levels, European countries with quite varied labor market policies and 
institutional structures cluster together, indicating similar over-time average wage 
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changes. And, sectors of countries with similar labor market structures, that is, sectors of 
countries whose labor market policies and institutions are characterized by same social 
policy model (Nordic model (Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands) 
or Anglo-Saxon model (UK and Ireland) or Continental model (Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, and Luxembourg) or Mediterranean model (Greece, Portugal, Italy, and 
Spain)) do not show similarities in their average wage changes. In other words, labor 
market policies and institutions of the European countries fail to explain the similarities 
in the over-time wage behaviors of the countries with varied labor market policies and 
institutions, and also, to explain the differences in the over-time wage behaviors across 
countries with similar labor market policies and institutions. In the first level, all of 
Europe, except for few sectors of Greece and Portugal show similar wage behaviors over-
time. In the second level, Nordic countries cluster with Mediterranean countries such as 
Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy, showing no measurable differences in their respective 
over time pattern of wage movements. At this level, in another cluster, Continental 
countries such as Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Germany cluster with Nordic 
Denmark and the Netherlands and Anglo-Saxon with Continental Switzerland, showing 
similarities in their respective over time patterns of wage changes. Similarly, in both third 
and fourth levels, countries with varied labor market policies and institutional structures 
show similar wage behaviors over time and cluster together. Chapter Four also finds that 
in each analysis of the four levels, sectors of a single country show differences in their 
over-time wage behaviors. All these findings do not support the argument of the LMF 
theorists, and labor market policies and institutions fail to explain the variations in 
relative wage behaviors across European country-sectors. Therefore, Chapter Four 
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concludes that the variations in average wage changes – relative wage flexibilities – 
across the European country-sectors may be explained by transnational factors.  
Chapter Five searches for factors that may explain the relative wage flexibilities 
across European country-sector clusters obtained in Chapter Four. This chapter examines 
which transnational variables out of a list of variables appear as the sources of the relative 
wage flexibilities. For this, the associations of a number of transnational variables with 
the relative wage flexibilities are examined. Chapter Five finds that transnational factors 
associated with variables such as investment, taxes, government expenditure and 
revenues, trade in goods and services, GDP, bilateral exchange rate, consumer price 
index, crude oil price, migration, employment rates and labor force participation rates are 
strongly and statistically significantly associated with relative wage flexibilities across 
European countries (and also across sectors within the countries). Based on the findings, 
Chapter Five concludes that the heterogeneous rates of high unemployment across 
European countries can be explained by the differences in the macroeconomic 
performance and the levels of international competitiveness of the countries, which are 
influenced by macroeconomic policies adopted by each country and also by the European 
Union. This chapter also concludes that the high rates of unemployment of each country 
can also be explained by the performance of the continental and global economy.   
6.2 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Policy recommendations for reducing unemployment rates in European countries 
that remain popular in the mainstream academia and in the policy field are associated 
with reforming labor market policies and institutions.  The proposed reforms would 
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reduce or eliminate unemployment benefits and employment protection legislations, 
abolish minimum wages, weaken unions and decentralize wage bargaining system. 
Although the reforms have failed to show evidence in reducing unemployment over the 
years, they are still widely accepted and proposed.  
The prime objective of labor market policies and institutions is to protect workers 
from distress and miseries which are brought by bad economic situations. Eliminating the 
protections by means of labor market reforms therefore, raises concern for the welfare of 
the workers. Contrary to the widely accepted view that reforming labor market policies 
and institutions will reduce unemployment in Europe, this dissertation finds that those 
policies and institutions do not apparently explain the evolution of unemployment in 
Europe. Therefore, reforming policies and institutions does not appear to be a solution to 
reducing high rates of European unemployment. The reforms may instead of reducing 
unemployment weaken the European social welfare system, which will increase poverty 
and bring greater miseries into the lives of the people. Also, reforms such as reducing or 
eliminating unemployment benefits and employment protection legislation, and 
abolishing minimum wage instead of reducing unemployment rates, may increase it by 
means of reducing consumer expenditure, and thereby, effective demand in the economy. 
Hence, the first recommendation of this dissertation is that labor market policies and 
institutions should not be reformed. Rather, policies should be directed toward 
maintaining a strong social welfare system.  
The formation of the European Union (EU) formally integrated several European 
countries, politically as well as economically. The prime goal of economic integration is 
to reduce economic differences between the EU countries and equalize their levels of 
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development. To achieve this goal, the EU guaranteed freedom of movement of goods, 
services, capital and labor across the EU countries. For this, the EU abolished the barriers 
to trade in goods and services and to the mobility of labor and capital across the 
countries. In Europe, people often migrate from one country to another in search for jobs 
paying better wages. Also, this dissertation finds that in many cases, differences in 
migration rate between countries are associated with the differences in their wage-
changes. Although, the EU has unrestricted labor-mobility between countries, it still 
remains restricted to some extent because of multiple reasons, one of which includes the 
differences in social welfare systems across countries. Due to the differences in social 
welfare systems, when a worker shifts from one country to another, he or she loses the 
social benefit transfers that he or she is entitled to receive in the former country. The loss 
of benefits due to the shift restricts the mobility of labor across the EU nations. 
Therefore, the second recommendation of this study is that the social welfare systems 
across EU countries should be integrated in order to facilitate labor mobility, and 
thereby, achieve the goal of economic integration.  
The formation of the EU aimed at removing economic differences, and the 
initiation of euro ended the exchange rate differences among the European economic and 
monetary union (EMU) nations. However, differences remain in other spheres, which 
lead to differences in the levels of international competitiveness, and thereby, in the 
economic conditions of the nations. The EU and EMU countries differ in their 
infrastructure, level of investment in research and development, and taxation, all of which 
make one county more competitive internationally than the others. Countries that are 
more competitive are able to attract greater multinational investments than those which 
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are less competitive. And, the differences in the inflows of multinational investment 
across countries lead to the differences in their economic conditions. This dissertation 
also finds that differences in variables related to international competitiveness are 
associated with the difference in wages, and thereby, can be said to be associated with 
differences in employment rates across European countries. Therefore, the third 
recommendation of this study is that individual countries, especially the poorer and high 
unemployment countries that lack appropriate level of international competitiveness, 
should direct policies toward improving their infrastructure and increasing their level of 
investment in research and development and higher education to reduce their 
unemployment rates and improve their economic conditions. 
With the formation of the EMU, the monetary and fiscal policies of the EMU 
nations73 were integrated. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)74 integrated the fiscal 
criteria for the EMU countries, but there persist differences in the tax systems of the 
countries. The share of taxation (including, direct and indirect taxes) and social security 
contributions in GDP vary widely across European countries. The differences in the tax 
systems make some countries tax havens relative to others. And, combined with the 
unrestricted mobility of capital across countries, the differences in taxation across them 
create an environment of tax competition in Europe. Countries which appear tax havens 
                                                 
73 The eurosystem that comprises the European Central Bank and the European System of Central Banks 
implements the monetary policies in the EMU nations. 
74 In order to support the inflationary target of the EMU, fiscal discipline was called for. For this purpose 
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was adopted in 1997. Under the SGP, the government’s ability of 
individual countries was controlled by means of imposing fiscal criteria that include: maintaining an annual 






receive greater inflows of capital compared to others, which increases the differences in 
the economic conditions of the countries. This study also finds that differences in taxes 
and social security contributions are strongly associated with the differences in the wages 
(and thereby, can be said to be associated with differences in employment rates) across 
European countries. Therefore, the fourth recommendation of this study is that the tax 
systems across the EMU countries should be integrated in order to eliminate tax 
competition, which will not only improve the international competitiveness of the poorer 
and high unemployment countries, but also mitigate economic differences between the 
countries.  
This dissertation finds strong association between the differences in the 
macroeconomic performance across European countries and the differences in their wage 
changes, and thereby, can also be said to be associated with the difference in changes in 
their employment rates. This indicates that countries that face lower demand have lower 
wages and lower levels of employment. Therefore, to increase employment rate or to 
reduce unemployment rate in European countries, policies should be directed to improve 
macroeconomic performance of the countries. Under the integrated monetary policy, the 
prime goal of the EMU is to maintain price stability and control inflation, which is set 
over and above any other goal. The integrated fiscal policy, implemented under the SGP, 
also targets controlling inflation over and above any other goal. To control inflation, the 
SGP imposes restraints on government spending, which impedes government’s role in 
reducing unemployment. This study also finds that differences in government spending 
and revenues across European countries are strongly associated with the difference in 
wage changes, and thereby, can be said to be associated with the differences in 
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unemployment rates across countries. Therefore, the final recommendation of this 
dissertation is that policies should be directed toward generating effective demand and 
achieving full employment in European countries, and the full employment policies 
should be accompanied by active labor market policies and policies increasing the 
enrollment in higher education, which will not only reduce overall unemployment rates, 
but also youth and female unemployment rates.  
This study concludes that the solution to the problem of European unemployment 
lies not with reforming the labor market policies and institutions, but with implementing 
full employment policies and strengthening social welfare systems rather than weakening 
them. Labor market reforms, which are recommended for the original EU members, are 
also extended to the accession countries, which are relatively economically backward. 
Since, labor market reforms can worsen the well being of the welfare dependents without 
increasing employment in the economy, reforms should not be imposed on the new EU 
members. Rather, in the new member nations of the EU, policies should be directed 
toward improving the infrastructure, enhancing international competitiveness, and 
implementing expansionary macroeconomic policies for achieving full employment goals 
in order to improve the economic conditions of those nations. 
Based on Washington Consensus (Williamson, 1989), international organizations 
such as the World Bank and the IMF recommend labor market reforms to improve 
employment and output growth in developing countries. The results of this study indicate 
that labor market reforms should not be adopted as a generalized solution to economic 
problems in any country because when the research perspective is broadened, the 
solutions to the problems may be found elsewhere. Hence, it is hoped that the results of 
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this study will motivate other researchers to analyze economic problems of any country 
from a broader perspective and to remain open to look for alternative solutions, instead of 
being biased by any existing generalized solution.  
The results of this study are generated from a novel methodological approach, 
which is developed exclusively to study the European problem of high unemployment 
from a broader perspective. The approach helps to capture the effects of economic 
interdependence and integration across European countries in studying the problem and 
therefore, generates more meaningful results. It is therefore, hoped that the approach of 
this study will motivate other researchers to explore, develop and employ diversified 
methodological techniques in the analysis of any research problem, instead of employing 
methodologies that are commonly used. It is also hoped that the relationship between 
transnational variables, employment rates and wages, which is found in this study, will 
motivate researchers to further explore the relationship in the set-up of other 
economically interdependent countries. 
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APPENDIX TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table A.2.1 Five-Year Average Rate of Unemployment75, 1960-2007[76] [77] 
  
1960-64 1965-79 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005 2006 2007 
United States 5.72 3.85 5.40 7.03 8.31 6.23 6.59 4.93 5.20 5.08 4.62 4.62 
Belgium 2.21 2.26 2.23 6.50 11.53 11.21 10.82 11.71 7.54 8.44 8.25 7.46 
Denmark 1.85 1.22 1.46 6.64 9.72 6.62 9.13 6.28 5.11 5.02 4.10 4.01 
Germany 0.73 0.97 1.07 3.78 5.92 6.42 6.72 8.97 8.79 11.22 10.36 8.69 
Greece 5.34 5.21 2.69 1.92 5.72 7.54 8.52 10.65 10.24 9.63 8.75 8.09 
Spain 1.41 1.63 2.51 6.05 15.87 19.95 19.63 20.03 11.71 9.19 8.54 8.29 
France 1.42 2.09 2.78 5.10 8.21 10.34 10.63 11.77 9.51 10.02 9.14  
Ireland 5.35 5.19 6.01 8.47 11.81 16.49 14.71 9.63 4.21 4.26 4.39 4.56 
Italy 4.72 5.63 5.84 6.98 8.79 11.59 10.90 11.75 9.26 7.81 6.85 6.15 
Luxembourg    0.50 1.24 1.45 1.49 2.38 2.19 3.10 3.07 3.03 
Austria 2.04 1.83 1.25 1.87 3.16 3.44 3.63 4.05 4.11 5.17 4.75 4.42 
Netherlands 0.57 1.10 1.93 5.46 10.10 9.81 6.92 5.41 3.65 5.20 3.91 3.18 
Portugal 2.38 2.64 2.47 6.97 7.87 7.04 5.06 6.10 5.25 7.66 7.70 8.03 
Finland 1.40 2.52 2.15 5.07 5.14 4.65 10.93 12.88 9.20 8.42 7.73 6.86 
Sweden 1.58 1.79 2.24 2.00 3.18 2.36 6.03 9.01 5.72 7.78 7.07 6.16 
United 
Kingdom 1.52 1.71 2.49 4.66 9.70 9.80 8.98 7.19 4.97 4.61 5.38 5.27 
Norway 1.11 0.94 1.26 1.87 2.61 2.99 5.68 4.08 4.00 4.64 3.46 2.53 
Switzerland 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.41 0.54 0.68 2.53 3.50 3.26 4.30 3.87 3.50 
            
                                                 
75 Here Unemployment rate is measured as a percentage of civilian labor force. 
76 For the years 2005 to 2007, the rates of unemployment are annual. 
77 Source: OECD Database 
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Table A.4.1 Acronyms for Countries 
Acronym Country 
BE BELGIUM     
DK DENMARK     
DE GERMANY     
GR GREECE      
ES SPAIN       
FR FRANCE      
IE IRELAND     
IT ITALY       
LU LUXEMBOURG  
NL NETHERLANDS  
AT AUSTRIA     
PT PORTUGAL    
FI FINLAND     
SE SWEDEN      
UK  UNITED KINGDOM       
NO NORWAY    
CH SWITZERLAND     
 
Table A.4.2 Acronyms for Sectors 
Acronym Sectors 
Ag Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 
ce Mining and Energy Supply 
da Food, Beverages and Tobacco 
dbc Textiles and Clothing 
dfgh Fuels, Chemicals, Rubber and Plastic Products 
dl Electronics 
dm Transport Equipment 
do Other Manufacturing 
f Construction 
g Wholesale and Retail 
h Hotels and Restaurants 
i Transport and Communications 
j Financial Services 
k Other Market Services 




Table A.4.3 Cluster-Details of Level 1’s Analysis 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
AT ce DE ce FI ce IE ce NL ce SE ce CH ce LU ce   GR da PT ce 
AT da DE da FI da IE da NL da SE da CH da LU da  GR dbc PT da 
AT dbc DE dbc FI dbc IE dbc NL dbc SE dbc CH dbc LU dbc GR dfgh PT dfgh 
AT dfgh DE dfgh FI dfgh IE dfgh NL dfgh SE dfgh CH dfgh LU dfgh  GR dl PT dl 
AT dl DE dl FI dl IE dl NL dl SE dl CH dl LU dl GR dm PT dm 
AT dm DE dm FI dm IE dm NL dm SE dm CH dm LU dm GR do PT do 
AT do DE do FI do IE do NL do SE do CH do LU do GRAg PTAg 
AT f DE f FI f IE f NL f SE f CH f LU f    
AT g DE g FI g IE g NL g SE g CH g LU g    
AT h DE h FI h IE h NL h SE h CH h LU h    
AT i DE i FI i IE i NL i SE i CH i LU i    
AT j DE j FI j IE j NL j SE j CH j LU j    
AT k DE k FI k IE k NL k SE k CH k LU k    
AT ns DE ns FI ns IE ns NL ns SE ns CH ns LU ns    
ATAg DEAg FIAg IEAg NLAg SEAg CHAg LUAg    
BE ce DK ce FR ce IT ce NO ce UK ce ES ce GR ce    
BE da DK da FR da IT da NO da UK da ES da GR f    
BE dbc DK dbc FR dbc IT dbc NO dbc UK dbc ES dbc GR g    
BE dfgh DK dfgh FR dfgh IT dfgh NO dfgh UK dfgh ES dfgh GR h    
BE dl DK dl FR dl IT dl NO dl UK dl ES dl GR i    
BE dm DK dm FR dm IT dm NO dm UK dm ES dm GR j    
BE do DK do FR do IT do NO do UK do ES do GR k    
BE f DK f FR f IT f NO f UK f ES f GR ns    
BE g DK g FR g IT g NO g UK g ES g PT dbc    
BE h DK h FR h IT h NO h UK h ES h PT f    
BE i DK i FR i IT i NO i UK i ES i PT g    
BE j DK j FR j IT j NO j UK j ES j PT h    
BE k DK k FR k IT k NO k UK k ES k PT i    
BE ns DK ns FR ns IT ns NO ns UK ns ES ns PT j    
BEAg DKAg FRAg ITAg NOAg UKAg ESAg PT k    
              PT ns     
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Table A.4.4 Cluster-Details of Level 2’s Analysis 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 
AT ce DE ce FR ce NL ce ATAg GR ce LU ce   AT da UK ce 
AT f DE da FR da NL da BE k GR f LU h AT dbc UK da 
AT g DE dbc FR dbc NL dbc DK dbc GR g LU k AT dfgh UK dbc 
AT h DE dfgh FR dfgh NL dfgh DK dl GR h NO ce AT dl UK dfgh 
AT i DE dl FR dl NL dl DKAg GR i NO da AT dm UK dl 
AT j DE dm FR dm NL dm ES ce GR j NO dbc AT do UK dm 
AT k DE do FR do NL do ES da GR k NO dfgh DEAg UK do 
AT ns DE f FR f NL f ES dbc GR ns NO dl LUAg UK f 
BE ce DE g FR g NL g ES dfgh IE ce NO dm UK k UK g 
BE da DE h FR h NL h ES dl IE da NO do   UK h 
BE dbc DE i FR i NL i ES dm IE dbc NO g   UK i 
BE dfgh DE j FR j NL j ES do IE dfgh NO h   UK j 
BE dl DE k FR k NL k ES f IE dl NO i   UK ns 
BE dm DE ns FR ns NL ns ES g IE dm NO j   UKAg 
BE do DK ce IEAg NLAg ES h IE do NO k   BEAg 
BE f DK da LU da  NO f ES i IE f NO ns   FI ns 
BE g DK dfgh LU dbc PT f ES k IE g NOAg    
BE h DK dm LU dfgh  SE ce ES ns IE h PT dbc    
BE i DK do LU dl  ESAg IE i PT g    
BE j DK f LU dm  FI da IE j PT h    
BE ns DK g LU do  FI dbc IE k PT i    
CH ce DK h LU f  FI dfgh IE ns PT j    
CH da DK i LU g  FI dl IT ce PT k    
CH dbc DK j LU i  FI dm IT da PT ns    
CH dfgh DK k LU j  FI do IT dbc SE da    
CH dl DK ns LU ns  FI f IT dfgh SE dbc    
CH dm ES j   FI g IT dl SE dfgh    
CH do FI ce   FI h IT dm SE dl    
CH f    FI i IT do SE dm    
CH g    FI j IT f SE do    
CH h    FI k IT g SE f    
CH i    FIAg IT h SE g    
CH j    FRAg IT i SE h    
CH k      IT j SE i    
CH ns      IT k SE j    
CHAg      IT ns SE k    
      ITAg SE ns    
            SEAg     
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Table A.4.5 Cluster-Details of Level 3’s First Analysis 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
AT ce CH ce FR g DE f DE ce FR ce BE ce 
AT f CH da FR h DE ns DE da FR da BE da 
AT g CH dbc FR i DK ce DE dbc FR dbc BE dbc 
AT h CH dfgh FR j DK da DE dfgh FR dfgh BE dfgh 
AT i CH dl FR k DK dfgh DE dl FR dl BE dl 
AT j CH dm FR ns DK do DE dm FR dm BE dm 
AT k CH do NL dm DK f DE do FR do BE do 
AT ns CH f NL g DK g DE g FR f BE ns 
BE f CH g NL h DK h DE h IEAg LU da  
BE g CH h NL i DK i DE i NL ce LU dbc 
BE h CH i NL j DK j DE j NL da LU dfgh  
BE i CH j NL k DK k DE k NL dbc LU dl 
BE j CH k NLAg DK ns DK dm NL dfgh LU dm 
LU g CH ns SE ce ES j NO f NL dl LU do 
LU i CHAg   PT f NL do LU f 
LU j      NL f LU ns 
            NL ns 
 
Table A.4.6 Cluster-Details of Level 3’s Second Analysis 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
ES ce IT ce IE ce PT dbc LU ce   GR ce FI da SE da NO ce 
ES da IT da IE da PT g LU h GR f FI dbc SE dbc NO da 
ES dbc IT dbc IE dbc PT h LU k GR g FI dfgh SE dfgh NO dbc 
ES dfgh IT dfgh IE dfgh PT i NO g GR h FI dl SE dl NO dfgh 
ES dl IT dl IE dl PT j NO h GR i FI dm SE dm NO dl 
ES dm IT dm IE do PT k NO i GR j FI do SE do NO dm 
ES do IT do IE f PT ns NO j GR k FI g SE f NO do 
ES f IT f IE g SE g NO k GR ns FI h SEAg NOAg 
ES g IT g IE h SE h NO ns   FI i ATAg  
ES h IT h IE i SE i FI f   FI j DKAg  
ES i IT i IE j SE j FRAg   FI k   
ES k IT j IE k SE k BE k   FIAg   
ES ns IT k IE ns SE ns    IE dm   
ESAg IT ns DK dbc        




Table A.4.7 Cluster-Details of Level 4’s First Analysis 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 
AT f DE ns LU g BE f CH ce 
AT g DK ce LU i BE g CH da 
AT h DK da LU j BE i CH dfgh 
AT i DK dfgh AT ce DK f CH dl 
AT j DK do AT ns DK g CH dm 
AT k DK ns BE h DK h CH do 
DE f FR g BE j DK i CH f 
NL g FR h CH dbc DK j CH g 
NL h FR i   DK k CH h 
NL i FR j   ES j CH i 
NL j FR k   NLAg CH j 
NL k FR ns     CH k 
       CH ns 
       CHAg 
       FI ce 
        SE ce 
 
Table A.4.8 Cluster-Details of Level Four’s Second Analysis 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 
ES ce IT ce SE g NO g IE ce PT dbc 
ES da IT da SE h NO h IE da PT g 
ES dbc IT dbc SE i NO i IE dbc PT h 
ES dfgh IT dfgh SE j NO j IE dfgh PT i 
ES dl IT dl SE k NO k IE dl PT j 
ES dm IT dm SE ns NO ns IE do PT k 
ES do IT do   IE f IE j PT ns 
ES f IT f   IE h   IE g 
ES g IT g   IE i   IE ns 
ES h IT h   IE k   BE k 
ES i IT i      DK dbc 
ES k IT j      DK dl 
ES ns IT k      FRAg 
ESAg IT ns      LU h 
FI f ITAg      LU k 





Table A.4.9 Eigenvalues from Level 1’s Analysis 
Discriminant 
Function Eigenvalue % of Variance Cumulative % 
Canonical 
Correlation 
1 4.29 73.237 73.236 0.901 
2 1.57 26.763 100 0.781 
Table A.4.10 Eigenvalues from Level 2’s Analysis 
Discriminant 
Function Eigenvalue % of Variance Cumulative % 
Canonical 
Correlation 
1 4.18 51.07 51.07 0.898 
2 2.49 30.54 81.61 0.845 
3 1.50 18.39 100 0.775 
Table A.4.11 Eigenvalues from Level 3’s First Analysis 
Discriminant 
Function Eigenvalue % of Variance Cumulative % 
Canonical 
Correlation 
1 11.03 67.69 67.69 0.9575 
2 5.26 32.31 100 0.917 
Table A.4.12 Eigenvalues from Level 3’s Second Analysis 
Discriminant 
Function Eigenvalue % of Variance Cumulative % 
Canonical 
Correlation 
1 7.42 53.30 53.30 0.939 
2 6.49 46.70 100 0.930 
Table A.4.13 Eigenvalues from Level 4’s First Analysis 
Discriminant 
Function Eigenvalue % of Variance Cumulative % 
Canonical 
Correlation 
1 20.40 57.40 57.40 0.976 
2 11.26 31.68 89.07 0.958 
3 3.88 10.92 100 0.892 
Table A.4.14 Eigenvalues from Level 4’s Second Analysis 
Discriminant 
Function Eigenvalue % of Variance Cumulative % 
Canonical 
Correlation 
1 22.89 50.17 50.17 0.979 
2 14.04 30.76 80.92 0.966 
3 5.64 12.36 93.28 0.922 
4 3.07 6.72 100 0.868 
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Table A.5.1 (Part I)78 Correlation Coefficients between First Canonical Score and Pseudo score-
with reference to Greece [79] [80] [81] [82] at Level 1 





FR, IE, IT, 
LU, NL, 
AT, PT, FI, 
SE, UK, 
NO and CH 
Investment  -0.662 -0.588 -0.676 -0.680 -0.609 -0.608 -0.533 -0.678 -0.703 0.597 
Consumption -0.417 -0.316 -0.023 -0.216 -0.471 -0.486 -0.141 -0.527 0.363 0.300 
GDP -0.336 -0.105 -0.021 -0.247 -0.098 -0.271 0.046 -0.354 -0.082 0.209 
Government Net 
Lending 0.189 0.072 - 0.179 0.186 0.165 -0.098 0.2 - 0.176 
Government Net 
Lending as a % of 
GDP 
0.183 0.08 - 0.268 0.208 0.174 -0.096 0.228 - 0.187 
Total Direct Taxes -0.22 - -0.231 -0.205 -0.385 -0.284 -0.264 -0.393 - 0.279 
Taxes on income 
and profits as a % 
of GDP 
-0.048 -0.138 -0.081 -0.135 -0.104 -0.08 -0.082 -0.384 -0.07 0.151 
Indirect Taxes 0.2 - 0.178 0.099 0.201 0.223 0.327 0.286 - 0.214 
Taxes on goods an
d services as a % 
of GDP 
0.538 0.486 0.431 0.421 0.11 0.544 0.491 0.497 0.354 0.423 
Total tax revenue 
as a % of GDP 0.178 0.122 0.104 0.094 -0.013 0.216 0.212 -0.164 0.014 0.104 
Social Security 
Contributions  -0.12 0.036 - -0.083 -0.222 -0.11 -0.113 -0.155 - 0.141 
Social Benefits  -0.067 0.081 - -0.067 -0.18 -0.087 -0.046 -0.15 - 0.095 
Exports of goods 
and services 0.187 0.144 - 0.188 0.282 0.097 0.229 0.049 0.193 0.210 
                                                 
78 Due to the restriction of space, this table is presented in two parts: Part I displays correlations associated with the 
countries Belgium to Luxembourg and Part II displays correlations associated with countries the Netherlands to 
Switzerland, which is presented in the following table. 
79 Here in the title of the table “Pseudo score-with reference to Greece (or country that is named in the title of each of the 
tables A.5.1 to A.5.20)” implies that the Pseudo scores are calculated by using relative variables of the form: annual rate of 
change of Greece’s variable (or that country’s variable, which is named in the title of each of the tables A.5.1 to A5.20) 
relative to that of each of the other countries presented in the column heads.   
80 The acronyms of the countries used in the tables A.5.1 to A.5.20 are given in table A.4.1 of this appendix A. 
81 In the tables A.5.1 to A.5.20, negative correlation coefficients are shown within parenthesis and correlation coefficients 
that are not significant at 1% or 5% level of significance are underlined. 
82 In the tables from A.5.1 to A.5.20, the top four correlation coefficients (absolute values) are represented by the 
following color scheme:   
        









FR, IE, IT, 
LU, NL, 
AT, PT, FI, 
SE, UK, 
NO and CH 
Imports of goods 
and services 0.318 0.318 - 0.207 0.396 0.37 0.373 0.117 0.321 0.291 
Net exports of 
goods and services -0.208 0.15 - 0.006 0.41 -0.442 -0.226 -0.364 -0.084 0.256 
Trade in goods 
and services as a 
% of GDP 
0.564 0.635 0.585 0.506 0.606 0.654 0.633 0.526 0.572 0.573 
Bilateral 
Exchange Rate  0.167 0.168 0.13 -0.067 0.202 0.181 0.175 0.248 0.167 0.138 
Consumer Price 
Index 0.024 - 0.027 -0.194 0.013 0.021 0.026 0.03 0.023 0.036 
Nominal Oil Price 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069 
Real Oil Price 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 
Net Migration - -0.214 - -0.056 -0.103 0.685 - -0.101 -0.321 0.202 
Youth Population 








0.31 0.269 -0.094 0.219 0.515 0.283 0.266 0.069 0.366 0.281 
All civilian labor 
force participation 
rate 
0.265 -0.388 0.104 0.123 0.439 0.161 0.126 -0.132 0.216 0.187 
Employment rate  
for age group 15-
24 
- - - - - - - - - - 
Men's 
Employment Rate - - - - - - - - - - 
Women's 
Employment Rate - - - - - - - - - - 
Total 
Employment Rate - - - - - - - - - - 
1. Greece’s construction, market and non-market services sectors are in Cluster 1 (C.1). 







Table A.5.1 (Part II) Correlation Coefficients between First Canonical Score and Pseudo score-
with reference to Greece at Level 1 
Variable NL AT PT  FI SE UK NO CH 
Mean for BE, 
DK, DE, GR 
(C.1), ES, FR, 
IE, IT, LU, NL, 
AT, PT, FI, SE, 
UK, NO and 
CH 
Investment -0.625 -0.7 -0.725 -0.517 -0.582 -0.386 -0.354 -0.525 0.597 
Consumption -0.359 -0.404 -0.417 -0.022 -0.164 -0.154 -0.261 -0.362 0.300 
GDP -0.396 -0.287 -0.267 -0.01 -0.198 -0.06 -0.184 -0.598 0.209 
Government Net 
Lending 0.008 0.172 0.128 0.376 0.49 0.01 -0.192 - 0.176 
Government Net 
Lending as a % of 
GDP 
0.017 0.183 0.16 0.357 0.493 0.005 -0.171 - 0.187 
Total Direct Taxes -0.308 -0.382 -0.355 -0.251 -0.259 -0.265 -0.098 - 0.279 
Taxes on income 
and profits as a % 
of GDP 
-0.334 -0.452 -0.021 -0.081 -0.127 -0.22 0.028 -0.181 0.151 
Indirect Taxes 0.143 0.177 0.242 0.217 0.23 0.292 0.184 - 0.214 
Taxes on goods and 
services as a % of 
GDP 
0.468 0.415 0.295 0.545 0.382 0.629 0.175 0.404 0.423 
Total tax revenue as 
a % of GDP 0.068 0.004 0.027 0.185 0.032 0.105 0.052 0.182 0.104 
Social Security 
Contributions  0.004 -0.091 -0.535 -0.155 -0.117 -0.065 -0.164 - 0.141 
Social Benefits  -0.115 -0.064 0.008 -0.153 -0.106 -0.094 -0.11 - 0.095 
Exports of goods 
and services 0.337 0.079 0.002 0.346 0.402 0.455 0.332 0.038 0.210 
Imports of goods 
and services 0.381 0.094 0.225 0.369 0.421 0.451 0.166 0.134 0.291 
Net exports of goods 
and services 0.124 0.601 0.13 -0.419 0.186 -0.279 -0.414 -0.055 0.256 
Trade in goods and 
services as a % of 
GDP 
0.645 0.585 0.594 0.53 0.53 0.444 0.567 0.558 0.573 
Bilateral Exchange 
Rate  0.124 0.129 0.261 -0.057 0.139 -0.018 0.065 0.044 0.138 
Consumer Price 
Index 0.036 0.025 -0.086 -0.004 0.019 - 0.008 0.004 0.036 
Nominal Oil Price 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069 -0.069 0.069 0.069 
Real Oil Price 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 -0.054 0.054 0.054 
Net Migration 0.235 - 0.078 -0.113 -0.053 -0.603 -0.058 0.011 0.202 
Youth Population 
Share -0.189 -0.17 -0.216 0.034 -0.012 -0.045 -0.177 -0.091 0.115 
Male civilian labor 
force participation 
rate 
0.046 -0.101 -0.565 -0.496 -0.256 -0.251 -0.184 -0.212 0.268 
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Variable NL AT PT  FI SE UK NO CH 
Mean for BE, 
DK, DE, GR 
(C.1), ES, FR, 
IE, IT, LU, NL, 
AT, PT, FI, SE, 





0.39 0.48 0.29 0.254 0.191 0.266 0.217 0.291 0.281 
All civilian labor 
force participation 
rate 
0.258 0.387 -0.139 0.063 0.036 0.12 0.084 0.143 0.187 
Employment rate  
for age group 15-24 - - - - - - - - - 
Men's Employment 
Rate - - - - - - - - - 
Women's 
Employment Rate - - - - - - - - - 
Total Employment 
Rate - - - - - - - - - 
1. This table A.5.1 (Part II) is a continuation of the table A.5.1 (Part I). Therefore, the last column is same for both 
Part I and Part II. 
 
 
Table A.5.2 (Part I)83 Correlation Coefficients between Second Canonical Score and Pseudo 
score-with reference to Portugal at Level 1 
Variable BE DK DE GR ES FR IE IT 
Mean for 
BE, DK, DE, 
GR, ES, FR, 
IE, IT, LU, 
NL, PT 
(C.3), AT, 
FI, SE, UK, 
NO and CH 
Investment  0.167 -0.012 -0.092 -0.052 0.173 -0.133 0.225 0.035 0.175 
Consumption 0.448 -0.211 -0.233 0.403 0.368 0.48 0.3 0.425 0.378 
GDP 0.169 0.236 -0.491 0.476 0.033 0.353 -0.467 0.461 0.317 
Government Net 
Lending 0.092 -0.041 - 0.626 0.471 0.564 0.27 0.648 0.344 
Government Net 
Lending as a % of 
GDP 
0.037 -0.055 - 0.65 0.37 0.333 0.234 0.584 0.300 
Total Direct Taxes 0.267 - 0.375 -0.421 0.196 0.296 0.218 0.217 0.286 
Taxes on income 
and profits as a % 
of GDP 
-0.097 -0.071 0.188 -0.534 -0.146 -0.143 -0.086 -0.118 0.157 
Indirect Taxes 0.496 - 0.543 -0.684 0.667 0.544 0.635 0.488 0.531 
                                                 
83 Due to the restriction of space, this table is presented in two parts: Part I displays correlations for countries 




Variable BE DK DE GR ES FR IE IT 
Mean for 
BE, DK, DE, 
GR, ES, FR, 
IE, IT, LU, 
NL, PT 
(C.3), AT, 
FI, SE, UK, 
NO and CH 
Taxes on goods and 
services as a % of 
GDP 
0.261 0.313 0.255 -0.451 -0.224 0.21 0.49 -0.074 0.223 
Total tax revenue 
as a % of GDP 0.275 0.473 0.519 -0.438 0.23 0.269 0.437 0.176 0.314 
Social Security 
Contributions  0.547 0.533 - 0.024 0.541 0.595 0.613 0.535 0.516 
Social Benefits  0.516 0.625 - -0.087 0.46 0.56 0.656 0.617 0.486 
Exports of goods 
and services 0.576 0.432 - 0.441 0.187 0.639 0.292 0.522 0.472 
Imports of goods 
and services 0.357 0.27 - 0.276 0.191 0.499 0.258 0.369 0.393 
Net exports of 
goods and services 0.098 -0.168 - -0.079 -0.015 -0.045 -0.031 -0.316 0.145 
Trade in goods and 
services as a % of 
GDP 
-0.019 -0.099 -0.297 0.007 0.096 0.048 0.207 -0.058 0.137 
Bilateral Exchange 
Rate  0.411 0.375 0.318 -0.66 0.455 0.398 0.345 0.248 0.314 
Consumer Price 
Index 0.484 - 0.512 -0.603 0.458 0.526 0.566 0.524 0.485 
Nominal Oil Price 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.179 
Real Oil Price 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.050 
Net Migration - -0.121 - -0.062 0.225 0.455 - -0.008 0.176 
Youth Population 
Share 0.55 0.597 0.414 -0.147 0.086 0.354 -0.3 0.482 0.381 
Male civilian labor 
force participation 
rate 




0.223 0.088 0.373 0.333 -0.006 0.453 -0.185 -0.093 0.302 
All civilian labor 
force participation 
rate 
0.308 0.41 0.146 0.533 0.303 0.452 0.292 0.124 0.339 
Employment rate  
for age group 15-24 - - -0.334 - -0.339 0.062 - -0.214 0.262 
Men's Employment 
Rate - - -0.406 - -0.454 -0.181 - -0.135 0.284 
Women's 
Employment Rate - - -0.341 - -0.425 -0.02 - -0.349 0.276 
Total Employment 
Rate - - -0.391 - -0.367 -0.092 - -0.244 0.200 
1. Portugal’s textile and clothing manufacturing, construction, market and non-market services sectors are in Cluster 1(C.1). 





Table A.5.2 (Part II) Correlation Coefficients between Second Canonical Score and Pseudo 
score-with reference to Portugal at Level 1 
Variable LU NL AT PT (C.3) FI SE UK NO CH 
Mean for BE, 
DK, DE, GR, 
ES, FR, IE, IT, 
LU, NL, AT, 
PT(C.3)FI, SE, 
UK, NO and 
CH 
Investment  -0.052 0.216 -0.114 0.363 0.363 0.081 0.363 0.338 -0.192 0.175 
Consumption 0.035 0.297 0.395 0.625 0.452 0.586 0.377 0.171 0.627 0.378 
GDP -0.376 0.066 0.318 0.568 0.437 0.299 0.323 0.059 0.257 0.317 
Government Net 
Lending - 0.164 0.392 0.808 -0.05 -0.214 -0.159 0.311 - 0.344 
Government Net 
Lending as a % of 
GDP 
- 0.096 0.355 0.729 -0.07 -0.224 -0.169 0.294 - 0.300 
Total Direct Taxes - 0.181 0.172 0.355 0.301 0.364 0.298 0.338 - 0.286 
Taxes on income 
and profits as a % 
of GDP 
0.101 -0.117 -0.23 -0.067 -0.26 0.106 -0.101 -0.192 -0.118 0.157 
Indirect Taxes - 0.428 0.502 0.491 0.634 0.308 0.488 0.528 - 0.531 
Taxes on goods and 
services as a % of 
GDP 
0.234 0.085 0.331 0.220 0.237 0.006 -0.022 0.147 0.224 0.223 
Total tax revenue 
as a % of GDP 0.483 0.364 0.284 0.365 0.035 0.301 0.305 0.219 0.161 0.314 
Social Security 
Contributions  - 0.648 0.539 0.539 0.465 0.472 0.628 0.55 - 0.516 
Social Benefits  - 0.439 0.478 0.494 0.414 0.47 0.452 0.533 - 0.486 
Exports of goods 
and services 0.045 0.523 0.346 0.764 0.553 0.679 0.581 0.473 0.494 0.472 
Imports of goods 
and services -0.043 0.404 0.177 0.764 0.558 0.607 0.666 0.474 0.371 0.393 
Net exports of 
goods and services -0.028 -0.146 0.17 0.259 0.134 0.342 0.052 -0.298 -0.147 0.145 
Trade in goods and 
services as a % of 
GDP 
-0.169 0.125 -0.245 -0.114 0.212 0.242 -0.121 -0.047 0.228 0.137 
Bilateral Exchange 
Rate  0.411 0.325 0.317 -0.085 0.276 0.23 0.002 0.166 0.318 0.314 
Consumer Price 
Index 0.5 0.458 0.447 0.456 0.467 0.364 - 0.499 0.416 0.485 
Nominal Oil Price 0.19 0.19 0.19  0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.179 
Real Oil Price 0.053 0.053 0.053  0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.050 
Net Migration -0.073 0.026 - 0.202 0.177 0.418 -0.062 -0.279 -0.176 0.176 
Youth Population 
Share 0.481 0.491 0.562 -0.281 0.387 0.106 0.399 0.299 0.543 0.381 
Male civilian labor 
force participation 
rate 
-0.288 0.042 0.179 0.283 0.416 0.394 0.422 0.493 0.078 0.304 
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Variable LU NL AT PT (C.3) FI SE UK NO CH 
Mean for BE, 
DK, DE, GR, 
ES, FR, IE, IT, 
LU, NL, AT, 
PT(C.3)FI, SE, 





-0.263 -0.198 -0.06 0.605 0.702 0.596 0.322 0.406 -0.227 0.302 
All civilian labor 
force participation 
rate 
-0.297 -0.052 0.076 0.534 0.635 0.564 0.449 0.519 -0.061 0.339 
Employment rate  
for age group 15-24 - -0.55 - -0.361 -0.129 -0.204 - -0.166 - 0.262 
Men's Employment 
Rate - -0.473 - -0.369 -0.124 -0.334 - -0.08 - 0.284 
Women's 
Employment Rate - -0.54 - 0.236 0.313 0.219 - 0.039 - 0.276 
Total Employment 
Rate - -0.482 - -0.078 0.089 -0.034 - -0.02 - 0.200 
 1. This table A.5.1 (Part II) is a continuation of the table A.5.1 (Part I). Therefore, the last column is same for both 
Part I and Part II. 
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Table A.5.3 (Part I)84 Correlation Coefficients between First Canonical Score and Pseudo score-with reference to UK at Level 2 
Variable BE DK DE FR LU NL AT CH 
Mean for BE, 
DK, DE, FR, LU, 
NL, AT, CH, 
GR, ES, IE, IT, 
PT, FI, SE and 
NO of clusters 1, 










IE, IT, PT, 
FI, SE and 
NO of 
Cluster 2 
Investment (0.296) 0.427  (0.160) (0.421) (0.241) (0.237) (0.394) (0.150) 0.339  0.291  0.387  
Consumption (0.101) 0.429  (0.107) 0.057  (0.583) 0.068  (0.289) 0.034  0.272  0.209  0.336  
GDP (0.592) 0.079  (0.430) (0.708) (0.545) (0.587) (0.695) (0.049) 0.511  0.461  0.560  
Government Net Lending (0.263) 0.463  - 0.307  - (0.345) 0.274  - 0.321  0.331  0.315  
Government Net Lending as a 
% of GDP (0.272) 0.462  - 0.307  - (0.344) 0.361  - 0.322  0.349  0.305  
Total Direct Taxes 0.786  - 0.787  0.237  - 0.236  (0.563) - 0.353  0.522  0.248  
Taxes on income and profits 
as a % of GDP 0.654  0.527  0.436  (0.036) 0.604  0.135  0.125  0.365  0.348  0.360  0.335  
Indirect Taxes 0.396  0.805  - 0.474  - 0.555  0.253  - 0.302  0.497  0.180  
Taxes on goods and services 
as a % of GDP (0.070) 0.405  0.172  0.236  (0.143) 0.198  (0.164) 0.495  0.231  0.235  0.226  
Total tax revenue as a % of 
GDP 0.537  0.675  0.387  0.270  0.347  0.258  (0.142) 0.389  0.299  0.376  0.222  
Social Security Contributions  0.451  (0.080) - 0.279  - 0.288  (0.181) - 0.259  0.256  0.261  
Social Benefits  0.273  0.117  - 0.080  - 0.253  0.511  - 0.257  0.247  0.263  
Exports of goods and services 0.626  0.420  - 0.591  0.477  0.642  0.555  0.711  0.426  0.574  0.297  
Imports of goods and services 0.530  0.580  - 0.300  0.395  0.622  0.634  0.796  0.411  0.551  0.289  
Net exports of goods and 
services 0.205  (0.339) - 0.279  0.071  (0.182) (0.105) (0.403) 0.183  0.226  0.145  
                                                 
84 Due to the restriction of space, this table is presented in two parts: Part I displays correlations for countries Belgium to Switzerland and Part II displays 




Variable BE DK DE FR LU NL AT CH 
Mean for BE, 
DK, DE, FR, LU, 
NL, AT, CH, 
GR, ES, IE, IT, 
PT, FI, SE and 
NO of clusters 1, 










IE, IT, PT, 
FI, SE and 
NO of 
Cluster 2 
Trade in goods and services 
as a % of GDP (0.870) (0.854) (0.862) (0.885) (0.788) (0.885) (0.724) (0.666) 0.641  0.817  0.465  
Bilateral Exchange Rate  
(0.788) (0.786) (0.706) (0.809) (0.788) (0.718) (0.696) (0.634) 0.633  0.741  0.526  
Consumer Price Index - - - - - - - - - - - 
Nominal Oil Price 0.595  0.595  0.595  0.595  0.595  0.595  0.595  0.595  0.595  0.595  0.595  
Real Oil Price 0.477  0.477  0.477  0.477  0.477  0.477  0.477  0.477  0.477  0.477  0.477  
Net Migration - 0.655  - 0.140  0.094  0.648  - 0.174  0.443  0.342  0.515  
Youth Population Share 0.191  0.042  0.300  0.071  0.263  (0.046) 0.266  0.077  0.114  0.157  0.072  
Male civilian labor force 
participation rate 0.223  0.343  0.472  0.357  (0.190) (0.411) 0.321  (0.130) 0.250  0.306  0.194  
Female civilian labor force 
participation rate 0.183  (0.152) (0.018) 0.214  (0.367) (0.375) 0.143  (0.463) 0.196  0.239  0.152  
All civilian labor force 
participation rate 0.243  0.207  0.045  0.329  (0.285) (0.415) 0.030  (0.360) 0.187  0.239  0.134  
Employment rate  for age 
group 15-24 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Men's Employment Rate - - - - - - - - - - - 
Women's Employment Rate - - - - - - - - - - - 
Total Employment Rate - - - - - - - - - - - 











Table A.5.3 (Part II) Correlation Coefficients between First Canonical Score and Pseudo score-with reference to UK at Level 2 
Variable GR ES IE IT PT FI SE NO 
Mean for BE, 
DK, DE, FR, LU, 
NL, AT, CH, 
GR, ES, IE, IT, 
PT, FI, SE and 
NO of clusters 1, 
2 and 3 
Mean for 
BE, DK, DE, 
FR, LU, NL, 
AT and CH 
of Cluster 1 
Mean for 
GR, ES, 
IE, IT, PT, 
FI, SE and 
NO of 
Cluster 2 
Investment 0.043  (0.500) (0.729) (0.349) (0.265) (0.637) (0.266) (0.305) 0.339  0.291  0.387  
Consumption (0.384) (0.307) (0.471) (0.382) (0.354) (0.391) (0.088) 0.310  0.272  0.209  0.336  
GDP (0.431) (0.833) (0.631) (0.418) (0.469) (0.665) (0.541) 0.494  0.511  0.461  0.560  
Government Net Lending 0.237  0.322  0.457  0.352  0.364  (0.158) (0.321) 0.307  0.321  0.331  0.315  
Government Net Lending as a 
% of GDP 0.241  0.323  0.467  0.354  0.277  (0.141) (0.322) 0.312  0.322  0.349  0.305  
Total Direct Taxes 0.056  (0.131) 0.045  (0.074) 0.288  (0.314) 0.695  (0.381) 0.353  0.522  0.248  
Taxes on income and profits 
as a % of GDP 0.076  (0.155) 0.356  (0.116) (0.795) (0.424) 0.479  (0.281) 0.348  0.360  0.335  
Indirect Taxes (0.023) (0.089) (0.340) (0.035) (0.114) (0.227) (0.075) 0.541  0.302  0.497  0.180  
Taxes on goods and services 
as a % of GDP 0.282  (0.056) 0.045  (0.041) 0.447  (0.217) 0.089  0.633  0.231  0.235  0.226  
Total tax revenue as a % of 
GDP 0.449  (0.127) 0.329  0.051  0.038  (0.333) 0.170  0.281  0.299  0.376  0.222  
Social Security Contributions  (0.225) (0.255) (0.410) (0.086) 0.396  (0.062) (0.354) 0.297  0.259  0.256  0.261  
Social Benefits  (0.298) (0.340) (0.115) (0.362) (0.228) 0.216  0.306  (0.240) 0.257  0.247  0.263  
Exports of goods and services 0.086  (0.034) (0.037) 0.478  0.194  0.418  0.463  (0.664) 0.426  0.574  0.297  
Imports of goods and services (0.082) (0.493) (0.213) (0.208) (0.287) 0.321  0.242  0.469  0.411  0.551  0.289  
Net exports of goods and 
services 0.039  0.066  0.142  0.141  0.036  (0.198) 0.486  0.056  0.183  0.226  0.145  
Trade in goods and services 
as a % of GDP (0.385) (0.739) (0.579) (0.548) (0.800) (0.035) (0.045) (0.590) 0.641  0.817  0.465  
Bilateral Exchange Rate  (0.475) (0.478) (0.764) (0.609) (0.466) (0.457) (0.333) (0.629) 0.633  0.741  0.526  
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Variable GR ES IE IT PT FI SE NO 
Mean for BE, 
DK, DE, FR, LU, 
NL, AT, CH, 
GR, ES, IE, IT, 
PT, FI, SE and 
NO of clusters 1, 
2 and 3 
Mean for 
BE, DK, DE, 
FR, LU, NL, 
AT and CH 
of Cluster 1 
Mean for 
GR, ES, 
IE, IT, PT, 
FI, SE and 
NO of 
Cluster 2 
Consumer Price Index - - - - - - - - - - - 
Nominal Oil Price 0.595  0.595  0.595  0.595  0.595  0.595  0.595  0.595  0.595  0.595  0.595  
Real Oil Price 0.477  0.477  0.477  0.477  0.477  0.477  0.477  0.477  0.477  0.477  0.477  
Net Migration 0.734  0.574  - 0.574  (0.605) 0.130  0.566  (0.423) 0.443  0.342  0.515  
Youth Population Share (0.104) 0.070  0.010  0.128  0.003  0.072  (0.031) 0.156  0.114  0.157  0.072  
Male civilian labor force 
participation rate 0.334  0.101  0.173  0.059  0.284  0.252  0.045  0.308  0.250  0.306  0.194  
Female civilian labor force 
participation rate (0.087) (0.113) 0.026  (0.418) (0.306) (0.047) (0.038) 0.179  0.196  0.239  0.152  
All civilian labor force 
participation rate 0.075  (0.038) 0.106  (0.252) 0.258  0.080  (0.009) 0.258  0.187  0.239  0.134  
Employment rate  for age 
group 15-24 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Men's Employment Rate - - - - - - - - - - - 
Women's Employment Rate - - - - - - - - - - - 
Total Employment Rate - - - - - - - - - - - 








Table A.5.4 (Part I)85 Correlation Coefficients between Second Canonical Score and Pseudo score-with reference to Austria at Level 2 
Variable BE DK DE FR LU NL AT (C.2) CH 
Mean for 
countries of 





LU, NL, AT 
and CH of 
Cluster 1 
Mean for 
GR, ES, IE, 
IT, PT, FI, 
SE and NO 
of Cluster 2 
Investment  -0.274 -0.393 -0.31 -0.323 -0.021 -0.422 0.082 -0.556 0.308 0.298 0.320 
Consumption 0.366 -0.009 0.213 0.243 0.088 0.397 0.534 0.551 0.292 0.300 0.298 
GDP -0.691 -0.638 -0.501 -0.682 -0.618 -0.702 -0.158 -0.197 0.571 0.523 0.615 
Government Net 
Lending -0.278 0.168 - 0.101 - 0.065 0.492 - 0.226 0.221 0.257 
Government Net 
Lending as a % of 
GDP 
-0.278 0.172 - 0.14 - 0.053 0.450 - 0.248 0.219 0.296 
Total Direct Taxes -0.176 - -0.318 -0.325 - 0.621 0.583 - 0.405 0.405 0.421 
Taxes on income 
and profits as a % 
of GDP 
-0.123 -0.143 0.325 0.146 0.024 0.536 0.108 -0.061 0.212 0.183 0.252 
Indirect Taxes -0.511 -0.551 - -0.784 - -0.157 0.525 - 0.593 0.506 0.649 
Taxes on goods and 
services as a % of 
GDP 
-0.185 -0.201 -0.099 -0.305 -0.472 -0.265 -0.271 -0.329 0.381 0.266 0.455 
Total tax revenue 
as a % of GDP -0.306 -0.216 0.185 -0.391 -0.129 0.376 -0.015 -0.512 0.317 0.266 0.360 
Social Security 
Contributions  -0.233 -0.017 - -0.5 - 0.658 0.650 - 0.429 0.412 0.445 
Social Benefits  0.34 -0.148 - -0.453 - 0.517 0.691 - 0.470 0.430 0.509 
Exports of goods 
and services 0.42 0.318 - 0.505 -0.197 0.381 0.503 0.284 0.343 0.373 0.296 
Imports of goods 
and services 0.26 -0.086 - 0.391 -0.172 0.287 0.436 0.24 0.187 0.267 0.128 
Net exports of 
goods and services -0.331 -0.044 - -0.239 -0.268 -0.284 -0.256 -0.27 0.298 0.242 0.351 
                                                 
85 Due to the restriction of space, this table is presented in two parts: Part I displays correlations for countries Belgium to Switzerland and Part II displays 
correlations for countries Greece to UK, which is presented in the following table. 
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Variable BE DK DE FR LU NL AT (C.2) CH 
Mean for 
countries of 





LU, NL, AT 
and CH of 
Cluster 1 
Mean for 
GR, ES, IE, 
IT, PT, FI, 
SE and NO 
of Cluster 2 
Trade in goods and 
services as a % of 
GDP 
-0.518 -0.083 -0.245 -0.006 -0.286 -0.09 -0.020 0.309 0.219 0.195 0.231 
Bilateral Exchange 
Rate  -0.701 -0.687 -0.394 -0.707 -0.701 -0.431 -0.023 0.48 0.528 0.515 0.541 
Consumer Price 
Index -0.536 - -0.528 -0.606 -0.594 0.5 0.686 0.392 0.599 0.549 0.643 
Nominal Oil Price 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.118 
Real Oil Price 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.294 
Net Migration - - - - - - - - - - - 
Youth Population 
Share 0.204 0.228 -0.339 -0.16 0.237 0.516 -0.408 -0.119 0.307 0.276 0.311 
Male civilian labor 
force participation 
rate 




0.319 0.583 0.387 0.559 -0.106 -0.186 0.610 0.285 0.333 0.379 0.284 
All civilian labor 
force participation 
rate 
0.713 0.423 0.699 0.732 -0.043 0.133 0.704 0.391 0.472 0.480 0.453 
Employment rate  
for age group 15-24 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Men's Employment 
Rate - - - - - - - - - - - 
Women's 
Employment Rate - - - - - - - - - - - 
Total Employment 
Rate - - - - - - - - - - - 
1. Austria’s energy and mining, transportation, marketing and non-marketing sectors are in Cluster 2(C.2). 







Table A.5.4 (Part II) Correlation Coefficients between Second Canonical Score and Pseudo score-with reference to Austria at Level 2 














IE, IT, PT, 
FI, SE and 
NO of 
Cluster 2 
Investment  -0.078 -0.436 -0.152 0.088 -0.449 -0.439 -0.405 -0.514 -0.289 0.308 0.298 0.320 
Consumption -0.073 0.437 0.312 0.294 0.352 -0.243 0.537 -0.134 -0.177 0.292 0.300 0.298 
GDP -0.549 -0.699 -0.673 -0.635 -0.569 -0.691 -0.638 -0.469 -0.592 0.571 0.523 0.615 
Government Net 
Lending 0.308 0.375 -0.034 0.41 0.307 0.51 0.107 0.001 -0.008 0.226 0.221 0.257 
Government Net 
Lending as a % of 
GDP 
0.441 0.413 -0.013 0.466 0.573 0.346 0.112 0.005 -0.005 0.248 0.219 0.296 
Total Direct Taxes -0.658 -0.476 -0.459 -0.649 -0.339 -0.557 -0.223 -0.008 -0.28 0.405 0.405 0.421 
Taxes on income 
and profits as a % 
of GDP 
-0.369 -0.272 0.298 -0.382 -0.172 -0.107 0.133 0.286 -0.113 0.212 0.183 0.252 
Indirect Taxes -0.752 -0.682 -0.602 -0.738 -0.739 -0.512 -0.61 -0.557 -0.582 0.593 0.506 0.649 
Taxes on goods and 
services as a % of 
GDP 
-0.56 -0.652 -0.365 -0.527 -0.456 -0.507 -0.435 -0.141 -0.712 0.381 0.266 0.455 
Total tax revenue 
as a % of GDP -0.667 -0.466 0.014 -0.619 -0.622 -0.274 -0.038 0.178 -0.389 0.317 0.266 0.360 
Social Security 
Contributions  -0.717 -0.495 -0.509 -0.691 -0.346 -0.64 -0.099 -0.061 -0.396 0.429 0.412 0.445 
Social Benefits  -0.674 -0.494 -0.556 -0.54 -0.58 -0.597 -0.226 -0.402 -0.367 0.470 0.430 0.509 
Exports of goods 
and services 0.664 -0.405 -0.45 -0.001 -0.522 -0.033 0.038 0.252 0.519 0.343 0.373 0.296 
Imports of goods 
and services 0.087 -0.043 -0.145 0.166 0.156 0.082 0.237 0.104 0.095 0.187 0.267 0.128 
Net exports of 
goods and services -0.249 -0.252 -0.3 -0.651 -0.596 -0.247 -0.207 -0.302 -0.28 0.298 0.242 0.351 
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IE, IT, PT, 
FI, SE and 
NO of 
Cluster 2 
Trade in goods and 
services as a % of 
GDP 
0.409 -0.418 -0.106 -0.079 -0.236 0.164 -0.282 0.151 -0.319 0.219 0.195 0.231 
Bilateral Exchange 
Rate  -0.677 -0.586 -0.591 -0.627 -0.708 -0.222 -0.511 -0.409 -0.528 0.528 0.515 0.541 
Consumer Price 
Index -0.68 -0.719 -0.628 -0.718 -0.714 -0.519 -0.607 -0.558 - 0.599 0.549 0.643 
Nominal Oil Price 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.118 -0.118 0.118 0.118 0.118 
Real Oil Price 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.294 -0.294 0.294 0.294 0.294 
Net Migration - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Youth Population 
Share -0.361 -0.271 -0.356 -0.203 -0.268 0.191 -0.519 -0.319 -0.521 0.307 0.276 0.311 
Male civilian labor 
force participation 
rate 




-0.237 -0.061 -0.014 0.37 0.437 0.421 0.453 0.275 0.363 0.333 0.379 0.284 
All civilian labor 
force participation 
rate 
0.163 0.479 0.649 0.569 0.448 0.359 0.523 0.433 0.563 0.472 0.480 0.453 
Employment rate  
for age group 15-24 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Men's Employment 
Rate - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Women's 
Employment Rate - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Total Employment 
Rate - - - - - - - - - - - - 
1. This table A.5.1 (Part II) is a continuation of the table A.5.1 (Part I). Therefore, the last three columns are same for both the Part I and Part II. 
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Table A.5.5 Correlation Coefficients between First Canonical Score and Pseudo score-with 
reference to Germany at Level 3’s First Analysis 























Investment  0.433  0.093  0.343  (0.143) 0.031  0.551  0.113  0.244  0.267  0.288  
Consumption 0.497  0.358  0.515  0.231  0.505  0.478  0.544  0.447  0.422  0.364  
GDP 0.445  0.377  0.484  (0.224) 0.425  0.524  0.488  0.424  0.412  0.335  
Government Net 
Lending - - - - - - - - - - 
Government Net 
Lending as a % of 
GDP 
- - - - - - - - - - 
Total Direct Taxes - - - - - - - - - - 
Taxes on income 
and profits as a % 
of GDP 
(0.124) (0.598) (0.193) 0.333  0.461  (0.174) (0.184) 0.295  0.283  0.228  
Indirect Taxes - - - - - - - - - - 
Taxes on goods an
d services as a % 
of GDP 
0.088  (0.204) 0.216  (0.211) (0.275) 0.207  (0.223) 0.203  0.187  0.150  
Total tax revenue 
as a % of GDP (0.144) (0.558) (0.187) 0.284  0.093  (0.242) (0.168) 0.239  0.279  0.214  
Social Security 
Contributions  - - - - - - - - - - 
Social Benefits  - - - - - - - - - - 
Exports of goods 
and services - - - - - - - - - - 
Imports of goods 
and services - - - - - - - - - - 
Net exports of 
goods and services - - - - - - - - - - 
Trade in goods 
and services as a 
% of GDP 
0.348  0.204  0.395  (0.119) 0.104  0.013  0.324  0.215  0.202  0.234  
Bilateral 
Exchange Rate  (0.076) 0.099  (0.135) 0.099  (0.207) 0.149  0.287  0.150  0.142  0.088  
Consumer Price 
Index - - - - - - - - - - 
Nominal Oil Price 0.264  0.264  0.264  0.264  0.264  0.264  0.264  0.264  0.264  0.264  
Real Oil Price 0.116  0.116  0.116  0.116  0.116  0.116  0.116  0.116  0.116  0.116  
Net Migration - - (0.171) 0.288  0.258  - 0.159  0.219  0.224  0.288  
Youth Population 
Share (0.423) (0.367) (0.462) (0.551) (0.115) (0.315) (0.518) 0.393  0.435  0.487  
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0.155  0.750  0.526  (0.578) (0.236) (0.100) (0.142) 0.355  0.345  0.366  
All civilian labor 
force participation 
rate 
0.023  0.737  0.563  (0.571) (0.215) 0.049  0.013  0.310  0.279  0.297  
Employment rate  
for age group 15-
24 
- - 0.502  - (0.450) - - 0.476  - - 
Men's 
Employment Rate - - 0.517  - (0.070) - - 0.293  - - 
Women's 
Employment Rate - - 0.434  - (0.267) - - 0.350  - - 
Total 
Employment Rate - - 0.478  - (0.178) - - 0.328  - - 
 




   
Table A.5.6 Correlation Coefficients between First Canonical Score and Pseudo score-with 
reference to France at Level 3’s First Analysis 
























Investment  -0.743 -0.57 -0.683 -0.533 -0.69 -0.609 -0.495 0.618 0.607 0.638 
Consumption -0.327 -0.25 0.495 -0.618 0.061 -0.33 0.215 0.328 0.300 0.473 
GDP -0.149 -0.149 0.520 -0.502 -0.233 0.246 0.192 0.284 0.245 0.326 
Government Net 
Lending -0.25 0.188 0.261 - 0.222 0.295 - 0.243 0.239 0.250 
Government Net 
Lending as a % of 
GDP 
-0.265 0.187 0.257 - 0.218 0.299 - 0.245 0.242 0.265 
Total Direct Taxes 0.033 - 0.372 - 0.381 0.04 - 0.206 0.151 0.033 
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Taxes on income and 
profits as a % of 
GDP 
0.114 -0.422 0.087 0.414 0.51 0.075 0.078 0.243 0.269 0.264 
Indirect Taxes -0.06 - 0.458 - 0.008 0.24 - 0.192 0.103 0.060 
Taxes on goods and 
services as a % of 
GDP 
-0.162 -0.444 -0.151 -0.316 -0.471 0.044 -0.411 0.286 0.308 0.239 
Total tax revenue as 
a % of GDP 0.031 -0.566 0.262 0.43 0.216 -0.053 -0.103 0.237 0.233 0.231 
Social Security 
Contributions  -0.368 -0.016 0.384 - 0.045 -0.393 - 0.241 0.206 0.368 
Social Benefits  0.128 -0.249 0.413 - 0.497 -0.125 - 0.282 0.250 0.128 
Exports of goods and 
services -0.563 -0.387 0.667 -0.661 -0.459 -0.432 -0.208 0.482 0.452 0.612 
Imports of goods and 
services -0.625 -0.551 0.631 -0.687 -0.531 -0.658 -0.099 0.540 0.525 0.656 
Net exports of goods 
and services -0.353 -0.062 -0.120 -0.179 -0.193 -0.002 -0.297 0.172 0.181 0.266 
Trade in goods and 
services as a % of 
GDP 
0.007 -0.355 0.138 -0.379 -0.494 -0.342 -0.027 0.249 0.267 0.193 
Bilateral Exchange 
Rate  0.657 0.213 -0.277 0.12 0.657 0.108 0.123 0.308 0.313 0.389 
Consumer Price 
Index 0.118 0.128 0.374 0.087 0.154 -0.005 0.165 0.147 0.110 0.103 
Nominal Oil Price 0.264 0.264 0.264 0.264 0.264 0.264 0.264 0.264 0.264 0.264 
Real Oil Price 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 
Net Migration - - -0.540 0.326 0.203 - -0.409 0.370 0.313 0.326 
Youth Population 
Share 0.278 0.191 -0.669 0.173 0.563 0.447 0.399 0.389 0.342 0.226 
Male civilian labor 
force participation 
rate 
-0.619 0.2 -0.443 -0.615 -0.442 -0.154 -0.193 0.381 0.371 0.617 
Female civilian labor 
force participation 
rate 
-0.6 0.5 0.548 -0.721 -0.447 -0.68 -0.355 0.550 0.551 0.661 
All civilian labor 
force participation 
rate 
-0.655 0.386 0.020 -0.69 -0.475 -0.494 -0.293 0.430 0.499 0.673 
Employment rate  
for age group 15-24 - - -0.591 - -0.585 - - 0.588 0.585 - 
Men's Employment 
Rate - - -0.461 - -0.358 - - 0.410 0.358 - 
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Employment Rate - - 0.451 - -0.428 - - 0.439 0.428 - 
Total Employment 
Rate - - -0.197 - -0.398 - - 0.297 0.398 - 
1. France’s market and non-market services sectors are in Cluster 1 (C.1). 
    
 
    
Table A.5.7 Correlation Coefficients between First Canonical Score and Pseudo score-with 
reference to Netherlands at Level 3’s First Analysis 






















Investment  0.451 0.268 0.327 -0.026 0.275 0.546 0.18 0.296 0.300 0.239 
Consumption -0.241 -0.331 -0.052 -0.576 0.501 -0.22 0.077 0.285 0.250 0.409 
GDP 0.181 0.083 0.238 -0.462 0.570 0.407 0.397 0.334 0.295 0.322 
Government Net 
Lending -0.461 0.35 0.029 - 0.378 -0.208 - 0.285 0.262 0.461 
Government Net 
Lending as a % of 
GDP 
-0.461 0.352 0.027 - 0.344 -0.204 - 0.278 0.261 0.461 
Total Direct Taxes -0.392 - -0.344 - 0.223 -0.484 - 0.361 0.407 0.392 
Taxes on income and 
profits as a % of 
GDP 
-0.406 -0.616 -0.004 -0.477 -0.506 -0.491 -0.453 0.422 0.408 0.442 
Indirect Taxes -0.03 - 0.025 - 0.574 0.282 - 0.228 0.112 0.030 
Taxes on goods and 
services as a % of 
GDP 
0.403 0.03 -0.047 0.453 0.543 0.481 -0.024 0.283 0.240 0.428 
Total tax revenue as 
a % of GDP -0.185 -0.455 0.174 -0.165 -0.090 -0.182 -0.189 0.206 0.225 0.175 
Social Security 
Contributions  -0.241 -0.044 0.012 - 0.525 -0.363 - 0.237 0.165 0.241 
Social Benefits  -0.392 - -0.344 - 0.212 -0.484 - 0.358 0.407 0.392 
Exports of goods and 
services 0.097 -0.018 0.156 -0.397 0.702 -0.048 0.278 0.242 0.166 0.247 
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Imports of goods and 
services -0.057 -0.222 0.556 -0.569 0.684 -0.341 0.308 0.391 0.342 0.313 
Net exports of goods 
and services -0.283 0.273 0.093 -0.28 0.084 0.614 0.264 0.270 0.301 0.282 
Trade in goods and 
services as a % of 
GDP 
0.223 0.077 -0.163 -0.078 0.305 0.513 0.215 0.225 0.212 0.151 
Bilateral Exchange 
Rate  0.123 -0.055 0.208 -0.126 -0.378 0.123 0.21 0.175 0.141 0.125 
Consumer Price 
Index -0.173 -0.134 -0.151 -0.195 0.528 -0.539 0.015 0.248 0.201 0.184 
Nominal Oil Price 0.264 0.264 0.264 0.264 0.264 0.264 0.264 0.264 0.264 0.264 
Real Oil Price 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 
Net Migration - - -0.244 0.225 -0.100 - 0.16 0.182 0.210 0.225 
Youth Population 
Share -0.453 -0.475 -0.561 -0.471 -0.636 -0.193 -0.443 0.462 0.433 0.462 
Male civilian labor 
force participation 
rate 
0.072 0.474 0.447 -0.419 0.173 0.335 0.254 0.311 0.334 0.246 
Female civilian labor 
force participation 
rate 
0.072 0.474 0.447 -0.419 0.476 0.335 0.254 0.354 0.334 0.246 
All civilian labor 
force participation 
rate 
0.234 0.579 0.465 -0.427 0.465 0.29 0.227 0.384 0.370 0.331 
Employment rate  
for age group 15-24 - - 0.584 - 0.254 - - 0.419 0.584 - 
Men's Employment 
Rate - - 0.353 - 0.048 - - 0.200 0.353 - 
Women's 
Employment Rate - - 0.41 - 0.486 - - 0.448 0.410 - 
Total Employment 
Rate - - 0.383 - 0.328 - - 0.355 0.383 - 
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Table A.5.8 Correlation Coefficients between Second Canonical Score and Pseudo score-with 
reference to Belgium at Level 3’s First Analysis 

























Investment  -0.061 -0.079 -0.18 -0.014 -0.509 -0.41 0.159 0.202 0.205 0.234 
Consumption -0.039 -0.197 0.052 0.464 -0.613 0.323 0.132 0.26 0.295 0.376 
GDP 0.103 0.292 0.107 0.645 -0.286 -0.301 -0.469 0.315 0.349 0.346 
Government Net 
Lending -0.029 0.337 - -0.007 -0.157 0.194 - 0.145 0.145 0.082 
Government Net 
Lending as a % of 
GDP 
-0.024 0.335 - -0.009 -0.161 0.194 - 0.145 0.145 0.085 
Total Direct Taxes -0.172 - 0.452 0.473 0.043 -0.074 - 0.243 0.19 0.323 
Taxes on income 
and profits as a % 
of GDP 
0.057 0.153 -0.042 0.15 0.205 -0.08 0.4 0.155 0.174 0.132 
Indirect Taxes -0.211 0.349 - 0.587 -0.313 0.222 - 0.336 0.336 0.45 
Taxes on goods and 
services as a % of 
GDP 
-0.483 -0.133 -0.692 -0.588 -0.28 -0.145 -0.38 0.386 0.335 0.52 
Total tax revenue 
as a % of GDP -0.359 0.116 -0.401 -0.243 0.497 -0.271 0.159 0.292 0.274 0.38 
Social Security 
Contributions  -0.237 -0.153 - 0.574 0.192 -0.489 - 0.329 0.329 0.383 
Social Benefits  -0.347 0.132 - 0.492 -0.101 -0.508 - 0.316 0.316 0.297 
Exports of goods 
and services 0.123 0.159 - -0.094 -0.319 0.401 0.544 0.273 0.273 0.207 
Imports of goods 
and services 0.179 0.303 - -0.046 -0.297 0.195 0.315 0.223 0.223 0.172 
Net exports of 
goods and services 0.008 0.513 - -0.336 0.147 0.101 0.556 0.277 0.277 0.242 
Trade in goods and 
services as a % of 
GDP 
-0.152 -0.555 -0.486 -0.687 -0.608 -0.629 -0.391 0.501 0.504 0.594 
Bilateral Exchange 
Rate  -0.477 -0.61 -0.546 -0.685 -0.005 -0.676 -0.69 0.527 0.524 0.412 
Consumer Price 
Index -0.347 - 0.359 0.616 -0.496 -0.592 -0.455 0.478 0.501 0.49 
Nominal Oil Price 0.379 0.379 0.379 0.379 0.379 0.379 0.379 0.379 0.379 0.379 
Real Oil Price 0.439 0.439 0.439 0.439 0.439 0.439 0.439 0.439 0.439 0.439 
Net Migration - - 0.16 - 0.225 - -0.244 0.21 0.235 0.193 
Youth Population 
Share -0.042 0.531 0.553 0.114 0.499 0.683 0.669 0.442 0.423 0.389 
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Male civilian labor 
force participation 
rate 




-0.337 0.344 -0.109 -0.531 -0.652 0.005 0.06 0.291 0.322 0.431 
All civilian labor 
force participation 
rate 
-0.088 0.36 0.159 -0.4 -0.181 -0.178 0.139 0.215 0.224 0.247 
Employment rate  
for age group 15-24 - - - - - - - - - - 
Men's Employment 
Rate - - - - - - - - - - 
Women's 
Employment Rate - - - - - - - - - - 
Total Employment 
Rate - - - - - - - - - - 




Table A.5.4.9 Correlation Coefficients between Second Canonical Score and Pseudo score-with 
reference to Luxembourg at Level 3’s First Analysis 




















Investment  0.492  0.495  0.521  0.350  0.407  0.528  0.548  0.477  0.460  0.456  
Consumption (0.091) 0.115  0.218  (0.304) 0.262  0.104  0.069  0.166  0.196  0.212  
GDP (0.032) (0.037) 0.008  (0.149) (0.173) (0.234) (0.094) 0.104  0.119  0.065  
Government Net 
Lending - - - - - - - - - - 
Government Net 
Lending as a % 
of GDP 
- - - - - - - - - - 
Total Direct 
Taxes - - - - - - - - - - 
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Taxes on income 
and profits as a 
% of GDP 
0.367  0.307  0.391  0.388  0.239  0.483  0.453  0.375  0.374  0.362  
Indirect Taxes - - - - - - - - - - 
Taxes on goods a
nd services as a 
% of GDP 
(0.462) (0.676) (0.604) (0.559) (0.441) (0.608) (0.517) 0.553  0.535  0.613  
Total tax revenue 
as a % of GDP 0.239  (0.055) 0.180  0.486  (0.005) 0.265  0.288  0.217  0.235  0.240  
Social Security 
Contributions  - - - - - - - - - - 
Social Benefits  0.238  - (0.034) (0.069) 0.062  0.167  0.150  0.120  0.114  0.051  
Exports of goods 
and services 0.045  - (0.033) (0.118) 0.149  0.230  0.000  0.096  0.115  0.076  
Imports of goods 
and services (0.033) - (0.163) (0.244) (0.127) (0.036) (0.175) 0.130  0.121  0.203  
Net exports of 
goods and 
services 
0.595  - (0.400) 0.269  0.096  0.480  0.462  0.384  0.368  0.334  
Trade in goods 
and services as a 
% of GDP 
(0.360) (0.425) (0.423) (0.496) (0.661) (0.272) 0.150  0.398  0.442  0.448  
Bilateral 
Exchange Rate  (0.685) - (0.005) (0.676) (0.690) (0.546) (0.610) 0.535  0.520  0.341  
Consumer Price 
Index - 0.280  0.572  (0.509) (0.578) (0.459) (0.189) 0.431  0.529  0.453  
Nominal Oil Price 0.379  0.379  0.379  0.379  0.379  0.379  0.379  0.379  0.379  0.379  
Real Oil Price 0.439  0.439  0.439  0.439  0.439  0.439  0.439  0.439  0.439  0.439  
Net Migration - (0.608) 0.280  - (0.448) (0.115) - 0.363  0.281  0.444  
Youth Population 








0.306  0.200  0.079  0.014  0.256  0.270  0.236  0.194  0.185  0.098  
All civilian labor 
force 
participation rate 
0.342  0.289  0.081  0.194  0.115  0.326  0.237  0.226  0.211  0.188  
Employment rate  
for age group 15-
24 
- - - - - - - - - - 
Men's 
Employment Rate - - - - - - - - - - 
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Employment Rate - - - - - - - - - - 
Total 
Employment Rate - - - - - - - - - - 
    
 
 
Table A.5.10 Correlation Coefficients between First Canonical Score and Pseudo score-with 
reference to Greece at Level 3’s Second Analysis 























Investment  0.267  0.149  0.393  0.470  0.226  0.325  0.189  0.288  0.264  0.171  
Consumption 0.419  0.034  0.588  0.271  0.127  0.380  0.265  0.298  0.326  0.257  
GDP (0.054) (0.296) 0.177  (0.056) 0.027  0.045  0.020  0.096  0.108  0.031  
Government Net 
Lending (0.195) 0.448  (0.250) (0.056) (0.192) (0.260) (0.089) 0.213  0.216  0.181  
Government Net 
Lending as a % of 
GDP 
(0.227) 0.444  (0.310) (0.096) (0.194) (0.265) (0.118) 0.236  0.243  0.192  
Total Direct Taxes 0.408  0.350  0.440  0.394  0.370  0.249  0.157  0.338  0.333  0.258  
Taxes on income and 
profits as a % of GDP 0.162  0.212  0.347  0.116  0.280  0.162  0.283  0.223  0.214  0.241  
Indirect Taxes 0.019  (0.175) (0.160) (0.042) 0.008  0.066  (0.031) 0.072  0.082  0.035  
Taxes on goods and 
services as a % of 
GDP 
0.077  (0.216) (0.316) (0.138) (0.303) (0.198) (0.194) 0.206  0.190  0.231  
Total tax revenue as a 
% of GDP 0.416  0.324  0.406  0.221  0.384  0.293  0.428  0.353  0.348  0.368  
Social Security 
Contributions  0.239  0.231  0.188  0.558  0.263  0.185  0.183  0.264  0.264  0.210  
Social Benefits  0.205  0.163  0.192  0.320  0.166  0.143  0.116  0.186  0.190  0.141  
Exports of goods and 
services (0.271) (0.328) 0.013  (0.043) (0.277) (0.322) (0.069) 0.189  0.174  0.223  
Imports of goods and 
services (0.347) (0.420) 0.051  (0.273) (0.213) (0.267) 0.159  0.247  0.253  0.213  
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Net exports of goods 
and services (0.128) 0.415  0.180  (0.267) 0.271  (0.221) 0.335  0.260  0.258  0.276  
Trade in goods and 
services as a % of 
GDP 
(0.512) (0.602) (0.400) (0.457) (0.548) (0.440) (0.301) 0.466  0.452  0.430  
Bilateral Exchange 
Rate  (0.138) (0.104) (0.185) (0.014) 0.046  (0.083) (0.064) 0.091  0.098  0.064  
Consumer Price 
Index 0.105  0.162  0.107  0.395  0.134  0.132  0.107  0.163  0.168  0.124  
Nominal Oil Price 0.198  0.198  0.198  0.198  0.198  0.198  0.198  0.198  0.198  0.198  
Real Oil Price 0.179  0.179  0.179  0.179  0.179  0.179  0.179  0.179  0.179  0.179  
Net Migration 0.307  - 0.122  0.134  0.304  0.587  0.047  0.250  0.239  0.313  
Youth Population 
Share 0.569  (0.068) 0.702  0.563  0.045  0.354  0.589  0.413  0.474  0.329  
Male civilian labor 
force participation 
rate 
(0.019) 0.115  0.266  0.232  0.193  0.054  (0.312) 0.170  0.166  0.186  
Female civilian labor 
force participation 
rate 
(0.441) (0.184) 0.021  (0.085) (0.021) 0.026  (0.074) 0.122  0.139  0.040  
All civilian labor force 
participation rate (0.356) (0.108) 0.141  0.089  0.095  0.096  (0.144) 0.147  0.156  0.111  
Employment rate  
for age group 15-24 - - - - - - - - - - 
Men's Employment 
Rate - - - - - - - - - - 
Women's 
Employment Rate - - - - - - - - - - 
Total Employment 















Table A.5.11 Correlation Coefficients between Second Canonical Score and Pseudo score-with 
reference to Finland at Level 3’s Second Analysis 




GR, ES, IE, 
IT, PT, SE 









Investment 0.522  0.170  0.370  0.446  0.427  0.239  (0.661) 0.405  0.385  
Consumption 0.428  0.579  0.282  0.509  0.534  0.657  0.466  0.494  0.505  
GDP 0.541  0.351  (0.115) 0.497  0.524  0.373  0.289  0.384  0.358  
Government Net 
Lending (0.057) 0.036  (0.084) 0.127  0.166  0.063  (0.106) 0.091  0.097  
Government Net 
Lending as a % of 
GDP 
(0.005) 0.019  (0.108) 0.120  0.162  0.036  (0.113) 0.080  0.093  
Total Direct Taxes (0.200) 0.135  0.254  0.312  (0.244) 0.519  0.369  0.290  0.305  
Taxes on income and 
profits as a % of GDP 0.047  0.046  0.482  0.385  (0.116) 0.279  0.303  0.237  0.269  
Indirect Taxes 0.056  (0.303) (0.356) (0.092) (0.298) 0.338  0.514  0.279  0.317  
Taxes on goods and 
services as a % of 
GDP 
0.451  (0.503) (0.396) (0.156) 0.018  0.008  0.364  0.271  0.241  
Total tax revenue as a 
% of GDP 0.452  (0.105) 0.178  0.570  0.016  0.359  0.517  0.314  0.291  
Social Security 
Contributions  (0.505) 0.387  (0.106) 0.438  (0.312) 0.322  0.512  0.369  0.346  
Social Benefits  (0.656) (0.503) (0.391) (0.597) (0.661) 0.258  (0.124) 0.456  0.422  
Exports of goods and 
services 0.726  0.401  0.180  0.638  0.376  0.529  0.549  0.486  0.446  
Imports of goods and 
services 0.722  0.326  0.155  0.538  0.394  0.689  0.642  0.495  0.457  
Net exports of goods 
and services (0.701) (0.530) (0.698) 0.286  (0.694) (0.455) (0.711) 0.582  0.562  
Trade in goods and 
services as a % of 
GDP 
0.287  (0.637) (0.587) (0.528) (0.468) (0.560) 0.135  0.457  0.486  
Bilateral Exchange 
Rate  (0.672) (0.765) (0.757) (0.763) (0.760) (0.638) (0.505) 0.694  0.698  
Consumer Price 
Index (0.483) (0.587) (0.639) (0.642) (0.617) (0.119) (0.463) 0.507  0.511  
Nominal Oil Price 0.046  0.046  0.046  0.046  0.046  0.046  0.046  0.046  0.046  
Real Oil Price (0.162) (0.162) (0.162) (0.162) (0.162) (0.162) (0.162) 0.162  0.162  
Net Migration (0.674) (0.593) - (0.675) 0.655  (0.612) (0.294) 0.584  0.566  
Youth Population 
Share (0.314) (0.173) (0.361) (0.241) (0.190) (0.602) (0.400) 0.326  0.328  
Male civilian labor 
force participation (0.291) 0.305  (0.100) 0.624  0.363  0.363  0.133  0.311  0.315  
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GR, ES, IE, 
IT, PT, SE 










Female civilian labor 
force participation 
rate 
(0.724) (0.294) 0.093  0.083  (0.133) 0.215  (0.051) 0.227  0.145  
All civilian labor force 
participation rate (0.711) (0.109) 0.044  0.403  0.157  0.368  0.060  0.264  0.190  
Employment rate  
for age group 15-24 - 0.331  - 0.297  0.397  (0.001) 0.177  0.240  0.240  
Men's Employment 
Rate - 0.589  - 0.417  0.505  0.419  0.280  0.442  0.442  
Women's 
Employment Rate - 0.136  - 0.183  (0.076) 0.102  0.056  0.111  0.111  
Total Employment 
Rate - 0.444  - 0.376  0.336  0.326  0.210  0.338  0.338  




Table A.5.12 Correlation Coefficients between Second Canonical Score and Pseudo score-with 
reference to Sweden at Level 3’s Second Analysis 




GR, ES, IE, 
IT, PT, FI, 
SE and NO 
of clusters 1 
and 2 
Mean for 
ES, IE, IT, 
PT, SE 
and NO of 
Cluster 1 
Investment  0.724 0.431 0.536 0.616 0.588 -0.4 0.481 0.539 0.509 
Consumption -0.312 0.016 -0.345 -0.329 0.163 -0.116 0.394 0.239 0.227 
GDP 0.591 0.215 -0.27 0.576 0.552 0.177 0.678 0.437 0.411 
Government Net 
Lending -0.221 -0.225 -0.228 -0.214 -0.212 -0.262 -0.211 0.225 0.225 
Government Net 
Lending as a % of 
GDP 
-0.216 -0.224 -0.227 -0.213 -0.21 -0.252 -0.214 0.222 0.223 
Total Direct Taxes -0.413 -0.281 -0.152 -0.088 -0.44 -0.011 0.663 0.293 0.272 
Taxes on income 
and profits as a % 
of GDP 
-0.163 -0.188 0.264 0.196 -0.273 -0.045 0.219 0.193 0.198 
Indirect Taxes -0.161 -0.607 -0.465 -0.454 -0.565 0.099 0.519 0.410 0.451 
Taxes on goods and 
services as a % of 
GDP 
0.472 -0.427 -0.186 -0.046 0.044 0.376 0.289 0.263 0.228 
 
 229




GR, ES, IE, 
IT, PT, FI, 
SE and NO 
of clusters 1 
and 2 
Mean for 
ES, IE, IT, 
PT, SE 
and NO of 
Cluster 1 
Total tax revenue as 
a % of GDP 0.24 -0.424 -0.149 0.266 -0.285 0.035 0.181 0.226 0.223 
Social Security 
Contributions  -0.512 0.033 -0.266 0.085 -0.367 0.286 0.609 0.308 0.274 
Social Benefits  -0.624 -0.562 -0.436 -0.609 -0.617 -0.423 0.516 0.541 0.527 
Exports of goods 
and services 0.685 -0.012 -0.204 0.493 0.038 0.375 0.451 0.323 0.262 
Imports of goods 
and services 0.603 -0.116 -0.303 0.148 0.09 0.329 0.344 0.276 0.222 
Net exports of goods 
and services -0.202 -0.525 -0.196 -0.208 -0.199 -0.127 -0.202 0.237 0.243 
Trade in goods and 
services as a % of 
GDP 
0.534 -0.189 0.087 0.158 0.029 0.506 0.534 0.291 0.250 
Bilateral Exchange 
Rate  -0.426 -0.357 -0.072 -0.537 -0.556 0.327 0.460 0.391 0.385 
Consumer Price 
Index -0.515 -0.608 -0.489 -0.641 -0.643 -0.228 0.571 0.528 0.530 
Nominal Oil Price 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 
Real Oil Price -0.162 -0.162 -0.162 -0.162 -0.162 -0.162 -0.162 0.162 0.162 
Net Migration 0.745 0.736 - -0.343 -0.242 0.064 0.710 0.473 0.419 
Youth Population 
Share 0.34 0.412 0.383 0.356 0.444 0.494 0.239 0.381 0.388 
Male civilian labor 
force participation 
rate 




-0.716 -0.33 0.049 0.019 -0.223 -0.156 0.448 0.277 0.204 
All civilian labor 
force participation 
rate 
-0.705 -0.246 -0.117 0.325 -0.005 -0.135 0.110 0.235 0.156 
Employment rate  
for age group 15-24 - 0.475 - 0.425 0.565 0.201 0.032 0.340 0.340 
Men's Employment 
Rate - 0.595 - 0.341 0.499 0.022 -0.005 0.292 0.292 
Women's 
Employment Rate - 0.118 - 0.184 -0.172 0.004 0.307 0.157 0.157 
Total Employment 
Rate - 0.39 - 0.337 0.257 0.028 0.136 0.230 0.230 







Table A.5.13 Correlation Coefficients between Second Canonical Score and Pseudo score-with 
reference to Norway at Level 3’s Second Analysis 




GR, ES, IE, 
IT, PT, FI, 
SE and NO 
of clusters 1 
and 2 
Mean for 
ES, IE, IT, 
PT, SE 
and NO of 
Cluster 1 
Investment  0.583 0.391 0.486 0.48 0.531 0.425 -0.290 0.455 0.434 
Consumption -0.12 0.142 -0.252 -0.024 0.234 0.13 0.325 0.175 0.184 
GDP 0.242 -0.057 -0.352 0.143 0.368 -0.158 0.430 0.250 0.251 
Government Net 
Lending 0.251 0.274 -0.148 0.3 0.323 0.183 0.332 0.259 0.260 
Government Net 
Lending as a % of 
GDP 
0.263 0.276 -0.141 0.302 0.327 0.19 0.313 0.259 0.258 
Total Direct Taxes -0.372 -0.187 -0.112 -0.029 -0.38 0.038 0.600 0.245 0.224 
Taxes on income 
and profits as a % 
of GDP 
-0.132 -0.1 0.301 0.227 -0.227 0.051 0.251 0.184 0.193 
Indirect Taxes -0.19 -0.613 -0.67 -0.482 -0.531 -0.081 0.576 0.449 0.492 
Taxes on goods and 
services as a % of 
GDP 
0.324 -0.624 -0.49 -0.442 -0.261 -0.334 -0.154 0.376 0.384 
Total tax revenue 
as a % of GDP 0.216 -0.403 -0.187 0.311 -0.366 -0.018 0.207 0.244 0.249 
Social Security 
Contributions  -0.613 -0.253 -0.52 -0.191 -0.49 -0.243 0.476 0.398 0.362 
Social Benefits  -0.593 -0.279 -0.334 -0.549 -0.564 0.422 0.594 0.476 0.457 
Exports of goods 
and services 0.379 -0.298 -0.368 -0.032 -0.226 -0.338 0.334 0.282 0.266 
Imports of goods 
and services 0.498 -0.289 -0.461 -0.197 -0.098 -0.263 0.241 0.292 0.258 
Net exports of 
goods and services -0.142 -0.425 -0.089 0.07 -0.135 -0.232 -0.258 0.193 0.202 
Trade in goods and 
services as a % of 
GDP 
0.307 -0.664 -0.598 -0.511 -0.747 -0.504 0.036 0.481 0.510 
Bilateral Exchange 
Rate  -0.59 -0.574 -0.655 -0.61 -0.694 -0.324 0.477 0.561 0.556 
Consumer Price 
Index -0.463 -0.521 -0.52 -0.602 -0.6 0.232 0.635 0.510 0.518 
Nominal Oil Price 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 
Real Oil Price -0.162 -0.162 -0.162 -0.162 -0.162 -0.162 -0.162 0.162 0.162 
Net Migration 0.582 -0.025 - -0.28 -0.655 0.199 -0.054 0.299 0.243 
Youth Population 
Share 0.133 0.253 0.141 0.201 0.274 -0.494 -0.056 0.222 0.237 
Male civilian labor 
force participation 
rate 
-0.339 0.143 -0.201 0.427 0.242 0.145 -0.103 0.229 0.210 
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GR, ES, IE, 
IT, PT, FI, 
SE and NO 
of clusters 1 
and 2 
Mean for 
ES, IE, IT, 
PT, SE 





-0.741 -0.339 0.164 0.141 -0.107 0.157 0.429 0.297 0.223 
All civilian labor 
force participation 
rate 
-0.731 -0.2 -0.006 0.351 0.109 0.138 0.269 0.258 0.179 
Employment rate  
for age group 15-24 - 0.225 - 0.266 0.239 -0.167 -0.250 0.229 0.229 
Men's Employment 
Rate - 0.42 - 0.343 0.342 -0.009 -0.028 0.228 0.228 
Women's 
Employment Rate - 0.143 - 0.198 -0.173 0.009 0.269 0.158 0.158 
Total Employment 
Rate - 0.345 - 0.32 0.178 -0.016 0.130 0.198 0.198 




Table A.5.14 Correlation Coefficients between First Canonical Score and Pseudo score-with 
reference to Austria at Level 4’s First Analysis 
Variable DK CH FR BE 
Mean for 
DK, CH, FR 
and BE of 
Cluster 2, 3, 
and 4 
Mean for DK 
and BE of 
Cluster 3 
Mean for 
DK, FR and 
BE of 
Cluster 2 
Investment  (0.282) (0.719) (0.842) (0.403) 0.562  0.343  0.509  
Consumption 0.566  0.518  0.118  0.620  0.455  0.593  0.435  
GDP (0.632) (0.601) (0.774) (0.707) 0.679  0.669  0.704  
Government Net Lending 0.119  - 0.611  (0.061) 0.264  0.090  0.264  
Government Net Lending as 
a % of GDP 0.123  - 0.656  (0.061) 0.280  0.092  0.280  
Total Direct Taxes - - (0.764) (0.291) 0.527  0.291  0.527  
Taxes on income and profits 
as a % of GDP (0.542) (0.572) (0.571) (0.378) 0.515  0.460  0.497  
Indirect Taxes (0.138) - (0.359) 0.027  0.175  0.083  0.175  
Taxes on goods and services 
as a % of GDP 0.381  0.125  0.300  (0.076) 0.220  0.228  0.252  
Total tax revenue as a % of 
GDP (0.619) (0.400) (0.698) (0.682) 0.600  0.651  0.666  
Social Security 
Contributions  (0.549) - (0.860) (0.828) 0.746  0.689  0.746  
Social Benefits  (0.341) - (0.661) 0.448  0.483  0.395  0.483  
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Variable DK CH FR BE 
Mean for 
DK, CH, FR 
and BE of 
Cluster 2, 3, 
and 4 
Mean for DK 
and BE of 
Cluster 3 
Mean for 
DK, FR and 
BE of 
Cluster 2 
Exports of goods and 
services (0.116) (0.448) 0.721  0.627  0.478  0.372  0.488  
Imports of goods and 
services 0.415  (0.161) 0.515  0.668  0.440  0.541  0.533  
Net exports of goods and 
services 0.119  (0.206) 0.059  (0.351) 0.184  0.235  0.176  
Trade in goods and services 
as a % of GDP (0.374) (0.408) (0.127) (0.705) 0.404  0.540  0.402  
Bilateral Exchange Rate  (0.859) 0.290  (0.840) (0.855) 0.711  0.857  0.851  
Consumer Price Index - (0.114) (0.824) (0.876) 0.605  0.876  0.850  
Nominal Oil Price (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) 
Real Oil Price (0.244) (0.244) (0.244) (0.244) (0.244) (0.244) (0.244) 
Net Migration - - - - - - - 
Youth Population Share 0.036  0.545  0.379  0.796  0.439  0.416  0.404  
Male civilian labor force 
participation rate 0.286  (0.092) 0.695  0.510  0.396  0.398  0.497  
Female civilian labor force 
participation rate (0.185) (0.269) 0.308  0.358  0.280  0.271  0.284  
All civilian labor force 
participation rate (0.006) (0.182) 0.587  0.562  0.334  0.284  0.385  
Employment rate  for age 
group 15-24 - - - - - - - 
Men's Employment Rate - - - - - - - 
Women's Employment Rate - - - - - - - 




Table A.5.15 Correlation Coefficients between First Canonical Score and Pseudo score-with 
reference to the Netherlands at Level 4’s First Analysis 













and BE of 
Cluster 2. 
Investment  (0.005) (0.740) (0.722) 0.416  0.471  0.372  0.381  
Consumption (0.020) (0.474) (0.735) (0.534) 0.441  0.277  0.430  
GDP (0.114) 0.457  (0.704) (0.111) 0.346  0.112  0.309  
Government Net Lending 0.076  - (0.175) (0.174) 0.142  0.125  0.142  
Government Net Lending 
as a % of GDP 0.083  - (0.097) (0.171) 0.117  0.127  0.117  
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and BE of 
Cluster 2. 
Total Direct Taxes - - (0.418) (0.039) 0.228  0.039  0.228  
Taxes on income and 
profits as a % of GDP 0.130  0.163  0.152  0.279  0.181  0.205  0.187  
Indirect Taxes (0.329) - (0.510) (0.239) 0.360  0.284  0.360  
Taxes on goods and 
services as a % of GDP 0.708  0.429  0.626  0.222  0.496  0.465  0.518  
Total tax revenue as a % 
of GDP 0.386  0.440  0.547  0.469  0.460  0.427  0.467  
Social Security 
Contributions  (0.586) - (0.419) (0.207) 0.404  0.396  0.404  
Social Benefits  (0.321) - (0.466) (0.054) 0.281  0.188  0.281  
Exports of goods and 
services (0.848) (0.845) 0.251  (0.399) 0.586  0.624  0.499  
Imports of goods and 
services (0.157) (0.649) (0.164) (0.183) 0.288  0.170  0.168  
Net exports of goods and 
services (0.856) 0.033  0.239  (0.678) 0.451  0.767  0.591  
Trade in goods and 
services as a % of GDP (0.447) (0.287) (0.214) (0.798) 0.436  0.622  0.486  
Bilateral Exchange Rate  (0.866) 0.352  (0.849) (0.861) 0.732  0.864  0.859  
Consumer Price Index - (0.423) (0.792) (0.819) 0.678  0.819  0.805  
Nominal Oil Price (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) 
Real Oil Price (0.244) (0.244) (0.244) (0.244) (0.244) (0.244) (0.244) 
Net Migration - 0.547  0.605  - 0.576  - 0.605  
Youth Population Share (0.092) 0.098  0.267  0.759  0.304  0.426  0.373  
Male civilian labor force 
participation rate (0.039) (0.407) 0.289  0.030  0.191  0.035  0.119  
Female civilian labor force 
participation rate 0.526  0.575  0.696  0.704  0.625  0.615  0.642  
All civilian labor force 
participation rate 0.269  0.195  0.556  0.503  0.381  0.386  0.443  
Employment rate  for age 
group 15-24 - - 0.327  - 0.327  - 0.327  
Men's Employment Rate - - 0.363  - 0.363  - 0.363  
Women's Employment 
Rate - - 0.605  - 0.605  - 0.605  







Table A.5.16 Correlation Coefficients between Second Canonical Score and Pseudo score-with 
reference to Denmark at Level 4’s First Analysis 
Variable AT NL CH FR 
Mean for AT, 
NL and CH 
of Clusters 1 
and 4 
Mean for 
AT and NL 
of Cluster 1 
Investment  0.320  0.063  (0.324) 0.185  0.236  0.176  
Consumption 0.378  (0.051) 0.388  0.079  0.272  0.215  
GDP 0.195  0.333  0.509  0.304  0.346  0.264  
Government Net Lending (0.451) 0.433  - (0.434) 0.442  0.442  
Government Net Lending as a % of 
GDP (0.451) 0.433  - (0.435) 0.442  0.442  
Total Direct Taxes - - - - - - 
Taxes on income and profits as a % 
of GDP (0.380) 0.306  0.263  (0.020) 0.316  0.343  
Indirect Taxes 0.614  0.297  - 0.061  0.456  0.456  
Taxes on goods and services as a % of 
GDP 0.631  0.100  (0.605) 0.392  0.446  0.366  
Total tax revenue as a % of GDP (0.087) 0.388  (0.358) (0.047) 0.277  0.237  
Social Security Contributions  (0.196) (0.047) - (0.246) 0.122  0.122  
Social Benefits  (0.184) 0.286  - (0.578) 0.235  0.235  
Exports of goods and services (0.054) 0.219  0.281  0.266  0.184  0.136  
Imports of goods and services 0.214  0.471  0.352  0.511  0.346  0.343  
Net exports of goods and services (0.065) (0.015) (0.048) (0.001) 0.043  0.040  
Trade in goods and services as a % of 
GDP (0.039) 0.238  0.494  0.330  0.257  0.139  
Bilateral Exchange Rate  0.295  0.242  0.444  (0.488) 0.327  0.268  
Consumer Price Index - - - - - - 
Nominal Oil Price (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) 
Real Oil Price (0.288) (0.288) (0.288) (0.288) (0.288) (0.288) 
Net Migration - - - - - - 
Youth Population Share 0.208  0.513  0.157  (0.012) 0.293  0.361  
Male civilian labor force 
participation rate 0.111  0.045  (0.015) 0.439  0.057  0.078  
Female civilian labor force 
participation rate (0.097) (0.159) (0.314) 0.110  0.190  0.128  
All civilian labor force participation 
rate (0.005) (0.068) (0.204) 0.313  0.092  0.037  
Employment rate  for age group 15-
24 - - - - - - 
Men's Employment Rate - - - - - - 
Women's Employment Rate - - - - - - 




Table A.5.17 Correlation Coefficients between Second Canonical Score and Pseudo score-with 
reference to Belgium at Level 4’s First Analysis 
Variable AT NL CH FR 
Mean for AT, 
NL and CH of 
Clusters 1 and 
4 
Mean for AT 
and NL of 
Cluster 1 
Investment  0.698  0.255  (0.270) 0.259  0.408  0.462  
Consumption (0.061) 0.116  0.581  0.178  0.253  0.089  
GDP 0.406  (0.155) 0.446  0.026  0.335  0.280  
Government Net Lending 0.068  (0.173) - (0.143) 0.121  0.121  
Government Net Lending as a % of 
GDP 0.069  (0.175) - (0.142) 0.122  0.122  
Total Direct Taxes (0.510) 0.301  - (0.312) 0.405  0.405  
Taxes on income and profits as a % of 
GDP (0.516) 0.282  0.158  (0.112) 0.319  0.399  
Indirect Taxes 0.510  (0.228) - (0.515) 0.369  0.369  
Taxes on goods and services as a % of 
GDP 0.328  (0.505) (0.738) (0.325) 0.524  0.417  
Total tax revenue as a % of GDP (0.204) 0.417  (0.478) (0.419) 0.367  0.311  
Social Security Contributions  (0.020) 0.720  - (0.142) 0.370  0.370  
Social Benefits  (0.302) 0.512  - (0.437) 0.407  0.407  
Exports of goods and services (0.370) (0.033) (0.056) 0.138  0.153  0.201  
Imports of goods and services (0.256) 0.113  (0.026) 0.286  0.132  0.184  
Net exports of goods and services 0.125  0.133  (0.276) 0.494  0.178  0.129  
Trade in goods and services as a % of 
GDP 0.000  0.184  0.427  0.222  0.204  0.092  
Bilateral Exchange Rate  0.283  0.243  (0.547) 0.407  0.358  0.263  
Consumer Price Index 0.163  0.260  0.196  (0.397) 0.206  0.211  
Nominal Oil Price (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) 
Real Oil Price (0.288) (0.288) (0.288) (0.288) (0.288) (0.288) 
Net Migration - - - - - - 
Youth Population Share (0.048) 0.253  (0.169) (0.409) 0.157  0.151  
Male civilian labor force participation 
rate (0.189) (0.170) (0.228) 0.275  0.195  0.179  
Female civilian labor force 
participation rate (0.227) (0.168) (0.310) 0.146  0.235  0.198  
All civilian labor force participation 
rate (0.262) - - 0.264  0.262  0.262  
Employment rate  for age group 15-24 - - - - - - 
Men's Employment Rate - - - - - - 
Women's Employment Rate - - - - - - 




Table A.5.18 Correlation Coefficients between First Canonical Score and Pseudo score-with 
reference to Sweden at Level 4’s Second Analysis 



















Investment  (0.164) 0.707  0.100  (0.557) (0.175) 0.382  0.436  0.144  
Consumption (0.525) (0.449) (0.595) (0.637) (0.713) 0.552  0.487  0.654  
GDP (0.298) (0.147) (0.753) (0.143) (0.388) 0.335  0.223  0.570  
Government Net Lending 0.571  0.582  0.553  0.573  (0.337) 0.570  0.577  0.445  
Government Net Lending as a % 
of GDP 0.573  0.582  0.555  0.575  (0.333) 0.571  0.578  0.444  
Total Direct Taxes (0.276) (0.663) (0.748) (0.492) (0.005) 0.545  0.470  0.377  
Taxes on income and profits as a 
% of GDP 0.126  (0.394) (0.138) 0.191  (0.041) 0.212  0.260  0.090  
Indirect Taxes (0.551) (0.750) (0.202) (0.745) (0.217) 0.562  0.650  0.210  
Taxes on goods and services as a 
% of GDP 0.028  0.080  0.534  0.175  (0.133) 0.204  0.054  0.333  
Total tax revenue as a % of GDP (0.395) (0.681) (0.241) (0.514) (0.539) 0.458  0.538  0.390  
Social Security Contributions  (0.797) (0.790) (0.823) (0.803) (0.575) 0.803  0.794  0.699  
Social Benefits  (0.497) (0.307) (0.412) (0.702) 0.238  0.480  0.402  0.325  
Exports of goods and services (0.573) (0.422) (0.841) (0.314) 0.217  0.538  0.498  0.529  
Imports of goods and services (0.304) (0.204) (0.779) (0.317) (0.651) 0.401  0.254  0.715  
Net exports of goods and services (0.121) 0.009  (0.070) 0.016  0.002  0.054  0.065  0.036  
Trade in goods and services as a 
% of GDP 0.518  0.365  0.599  0.803  0.742  0.571  0.442  0.671  
Bilateral Exchange Rate  (0.316) (0.560) (0.467) 0.105  (0.297) 0.362  0.438  0.382  
Consumer Price Index (0.453) (0.426) (0.032) (0.576) 0.199  0.372  0.439  0.116  
Nominal Oil Price (0.470) (0.470) (0.470) (0.470) (0.470) (0.470) (0.470) 0.470  
Real Oil Price (0.585) (0.585) (0.585) (0.585) (0.585) (0.585) (0.585) 0.585  
Net Migration 0.051  (0.153) - (0.363) 0.274  0.189  0.102  0.274  
Youth Population Share (0.063) 0.333  (0.437) (0.145) 0.552  0.245  0.198  0.495  
Male civilian labor force 
participation rate (0.599) (0.290) (0.302) (0.336) (0.449) 0.382  0.444  0.375  
Female civilian labor force 
participation rate (0.646) 0.114  (0.807) (0.609) (0.784) 0.544  0.380  0.796  
All civilian labor force 
participation rate (0.681) (0.055) (0.793) (0.494) (0.672) 0.506  0.368  0.733  
Employment rate  for age group 
15-24 (0.026) (0.719) - (0.323) (0.798) 0.356  0.373  0.798  
Men's Employment Rate (0.052) (0.684) - (0.276) (0.729) 0.337  0.368  0.729  
Women's Employment Rate (0.367) (0.581) - (0.496) (0.756) 0.481  0.474  0.756  
Total Employment Rate (0.191) (0.703) - (0.438) (0.769) 0.444  0.447  0.769  
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Table A.5.19 Correlation Coefficients between Second Canonical Score and Pseudo score-with 
reference to Sweden at Level 4’s Second Analysis 
Variable ES IT IE PT 
Mean for 
ES, IT, IE 
and PT of 
clusters 1, 4, 
and 5. 
Mean for 
ES and IT 
of Cluster 1. 
Investment  0.499  (0.285) (0.549) 0.443  0.444  0.392  
Consumption 0.425  0.576  (0.490) 0.321  0.453  0.500  
GDP 0.541  0.407  (0.117) 0.448  0.378  0.474  
Government Net Lending (0.176) (0.182) (0.189) (0.215) 0.190  0.179  
Government Net Lending as a % of 
GDP (0.179) (0.186) (0.192) (0.218) 0.194  0.182  
Total Direct Taxes 0.495  0.222  (0.105) 0.306  0.282  0.358  
Taxes on income and profits as a % 
of GDP 0.506  0.433  0.470  0.243  0.413  0.469  
Indirect Taxes (0.153) (0.069) (0.636) 0.142  0.250  0.111  
Taxes on goods and services as a % 
of GDP 0.474  0.529  0.125  0.504  0.408  0.502  
Total tax revenue as a % of GDP 0.646  0.375  0.426  0.310  0.439  0.511  
Social Security Contributions  0.371  0.321  (0.087) 0.365  0.286  0.346  
Social Benefits  0.020  (0.157) (0.427) 0.223  0.207  0.089  
Exports of goods and services 0.260  0.385  (0.097) 0.671  0.353  0.323  
Imports of goods and services 0.407  0.252  (0.234) 0.344  0.309  0.329  
Net exports of goods and services (0.368) (0.452) (0.354) (0.361) 0.384  0.410  
Trade in goods and services as a % 
of GDP 0.173  (0.210) 0.209  0.306  0.224  0.191  
Bilateral Exchange Rate  (0.164) (0.451) (0.062) 0.262  0.235  0.308  
Consumer Price Index (0.079) (0.084) (0.397) 0.318  0.220  0.082  
Nominal Oil Price 0.446  0.446  0.446  0.446  0.446  0.446  
Real Oil Price 0.469  0.469  0.469  0.469  0.469  0.469  
Net Migration 0.215  0.455  0.023  0.096  0.197  0.335  
Youth Population Share 0.217  0.455  0.026  0.095  0.198  0.336  
Male civilian labor force 
participation rate (0.127) 0.395  (0.052) 0.219  0.198  0.261  
Female civilian labor force 
participation rate 0.217  0.455  0.026  0.095  0.198  0.336  
All civilian labor force 
participation rate 0.312  0.476  (0.007) 0.214  0.252  0.394  
Employment rate  for age group 
15-24 0.340  0.167  - 0.396  0.301  0.254  
Men's Employment Rate 0.167  0.055  - 0.350  0.191  0.111  
Women's Employment Rate 0.109  0.033  - 0.451  0.198  0.071  





Table A.5.20 Correlation Coefficients between Second Canonical Score and Pseudo score-with 
reference to Norway at Level 4’s Second Analysis 
Variable ES IT IE PT 
Mean for 
ES, IT, IE 
and PT of 
clusters 1, 
4, and 5. 
Mean for 
ES and IT 
of Cluster 
1. 
Investment  0.580 0.312 (0.061) 0.563 0.379 0.446 
Consumption 0.352 0.354 (0.375) 0.345 0.357 0.353 
GDP (0.489) (0.586) (0.609) (0.388) 0.518 0.538 
Government Net Lending 0.483 0.541 0.223 0.441 0.422 0.512 
Government Net Lending as a 
% of GDP 0.468 0.526 0.229 0.423 0.412 0.497 
Total Direct Taxes 0.801 0.715 0.560 0.766 0.710 0.758 
Taxes on income and profits as 
a % of GDP 0.632 0.649 0.734 0.598 0.653 0.640 
Indirect Taxes 0.597 0.635 (0.314) 0.614 0.540 0.616 
Taxes on goods and services as 
a % of GDP 0.316 0.338 (0.124) 0.442 0.305 0.327 
Total tax revenue as a % of 
GDP 0.651 0.574 0.563 0.644 0.608 0.612 
Social Security Contributions  0.429 0.318 (0.168) 0.410 0.331 0.373 
Social Benefits  0.391 0.114 (0.318) 0.333 0.289 0.252 
Exports of goods and services 0.533 0.600 0.229 0.694 0.514 0.567 
Imports of goods and services 0.420 0.241 (0.265) 0.362 0.322 0.331 
Net exports of goods and 
services (0.373) (0.251) 0.319 0.497 0.360 0.312 
Trade in goods and services as 
a % of GDP (0.276) (0.564) (0.195) (0.050) 0.271 0.420 
Bilateral Exchange Rate  (0.350) (0.507) (0.617) 0.022 0.374 0.428 
Consumer Price Index 0.249 0.214 (0.287) 0.406 0.289 0.231 
Nominal Oil Price 0.446 0.446 0.446 0.446 0.446 0.446 
Real Oil Price 0.469 0.469 0.469 0.469 0.469 0.469 
Net Migration 0.012 0.353  (0.218) 0.194 0.183 
Youth Population Share 0.171 0.399 (0.184) 0.041 0.199 0.285 
Male civilian labor force 
participation rate 0.320 0.508 0.258 0.388 0.368 0.414 
Female civilian labor force 
participation rate 0.324 0.385 0.047 0.138 0.224 0.354 
All civilian labor force 
participation rate 0.279 0.442 0.097 0.307 0.281 0.360 
Employment rate  for age 
group 15-24 0.138 0.061  0.161 0.120 0.100 
Men's Employment Rate 0.146 0.141  0.297 0.195 0.144 
Women's Employment Rate 0.049 (0.034)  0.406 0.163 0.042 
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86 Standardized unemployment rate is the rate measured as far as possible across countries according to International Labor Organization’s guidelines of 
measuring unemployment and labor force. 
87 For the year 2008, the unemployment rates for the first two quarters are plotted. 
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89 The data plotted in Figures B.2.2 to B.2.19 are obtained OECD Database. In the figures, structural unemployment rate is the 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Investment represents total investment of fifteen sectors90 of a country, which is measured in 
millions euro. The data on investment is available for each of the fifteen sectors of each of the 
seventeen European countries. 
 Household expenditure represents the household consumption of a country, which is 
measured in millions euro. 
 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the value to total output of goods and services of an 
economy. It is measured in millions euro. 
 Government net lending represents government deficits, which is government expenditure 
less of its revenues. Government expenditure includes components such as government 
investments, government consumption expenditure, social benefits paid by government, 
interest payments on public debt, subsidies and others. Government revenue, on the other hand, 
includes revenues received by the government in the form of different types of taxes, social 
security contributions, dividends and other property income and others.  
 Government net lending as a percentage of GDP represents the share of government net 
lending in GDP. 
 Total direct taxes include taxes on incomes of household, business and others. Direct taxes 
are levied on income from employment, property, capital gains and any other source of 
individuals and enterprises.  
 Taxes on incomes and profits as a percentage of GDP represents the amount of resources 
collected by government directly from the incomes of people and companies.   
 Indirect taxes include taxes on goods and services rather than on individuals and are paid by 
consumers in the form of higher prices. These taxes are levied on the production, extraction, 
sale, transfer, leasing or delivery of goods, and the rendering of services, or on the use of goods 
or permission to use goods or to perform activities. These taxes take the forms such as sales 
taxes and value-added taxes. 
 Taxes on goods and services as a percentage of GDP represents the amount of resources the 
government collects from people as they spend their income on goods and services.  
 Total Tax Revenue is the revenue received by government in the form of taxes on income and 
profits, the taxes on good and services, payments made by employers and employees under 
compulsory social security schemes, payroll taxes, and taxes related to the ownership and 
transfer of property, and other taxes. Total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP indicates the 
share of a country’s output that is collected by the government through taxes. It can thus be 
regarded as a measure of the degree to which the government controls the economy’s 
resources.  
 Social Benefits paid by government include current transfers received by households from 
the government intended to provide for the needs that arise from certain events or 
circumstances, for example, sickness, unemployment, retirement, housing, education or family 
circumstances. 
                                                 
90 (i) agriculture, forestry and fishing; (ii) mining and energy supply; (iii) food, beverages and tobacco 
manufacturing; (iv) textiles and clothing manufacturing; (v) fuels, chemicals, rubber and plastic products 
manufacturing; (vi) electronics manufacturing; (vii) transport equipment manufacturing; (viii) other manufacturing; 
(ix) construction;(x) wholesale and retail; (xi) hotels and restaurants; (xii) transport and communications; (xiii) 
financial services; (xiv) other market services, and (xv) non-market services. 
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 Social contributions include actual or imputed payments made by employees and employers 
to social insurance schemes for making provision for social insurance benefits to be paid. 
 Net Exports of goods and services is the exports of goods and services less of its imports. The 
exports, imports and net exports of goods and services are all valued in US dollar. 
 Trade in goods and services as a percentage of GDP represents the share of trade in goods 
and services in GDP (ratio of sum of exports and imports of goods and services to GDP), 
which measures the importance of international trade in an economy.  
 Bilateral exchange rate represents the national currency of a country per US dollar. It 
measures the changes in a country’s price competitiveness in the international market based on 
changes in that country’s exchange rate relative to those of its competitors.  
 Consumer price index measures changes over time in the general level of prices of goods and 
service that a reference population acquires, uses or pays for consumption. Relative consumer 
price index measures the changes in a country’s price competitiveness in the international 
market based on changes in that country’s price level relative to those of its competitors. 
Unlike nominal bilateral exchange rates, relative consumer price index takes into account of 
not only the changes in market exchange rates, but also variations in relative price levels and 
therefore can be used as an indicator of competitiveness. 
 Nominal and real oil price represent world crude oil price measured in US dollar per barrel.  
 Net Migration is defined as the total number of immigrant nationals and foreigners minus the 
total of emigrant foreigners and nationals.  
 Youth share in population is the percentage of youth of age-group 15-24 in total population. 
 Male (Female) civilian labor force participation rate is defined as the percentage of male 
(female) civilian labor force (employment and unemployed) in total working age population 
(15 to 64). It is a measure of the extent of an economy’s working-age male (female) population 
that is economically active. 
 All person civilian labor force participation rate is defined as the percentage of total civilian 
labor force (employment and unemployed) to the working age population (15 to 64). It is a 
measure of the extent of an economy’s working-age population that is economically active. 
 Employment rate of age-group 15 to 24 is the percentage of persons of age-group 15-24 who 
are in employment.  
 Employment rate of female is the percentage of female of working age (15 to 64) who are in 
employment. 
 Employment rate of male is the percentage of male of working age (15 to 64) who are in 
employment. 
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